"Minimálbér-paradoxon" versenyzői munkaerőpiacon? ("Minimum-wage paradox" in a competitive labour market? Lessons from an experimental line of thought)

A versenyzői munkaerőpiac hagyományos kereslet-kínálati modellje az egyensúlyi bérszintet meghaladó minimálbér következményeként az egyensúlyi bérszint mellettinél alacsonyabb foglalkoztatást jósol; minél magasabb a minimálbér, annál alacsonyabbat. Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint ugyanakkor a minimálbér-emelés nem feltétlenül csökkenti a foglalkoztatást - ezt nevezik minimálbér-paradoxonnak -, ami legkézenfekvőbben a munkáltatók munkaerő-piaci monopszonerejével látszik magyarázhatónak. Ezzel szemben az a gondolatkísérlet, amelyről ez a cikk beszámol, általánosabb érvényű, versenyzői munkaerőpiacot feltételező magyarázat kidolgozására irányul. / === / In the conventional textbook demand/supply model of competitive labour markets, the introduction of a minimum wage above market-clearing level must reduce employment. Empirical findings suggest, however, that this may not always be the case, a finding most readily explained by monopsonistic competition in the labour market. The experimental line of thought reported here explores an alternative root, interpreting the "minimum-wage paradox" as the outcome of a competitive labour market that displays friction.

Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors

The paper examines the main characteristics of the (re)emerging foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), concentrating on the allocation of their aid resources. We adopt an econometric approach, similar to the ones used in the literature for analyzing the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors. Using this approach, we examine the various factors that influence aid allocation of the Visegrád countries, using data for the years between 2001 and 2008. Our most important conclusion is that the amount of aid a partner county gets from the four emerging donors is not influenced by the level of poverty or the previous performance (measured by the level of economic growth or the quality of institutions) of the recipients. The main determining factor seems to be geographic proximity, as countries in the Western-Balkans and the Post-Soviet region receive much more aid from the Visegrád countries than other recipients. Historical ties (pre-1989 development relations) and international obligations in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq are also found to be significant explanatory factors. This allocation is in line with the foreign political and economic interests of these new donors. While there are clear similarities between the four donors, the paper also identifies some individual country characteristics.

Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries: A Path Dependant Approach

The paper argues that the current emerging international development policies of the Visegrád (V4) countries are heavily influenced by the certain aspects of the communist past and the transition process. Due to these influences, the V4 countries have difficulties in adapting the foreign aid practices of Western donors and this leads to the emergence of a unique Central and Eastern European development cooperation model. As an analytical background, the paper builds on the path dependency theory of transition. A certain degree of path dependence is clearly visible in V4 foreign aid policies, and the paper analyzes some aspects of this phenomenon: how these new emerging foreign aid donors select their partner countries, how much they spend on aid, how they formulate their aid delivery policies and institutions and what role the non state actors play. The main conclusions of the paper are that the legacies of the communist past have a clear influence and the V4 countries still have a long way to go in adapting their aid policies to international requirements.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

A gyenge hazai innovációs teljesítmény intézményi magyarázatához. Vitaírás a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben való részvétel akadályairól (Towards an institutional explanation of the country's weak innovation performance)

