Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

El juego en la vejez, relatos de viejos marplatenses

En este texto se intenta problematizar la temática del juego en la vejez. Para ello la autora recurre a la descripción de una experiencia realizada en la ciudad de Mar del Plata en el contexto de la Formación Docente y que tiene como actores a personas adultas mayores y a estudiantes del cuarto año de estudios del Profesorado en Educación Física provincial. Se tiene en cuenta como marco teórico el material bibliográfico aportado por el Seminario Teoría de los Juegos cursado por la autora en su trayecto para lograr el postítulo de Magíster en Educación Corporal y se entrecruzan con otros estudios pertinentes a la temática gerontológica. Asimismo, los datos obtenidos por medio de la realización de entrevistas en un trabajo de campo allí descripto son los insumos necesarios para analizar, por un lado, tanto las conceptualizaciones que se tiene sobre la vejez y el envejecimiento como las ideas y preconceptos acerca del juego en los adultos mayores. Por otro lado, los juegos de hoy y ayer y la multiplicidad de sentidos que estos adquieren en la vejez, a partir de las voces de los propios protagonistas de la experiencia

El juego en la vejez, relatos de viejos marplatenses

En este texto se intenta problematizar la temática del juego en la vejez. Para ello la autora recurre a la descripción de una experiencia realizada en la ciudad de Mar del Plata en el contexto de la Formación Docente y que tiene como actores a personas adultas mayores y a estudiantes del cuarto año de estudios del Profesorado en Educación Física provincial. Se tiene en cuenta como marco teórico el material bibliográfico aportado por el Seminario Teoría de los Juegos cursado por la autora en su trayecto para lograr el postítulo de Magíster en Educación Corporal y se entrecruzan con otros estudios pertinentes a la temática gerontológica. Asimismo, los datos obtenidos por medio de la realización de entrevistas en un trabajo de campo allí descripto son los insumos necesarios para analizar, por un lado, tanto las conceptualizaciones que se tiene sobre la vejez y el envejecimiento como las ideas y preconceptos acerca del juego en los adultos mayores. Por otro lado, los juegos de hoy y ayer y la multiplicidad de sentidos que estos adquieren en la vejez, a partir de las voces de los propios protagonistas de la experiencia

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

El juego en la vejez, relatos de viejos marplatenses

En este texto se intenta problematizar la temática del juego en la vejez. Para ello la autora recurre a la descripción de una experiencia realizada en la ciudad de Mar del Plata en el contexto de la Formación Docente y que tiene como actores a personas adultas mayores y a estudiantes del cuarto año de estudios del Profesorado en Educación Física provincial. Se tiene en cuenta como marco teórico el material bibliográfico aportado por el Seminario Teoría de los Juegos cursado por la autora en su trayecto para lograr el postítulo de Magíster en Educación Corporal y se entrecruzan con otros estudios pertinentes a la temática gerontológica. Asimismo, los datos obtenidos por medio de la realización de entrevistas en un trabajo de campo allí descripto son los insumos necesarios para analizar, por un lado, tanto las conceptualizaciones que se tiene sobre la vejez y el envejecimiento como las ideas y preconceptos acerca del juego en los adultos mayores. Por otro lado, los juegos de hoy y ayer y la multiplicidad de sentidos que estos adquieren en la vejez, a partir de las voces de los propios protagonistas de la experiencia

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods

We investigate optimal strategies to defend valuable goods against the attacks of a thief. Given the value of the goods and the probability of success for the thief, we look for the strategy that assures the largest benefit to each player irrespective of the strategy of his opponent. Two complementary approaches are used: agent-based modeling and game theory. It is shown that the compromise between the value of the goods and the probability of success defines the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game, that is compared with the results of the agent-based simulations and discussed in terms of the system parameters.

