A situation analysis of the food control systems in Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries

Increased concerns over food safety have led to the adoption of international guidance on the key elements for national food control systems. This guidance had been used to conduct an initial assessment of the status of the food control systems in the countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council. Our research has identified how the countries have been attempting to enhance their food control systems. Although the countries have different approaches to food control management, cooperation is leading to increased harmonization of legislation and food control practices. Progress is being made but there is evidence of some weakness where additional efforts may be needed. (c) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Analyses of cataract surgery performed by the Unified Health System in Brazil, 2006-2007

Objective. Estimate cataract surgical rates (CSR) for Brazil and each federal unit in 2006 and 2007 based on the number of surgeries performed by the Unified Health System to help plan a comprehensive ophthalmology network in order to eliminate cataract blindness in compliance with the target set by the World Health Organization (WHO) of 3 000 cataract surgeries per million inhabitants per year. Methods. This descriptive study calculates CSR by using the number of cataract surgeries carried out by the Brazilian Unified Health System for each federal unit and estimates the need for cataract surgery in Brazil for 2006-2007, with official population data provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. The number of cataract surgeries was compared with the WHO target. Results. To reach the WHO goal for eliminating age-related cataract blindness in Brazil, 560 312 cataract surgeries in 2006 and 568 006 surgeries in 2007 needed to be done. In 2006, 179 121 cataract surgeries were done by the Unified Health System, corresponding to a CSR of 959 per million population; in 2007, 223 317 were performed, with a CSR of 1 179. With the Brazilian Council of Ophthalmology estimation of 165 000 surgeries each year by the non-public services, the CSR for Brazil would be 1 842 for 2006 and 2 051 for 2007. The proportions needed to achieve the proposed target were 38.6% in 2006 and 31.6% in 2007. Conclusions. Human resources, technical expertise, and equipment are crucial to reach the WHO goal. Brazil has enough ophthalmologists but needs improved planning and infrastructure in order to eliminate the problem, aspects that require greater financial investment and stronger political commitment.