Ownership structure and innovation: Is there a real link?

This work focuses on the study of the relationship between ownership and control structure of the company and its innovative activity. Its aim consists of analysing the role that may be played by determinants within the company related to ownership structure when the decision to incur research and development activities is taken as well as on the output of this innovate process. Among these determinants we may think of issues such as who owns the firm and how the control of decision-making is distributed, the nature of this control and the level of concentration of ownership, among others. The study is carried out for the year 2001 using a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing industries.

Independent auditor’s report of the State of Iowa on internal control over financial reporting and on compliance and other matters based on an audit of financial statements performed in accordance with government auditing standards for the year ended June 30, 2011

Independent auditor’s report of the State of Iowa on internal control over financial reporting and on compliance and other matters based on an audit of financial statements performed in accordance with government auditing standards for the year ended June 30, 2011

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

The Limits of Issue Ownership Dynamics : The Constraining Effect of Party Preference

Issue ownership theory argues that when a voter considers a party to be the most competent amongst others to deal with an issue (that is, the party "owns" the issue), chances are the voter will vote for that party. Recent work has shown that perceptions of issue ownership are dynamic: they are affected by the media coverage of party messages. However, based on the broad literature on partisan bias, we predict that parties' efforts to change issue ownership perceptions will have a difficult time breaching the perceptual screen created by a voter's party preference. Using two separate experiments with a similar design we show that the effect of partisan issue messages on issue competence is moderated by party preference. The effect of issue messages is reinforced when people already like a party, and blocked when people dislike a party.

Planning for disaster : local government's role in civil preparedness,1975

This handbook deals with the duties and responsibilities of a mayor of a city, a member of a county board of supervisor or a sheriff of a county from the standpoint of their relationship with a county/municipal civil defense and emergency planing administration.

Water planning law and government.

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.

Water Planning Law and Government, November 2008

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.