Random diffusion and leverage effect in financial markets

We prove that Brownian market models with random diffusion coefficients provide an exact measure of the leverage effect [J-P. Bouchaud et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 228701 (2001)]. This empirical fact asserts that past returns are anticorrelated with future diffusion coefficient. Several models with random diffusion have been suggested but without a quantitative study of the leverage effect. Our analysis lets us to fully estimate all parameters involved and allows a deeper study of correlated random diffusion models that may have practical implications for many aspects of financial markets.

Screening of illegal intracorporeal containers ("body packing"): is abdominal radiography sufficiently accurate? A comparative study with low-dose CT.

PURPOSE: To evaluate the diagnostic performance of abdominal radiography in the detection of illegal intracorporeal containers (hereafter, packets), with low-dose computed tomography (CT) as the reference standard. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This study was approved by the institutional ethical review board, with written informed consent. From July 2007 to July 2010, 330 people (296 men, 34 women; mean age, 32 years [range, 18-55 years]) suspected of having ingested drug packets underwent supine abdominal radiography and low-dose CT. The presence or absence of packets at abdominal radiography was reported, with low-dose CT as the reference standard. The density and number of packets (≤ 12 or >12) at low-dose CT were recorded and analyzed to determine whether those variables influence interpretation of results at abdominal radiography. RESULTS: Packets were detected at low-dose CT in 53 (16%) suspects. Sensitivity of abdominal radiography for depiction of packets was 0.77 (41 of 53), and specificity was 0.96 (267 of 277). The packets appeared isoattenuated to the bowel contents at low-dose CT in 16 (30%) of the 53 suspects with positive results. Nineteen (36%) of the 53 suspects with positive low-dose CT results had fewer than 12 packets. Packets that were isoattenuated at low-dose CT and a low number of packets (≤12) were both significantly associated with false-negative results at abdominal radiography (P = .004 and P = .016, respectively). CONCLUSION: Abdominal radiography is mainly limited by low sensitivity when compared with low-dose CT in the screening of people suspected of carrying drug packets. Low-dose CT is an effective imaging alternative to abdominal radiography.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

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