Miért van a magyar gazdaság hasonlóan kritikus helyzetben, mint a rendszerváltást megelőző időkben? Miért nem sikerül az eladósodást megállítani, a gazdaságot konszolidálni, és fenntartható növekedési pályára állítani? Ennek közvetlen okát a szerzők a fejlődés féloldalasságában és a duális gazdasági szerkezetben látják. A piacgazdasági intézmények bevezetése ugyanis nem járt együtt az egész gazdaságot (vagy legalábbis annak nagy részét) átfogó, a tudásvezérelt információgazdaság felé mutató, gyors fejlődéssel. Számos indikátor azt jelzi, hogy az ország lemaradt a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben. Az innovációk elégtelensége azonban nem véletlen, nem exogén adottság, hanem a formális piaci intézmények mögött meghúzódó valós intézményi berendezkedéssel, a gazdaságban ténylegesen észlelhető magatartásmintákkal magyarázható. A piacgazdasági intézmények és jogi keretek, amelyek elvileg lehetőséget adnak az erőforrásokhoz való szabad és nyílt hozzáférésre, csak részben töltődtek meg tartalommal. Az országban még mindig meglehetősen korlátozott a sikeres belépés lehetősége a piaci és a politikai arénába, azaz a magyar társadalom - a north-i terminológiával élve - "korlátozott hozzáférésre alapozott társadalomként" írható le. Az a tény, hogy a piaci szereplők esélyei az államhoz és intézményeihez fűződő kapcsolatoktól függően nagyban különböznek egymástól, és a gazdasági szereplők rendszerszerűen használják e kapcsolatokat járadékszerzésre, lefojtja az innovációt, és újra és újra megakasztja a fejlődést. / === / Why is Hungary's economy still in a critical state similar to the one before the change of system? Why is the indebtedness not being halted, the economy consolidated or vital structural reforms performed? The authors see the direct cause in lopsided development and a dual economic structure. The introduction of market economic institutions was not followed by rapid, overall development towards a knowledge-led, information economy. Several indicators show how Hungary has fallen behind in competition for international innovation. The inadequacy is not a fortuitous, exogenous attribute, but explicable in terms of a real institutional setup underlying the formal market institutions, and of actual behaviour patterns found in the economy. Only in part has substance been gained by the institutions and legal frames of a market economy that theoretically would provide free and open access to resources. The scope for successful entry into the market or political arena remains very narrow, so that in Douglass North's terms, Hungary's is still "a society based on restricted access." Innovation is stifled and development repeatedly impeded by the fact that market players' chances differ widely depending on their connections with the state and its institutions and such connections are used regularly in rent-seeking.

State Fragility and International Development Cooperation

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face.

Inventory investment and sectoral characteristics in some OECD countries

This paper discusses the effects of sectoral structure on the long run macroeconomic inventory behaviour of national economies. Data on 15 OECD countries are included in the analysis, which is based on correlation and cluster analysis methodologies. The study is part of a long-term research project exploring factors influencing the inventory behaviour of national economies. First, we introduce some basic characteristics of macroeconomic inventory formation in the 15 OECD countries. We argue that our previous results on the existence of specific characteristic features of macroeconomic inventory investment are justified, hence it makes sense to study the factors influencing these features. We then examine the contribution of various sectors to the production of in the countries involved and the relationship between sectoral structure and inventory intensity (annual inventory change/Gross Value Added). We find that the high share of agriculture and manufacturing increases inventory intensity, that the increasing share of services has a negative effect and that the role of construction and trade is not obvious. The relatively low stability of the statistical results warns us to be cautious with our judgements. Further, case-by-case analysis would be required to obtain more solid results.

Inventory investment and GDP characteristics in OECD countries

There are very few research studies on macroeconomic inventory behaviour of various countries. It is clear that macro inventories are the results of a large number of individual microdecisions. However, we believe that it is worth analysing how inventories develop in the individual countries and why we can see different tendencies. This paper is the newest piece in a series of studies on the above subject. We use the OECD database to analyse inventory trends between 1987 and 2004 in nine of the most developed economies of the world. Annual inventory investment data are used and their connections with other components of GDP expenditure (governmental and private consumption, investment in fixed assets and foreign trade balance as well as the annual growth rate of GDP) are examined by multi-variable statistical analysis. Conclusions include the steadily decreasing tendency of inventory fluctuations, the varying periods of higher and lower rates of inventory investments and the differences of main influencing factors by country.

Macroeconomic characteristics and inventory investment: a multi-country study

The paper is a new element in a series of studies analyzing macroeconomic inventory behavior by use of multi-country data. In this paper, seven hypotheses are tested with positive result. These hypotheses include subjects like relations of inventories with growth and with some other macroeconomic indicators of the use of GDP and the long-term tendencies of global inventory formations. Multivariate statistical analysis is used for evaluation.