947 resultados para Labor contracts
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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As an employer, you are always seeking good employees to add to your business. Many youth are eager to work in Iowa, especially during the summer months.To a teenager, a job means money for school and other expenses, work experience and help in deciding on a career.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Frequently asked questions and answers regarding the Division of Labor Contractor Registration Law in Iowa.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Monthly Labor Force Data report produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