Cognitive strategies for reducing energy consumption in wireless sensor networks

El consumo energético de las Redes de Sensores Inalámbricas (WSNs por sus siglas en inglés) es un problema histórico que ha sido abordado desde diferentes niveles y visiones, ya que no solo afecta a la propia supervivencia de la red sino que el creciente uso de dispositivos inteligentes y el nuevo paradigma del Internet de las Cosas hace que las WSNs tengan cada vez una mayor influencia en la huella energética. Debido a la tendencia al alza en el uso de estas redes se añade un nuevo problema, la saturación espectral. Las WSNs operan habitualmente en bandas sin licencia como son las bandas Industrial, Científica y Médica (ISM por sus siglas en inglés). Estas bandas se comparten con otro tipo de redes como Wi-Fi o Bluetooth cuyo uso ha crecido exponencialmente en los últimos años. Para abordar este problema aparece el paradigma de la Radio Cognitiva (CR), una tecnología que permite el acceso oportunista al espectro. La introducción de capacidades cognitivas en las WSNs no solo permite optimizar su eficiencia espectral sino que también tiene un impacto positivo en parámetros como la calidad de servicio, la seguridad o el consumo energético. Sin embargo, por otra parte, este nuevo paradigma plantea algunos retos relacionados con el consumo energético. Concretamente, el sensado del espectro, la colaboración entre los nodos (que requiere comunicación adicional) y el cambio en los parámetros de transmisión aumentan el consumo respecto a las WSN clásicas. Teniendo en cuenta que la investigación en el campo del consumo energético ha sido ampliamente abordada puesto que se trata de una de sus principales limitaciones, asumimos que las nuevas estrategias deben surgir de las nuevas capacidades añadidas por las redes cognitivas. Por otro lado, a la hora de diseñar estrategias de optimización para CWSN hay que tener muy presentes las limitaciones de recursos de estas redes en cuanto a memoria, computación y consumo energético de los nodos. En esta tesis doctoral proponemos dos estrategias de reducción de consumo energético en CWSNs basadas en tres pilares fundamentales. El primero son las capacidades cognitivas añadidas a las WSNs que proporcionan la posibilidad de adaptar los parámetros de transmisión en función del espectro disponible. La segunda es la colaboración, como característica intrínseca de las CWSNs. Finalmente, el tercer pilar de este trabajo es teoría de juegos como algoritmo de soporte a la decisión, ampliamente utilizado en WSNs debido a su simplicidad. Como primer aporte de la tesis se presenta un análisis completo de las posibilidades introducidas por la radio cognitiva en materia de reducción de consumo para WSNs. Gracias a las conclusiones extraídas de este análisis, se han planteado las hipótesis de esta tesis relacionadas con la validez de usar capacidades cognitivas como herramienta para la reducción de consumo en CWSNs. Una vez presentada las hipótesis, pasamos a desarrollar las principales contribuciones de la tesis: las dos estrategias diseñadas para reducción de consumo basadas en teoría de juegos y CR. La primera de ellas hace uso de un juego no cooperativo que se juega mediante pares de jugadores. En la segunda estrategia, aunque el juego continúa siendo no cooperativo, se añade el concepto de colaboración. Para cada una de las estrategias se presenta el modelo del juego, el análisis formal de equilibrios y óptimos y la descripción de la estrategia completa donde se incluye la interacción entre nodos. Con el propósito de probar las estrategias mediante simulación e implementación en dispositivos reales hemos desarrollado un marco de pruebas compuesto por un simulador cognitivo y un banco de pruebas formado por nodos cognitivos capaces de comunicarse en tres bandas ISM desarrollados en el B105 Lab. Este marco de pruebas constituye otra de las aportaciones de la tesis que permitirá el avance en la investigación en el área de las CWSNs. Finalmente, se presentan y discuten los resultados derivados de la prueba de las estrategias desarrolladas. La primera estrategia proporciona ahorros de energía mayores al 65% comparados con una WSN sin capacidades cognitivas y alrededor del 25% si la comparamos con una estrategia cognitiva basada en el sensado periódico del espectro para el cambio de canal de acuerdo a un nivel de ruido fijado. Este algoritmo se comporta de forma similar independientemente del nivel de ruido siempre que éste sea espacialmente uniformemente. Esta estrategia, a pesar de su sencillez, nos asegura el comportamiento óptimo en cuanto a consumo energético debido a la utilización de teoría de juegos en la fase de diseño del comportamiento de los nodos. La estrategia colaborativa presenta mejoras respecto a la anterior en términos de protección frente al ruido en escenarios de ruido más complejos donde aporta una mejora del 50% comparada con la estrategia anterior. ABSTRACT Energy consumption in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is a known historical problem that has been addressed from different areas and on many levels. But this problem should not only be approached from the point of view of their own efficiency for survival. A major portion of communication traffic has migrated to mobile networks and systems. The increased use of smart devices and the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) give WSNs a great influence on the carbon footprint. Thus, optimizing the energy consumption of wireless networks could reduce their environmental impact considerably. In recent years, another problem has been added to the equation: spectrum saturation. Wireless Sensor Networks usually operate in unlicensed spectrum bands such as Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands shared with other networks (mainly Wi-Fi and Bluetooth). To address the efficient spectrum utilization problem, Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged as the key technology that enables opportunistic access to the spectrum. Therefore, the introduction of cognitive capabilities to WSNs allows optimizing their spectral occupation. Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSNs) do not only increase the reliability of communications, but they also have a positive impact on parameters such as the Quality of Service (QoS), network security, or energy consumption. These new opportunities introduced by CWSNs unveil a wide field in the energy consumption research area. However, this also implies some challenges. Specifically, the spectrum sensing stage, collaboration among devices (which requires extra communication), and changes in the transmission parameters increase the total energy consumption of the network. When designing CWSN optimization strategies, the fact that WSN nodes are very limited in terms of memory, computational power, or energy consumption has to be considered. Thus, light strategies that require a low computing capacity must be found. Since the field of energy conservation in WSNs has been widely explored, we assume that new strategies could emerge from the new opportunities presented by cognitive networks. In this PhD Thesis, we present two strategies for energy consumption reduction in CWSNs supported by three main pillars. The first pillar is that cognitive capabilities added to the WSN provide the ability to change the transmission parameters according to the spectrum. The second pillar is that the ability to collaborate is a basic characteristic of CWSNs. Finally, the third pillar for this work is the game theory as a decision-making algorithm, which has been widely used in WSNs due to its lightness and simplicity that make it valid to operate in CWSNs. For the development of these strategies, a complete analysis of the possibilities is first carried out by incorporating the cognitive abilities into the network. Once this analysis has been performed, we expose the hypotheses of this thesis related to the use of cognitive capabilities as a useful tool to reduce energy consumption in CWSNs. Once the analyses are exposed, we present the main contribution of this thesis: the two designed strategies for energy consumption reduction based on game theory and cognitive capabilities. The first one is based on a non-cooperative game played between two players in a simple and selfish way. In the second strategy, the concept of collaboration is introduced. Despite the fact that the game used is also a non-cooperative game, the decisions are taken through collaboration. For each strategy, we present the modeled game, the formal analysis of equilibrium and optimum, and the complete strategy describing the interaction between nodes. In order to test the strategies through simulation and implementation in real devices, we have developed a CWSN framework composed by a CWSN simulator based on Castalia and a testbed based on CWSN nodes able to communicate in three different ISM bands. We present and discuss the results derived by the energy optimization strategies. The first strategy brings energy improvement rates of over 65% compared to WSN without cognitive techniques. It also brings energy improvement rates of over 25% compared with sensing strategies for changing channels based on a decision threshold. We have also seen that the algorithm behaves similarly even with significant variations in the level of noise while working in a uniform noise scenario. The collaborative strategy presents improvements respecting the previous strategy in terms of noise protection when the noise scheme is more complex where this strategy shows improvement rates of over 50%.

