924 resultados para Endogenous borrowing constraints
Resumo:
A Investigação Operacional vem demonstrando ser uma valiosa ferramenta de gestão nos dias de hoje em que se vive num mercado cada vez mais competitivo. Através da Programação Linear pode-se reproduzir matematicamente um problema de maximização dos resultados ou minimização dos custos de produção com o propósito de auxiliar os gestores na tomada de decisão. A Programação Linear é um método matemático em que a função objectivo e as restrições assumem características lineares, com diversas aplicações no controlo de gestão, envolvendo normalmente problemas de utilização dos recursos disponíveis sujeitos a limitações impostas pelo processo produtivo ou pelo mercado. O objectivo geral deste trabalho é o de propor um modelo de Programação Linear para a programação ou produção e alocação de recursos necessários. Optimizar uma quantidade física designada função objectivo, tendo em conta um conjunto de condicionalismos endógenas às actividades em gestão. O objectivo crucial é dispor um modelo de apoio à gestão contribuindo assim para afectação eficiente de recursos escassos à disposição da unidade económica. Com o trabalho desenvolvido ficou patente a importância da abordagem quantitativa como recurso imprescindível de apoio ao processo de decisão. The operational research has proven to be a valuable management tool today we live in an increasingly competitive market. Through Linear Programming can be mathematically reproduce a problem of maximizing performance or minimizing production costs in order to assist managers in decision making. The Linear Programming is a mathematical method in which the objective function and constraints are linear features, with several applications in the control of management, usually involving problems of resource use are available subject to limitations imposed by the production process or the market. The overall objective of this work is to propose a Linear Programming model for scheduling or production and allocation of necessary resources. Optimizing a physical quantity called the objective function, given a set of endogenous constraints on management thus contributing to efficient allocation of scarce resources available to the economic unit. With the work has demonstrated the importance of the quantitative approach as essential resource to support the decision process.
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To clarify the role of Angiotensin II (Ang II) in the sensory system and especially in the trigeminal ganglia, we studied the expression of angiotensinogen (Ang-N)-, renin-, angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE)- and cathepsin D-mRNA, and the presence of Ang II and substance P in the rat and human trigeminal ganglia. The rat trigeminal ganglia expressed substantial amounts of Ang-N- and ACE mRNA as determined by quantitative real time PCR. Renin mRNA was untraceable in rat samples. Cathepsin D was detected in the rat trigeminal ganglia indicating the possibility of existence of pathways alternative to renin for Ang I formation. In situ hybridization in rat trigeminal ganglia revealed expression of Ang-N mRNA in the cytoplasm of numerous neurons. By using immunocytochemistry, a number of neurons and their processes in both the rat and human trigeminal ganglia were stained for Ang II. Post in situ hybridization immunocytochemistry reveals that in the rat trigeminal ganglia some, but not all Ang-N mRNA-positive neurons marked for Ang II. In some neurons Substance P was found colocalized with Ang II. Angiotensins from rat trigeminal ganglia were quantitated by radioimmunoassay with and without prior separation by high performance liquid chromatography. Immunoreactive angiotensin II (ir-Ang II) was consistently present and the sum of true Ang II (1-8) octapeptide and its specifically measured metabolites were found to account for it. Radioimmunological and immunocytochemical evidence of ir-Ang II in neuronal tissue is compatible with Ang II as a neurotransmitter. In conclusion, these results suggest that Ang II could be produced locally in the neurons of rat trigeminal ganglia. The localization and colocalization of neuronal Ang II with Substance P in the trigeminal ganglia neurons may be the basis for a participation and function of Ang II in the regulation of nociception and migraine pathology.
Resumo:
We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.
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I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.
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Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volumein stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returnsand the correlations between trading volume, price changes and pricelevels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utilitymaximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in factconsistent with a standard infite horizon perfect information expectedutility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar tothose found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharpcontrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differencesthat are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futuresmarkets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize theintegral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budgetand leverage con-straints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou(1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for theequilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where theconstraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdingsvolatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasingfunctions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of theprice-volume relation.
Resumo:
Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.
Resumo:
In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.
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We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.
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For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.