Competitive location and pricing on networks

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presentedto solve the model together with computational experience.

The Tea4-PP1 landmark promotes local growth by dual Cdc42 GEF recruitment and GAP exclusion.

Cell polarization relies on small GTPases, such as Cdc42, which can break symmetry through self-organizing principles, and landmarks that define the axis of polarity. In fission yeast, microtubules deliver the Tea1-Tea4 complex to mark cell poles for growth, but how this complex activates Cdc42 is unknown. Here, we show that ectopic targeting of Tea4 to cell sides promotes the local activation of Cdc42 and cell growth. This activity requires that Tea4 binds the type I phosphatase (PP1) catalytic subunit Dis2 or Sds21, and ectopic targeting of either catalytic subunit is similarly instructive for growth. The Cdc42 guanine-nucleotide-exchange factor Gef1 and the GTPase-activating protein Rga4 are required for Tea4-PP1-dependent ectopic growth. Gef1 is recruited to ectopic Tea4 and Dis2 locations to promote Cdc42 activation. By contrast, Rga4 is locally excluded by Tea4, and its forced colocalization with Tea4 blocks ectopic growth, indicating that Rga4 must be present, but at sites distinct from Tea4. Thus, a Tea4-PP1 landmark promotes local Cdc42 activation and growth both through Cdc42 GEF recruitment and by creating a local trough in a Cdc42 GAP.

Exclusion of lumbar arteries by aortic endovascular grafts: can angiography demonstrate sealing characteristics?

BACKGROUND: This study evaluates sealing characteristics of two designs of endovascular grafts by angiographic demonstration of exclusion of porcine lumbar arteries. METHODS: 6 endovascular grafts (3 self-expandable with integrated polyurethane wall versus 3 nitinol structures covered with polyester fabric) were implanted in 6 porcine aortae. Perfusion of lumbar arteries was assessed by angiography after implantation and by angiography and dissection at graft explantation after 4 +/- 2 months. Tissue healing was evaluated by light and scanning electron microscopy. RESULTS: Immediate exclusion of the lumbar arteries was achieved in 14/31 vessels (12 by polyurethane grafts and 2 by polyester grafts, p < 0.001). Follow-up angiography and dissection at explantation revealed perfusion of 30/31 lumbar arteries with a collateral network in most cases. Another reason for reperfusion of initially excluded branches was distention of the polyurethane grafts with resulting shortening allowing reperfusion of 8 of the 31 originally covered branches. Histological examination revealed a complete neointimal lining and a tight contact between endovascular grafts and aorta. CONCLUSIONS: The immediate angiographic demonstration of exclusion of lumbar arteries predicts sealing characteristics of endovascular grafts. Later angiographic reappearance is due to development of a collateral network and possible shortening of self-expandable devices.

Testosterone: a specific competitive antagonist of aldosterone in the toad bladder.

Testosterone (100 nM to 40 microM) antagonized the effect of aldosterone (10 nM) on Na+ transport in the toad bladder measured in vitro as short-circuit current (SCC). Half-maximal inhibition occurred at an antagonist-agonist molar ratio of 150:1. The antagonist action of testosterone was reversed by addition of more aldosterone. The antagonism was specific in the sense that testosterone (20 microM) did not inhibit the response of the SCC to oxytocin (50 mU/ml). By itself, testosterone (up to 20 microM) had no agonist activity on base-line SCC. Finally, testosterone (500 nM to 20 microM) specifically displaced [3H]aldosterone (5 nm) from its cytoplasmic and nuclear binding sites in bladders incubated in vitro at 25 or 0 degrees C and labeled at steady state. There was a significant linear correlation between the effect of testosterone on the aldosterone-dependent SCC and its effect on [3H]aldosterone binding sites in the cytoplasm and in the nucleus. We conclude that 1) testosterone is a specific competitive antagonist of aldosterone, and 2) [3H]aldosterone nuclear and cytoplasmic binding sites could be mineralocorticoid receptors, mediating the action of aldosterone on Na+ transport.

Location of hubs in a competitive environment

We offer a formulation that locates hubs on a network in a competitiveenvironment; that is, customer capture is sought, which happenswhenever the location of a new hub results in a reduction of thecurrent cost (time, distance) needed by the traffic that goes from thespecified origin to the specified destination.The formulation presented here reduces the number of variables andconstraints as compared to existing covering models. This model issuited for both air passenger and cargo transportation.In this model, each origin-destination flow can go through either oneor two hubs, and each demand point can be assigned to more than a hub,depending on the different destinations of its traffic. Links(``spokes'' have no capacity limit. Computational experience is provided.

Firm-specific investment, sticky prices and the Taylor principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique.We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.

Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Supply chain management as a competitive advantage in the Spanish grocery sector

Adversarial relationships have long dominated business relationships,but Supply Chain Management (SCM) entails a new perspective. SCM requiresa movement away from arms-length relationships toward partnership stylerelations. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper analyses the relationship between internal andexternal integration processes, their effect on firms performance andtheir contribution to the achievement of a competitive advantage.Performance improvements are analysed through costs, stock out and leadtime reductions. And, the achievement of a better competitive positionis measured by comparing the firm s performance with its competitors performance. To analyse this, an empirical study has been conducted inthe Spanish grocery sector.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.