Nonatomic games on Loeb spaces

In the setting of noncooperative game theory, strategic negligibility of individual agents, or diffuseness of information, has been modeled as a nonatomic measure space, typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure. However, recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets, for example the unit interval, there do not exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in such nonatomic games. In this brief announcement, we show that there is a perfectly satisfactory existence theory for nonatomic games provided this nonatomicity is formulated on the basis of a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces. We also emphasize other desirable properties of games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces, and present a synthetic treatment, embracing both large games as well as those with incomplete information.

Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and sorting

The Tiebout Hypothesis asserts that, when it is efficient to have multiple jurisdictions providing local public goods, then competition between jurisdictions for residents will lead to a near-optimal outcome. Research from cooperative game theory both provides a foundation for the hypothesis and extends the hypothesis to diverse situations where small groups of participants are effective.

A Review on Repeated Games and Reputations with Incomplete Information

In this project we review the effects of reputation within the context of game theory. This is done through a study of two key papers. First, we examine a paper from Fudenberg and Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989). We add to this a review Gossner’s Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation (2011). We look specifically at scenarios in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run opponents, and how the former may develop a reputation. In turn, we show how reputation leads directly to both lower and upper bounds on the long-run player’s payoffs.

Legal shifts : shaping expectations of intellectual property protection in an open innovation industrial environment

Projet de recherche réalisé en 2014-2015 avec l'appui du Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture.

Legal shifts : shaping expectations of intellectual property protection in an open innovation industrial environment

Projet de recherche réalisé en 2014-2015 avec l'appui du Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture.

A stochastic model for prisoner's dilemma.

Includes bibliography.