1000 resultados para Guerre de Corée


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Référence bibliographique : Rol, 57123

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Report produced by Iowa Department of Economic Development

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In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71