Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Activités professionnelles et qualité de l'air des parcs de stationnement couvert : rapport d'expertise collective

[Table des matières] 1. Contexte, objet et modalités de traitement de la saisine. - 2. Préambule. - 3. Caractérisation des parcs de stationnement couverts et de leurs activités professionnelles en France (enquête Afsset). - 4. Observations de terrain et analyse d'activités professionnelles exercées dans les parcs de stationnement couverts (étude Anact). - 5. Evaluation des risques sanitaires. - 6. Recommandations. - Bibliographie. - Annexe 1 : Lettre de saisine. - Annexe 2 : Présentation des positions divergentes. - Annexe 3 : Synthèse des déclarations publiques d'intérêts des experts par rapport au champ de la saisine. - Annexe 4 : Réglementation et recommandations institutionnelles concernant la qualité de l'air dans les parcs de stationnement couverts, et l'hygiène et la sécurité des travailleurs. - Annexe 5 : Etude de coparly sur la mesure de polluants atmosphériques dans les parcs de stationnement - Informations générales. - Annexe 6 : Dépassement des valeurs cibles Afsset" limitant les risques pour la santé des travailleurs dans les parcs de stationnement (Coparly, 2009). - Annexe 7 : Enquête Asset - Méthode d'identification du code NAF le plus adapté. - Annexe 8 : Enquête Afsset - Questionnaire d'enquête. - Annexe 9 : Enquête Afsset - Villes d'implantation des parcs inclus dans l'étude. - Annexe 10 : Rapport de l'Anact : Activité professionnelle et qualité de l'air dans les parcs couverts de stationnement. - Annexe 11 : Résultats de mesures de la campagne du LCPP utilisés pour les scénarios d'exposition. - Annexe 12 : Résultats issus de l'enquête Afsset sur les activités professionnelles exercées dans les parcs de stationnement couverts. - Annexe 13 : Concentrations ubiquitaires dans différents "micro-environnements" (Afsset, 2007). - Annexe 14 : Facteurs d'abattement entre concentrations dans le local d'exploitation et dans le parc. - Annexe 15 : Limites des valeurs toxicologiques de référence (Afsset, 2007). - Annexe 16 : Exemples de solutions pour améliorer la qualité de l'air et réduire l'exposition des travailleurs.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Collective victimisation and collective guilt in the former Yugoslavia : the interplay between individual, local and societal levels

The thesis examines the impact of collective war victimization on individuals' readiness to accept or assign collective guilt for past war atrocities. As a complement to previous studies, its aim is to articulate an integrated approach to collective victimization, which distinguishes between individual-, communal-, and societal-level consequences of warfare. Building on a social representation approach, it is guided by the assumption that individuals form beliefs about a conflict through their personal experiences of victimization, communal experiences of warfare that occur in their proximal surrounding, and the mass- mediatised narratives that circulate in a society's public sphere. Four empirical studies test the hypothesis that individuals' beliefs about the conflict depend on the level and type of war experiences to which they have been exposed, that is, on informative and normative micro and macro contexts in which they are embedded. The studies have been conducted in the context of the Yugoslav wars that attended the breakup of Yugoslavia, a series of wars fought between 1991 and 2001 during which numerous war atrocities were perpetrated causing a massive victimisation of population. To examine the content and impact of war experiences at each level of analysis, the empirical studies employed various methodological strategies, from quantitative analyses of a representative public opinion survey, to qualitative analyses of media content and political speeches. Study 1 examines the impact of individual- and communal- level war experiences on individuals' acceptance and assignment of collective guilt. It further examines the impact of the type of communal level victimization: exposure to symmetric (i.e., violence that similarly affects members of different ethnic groups, including adversaries) and asymmetric violence. The main goal of Study 2 is to examine the structural and political circumstances that enhance collective guilt assignment. While the previous studies emphasize the role of past victimisation, Study 2 tests the assumption that the political demobilisation strategy employed by elites facing public discontent in the collective system-threatening circumstances can fuel out-group blame. Studies 3 and 4 have been conducted predominantly in the context of Croatia and examine rhetoric construction of the dominant politicized narrative of war in a public sphere (Study 3) and its maintenance through public delegitimization of alternative (critical) representations (Study 4). Study 4 further examines the likelihood that highly identified group members adhere to publicly delegitimized critical stances on war. - Cette thèse étudie l'impact de la victimisation collective de guerre sur la capacité des individus à accepter ou à attribuer une culpabilité collective liée à des atrocités commises en temps de guerre. En compléments aux recherches existantes, le but de ce travail est de définir une approche intégrative de la victimisation collective, qui distingue les conséquences de la guerre aux niveaux individuel, régional et sociétal. En partant de l'approche des représentations sociales, cette thèse repose sur le postulat que les individus forment des croyances sur un conflit au travers de leurs expériences personnelles de victimisation, de leurs expériences de guerre lorsque celle-ci se déroule près d'eux, ainsi qu'au travers des récits relayés par les mass media. Quatre études testent l'hypothèse que les croyances des individus dépendent des niveaux et des types d'expériences de guerre auxquels ils ont été exposés, c'est-à-dire, des contextes informatifs et normatifs, micro et macro dans lesquels ils sont insérés. Ces études ont été réalisées dans le contexte des guerres qui, entre 1991 et 2001, ont suivi la dissolution de la Yougoslavie et durant lesquelles de nombreuses atrocités de guerre ont été commises, causant une victimisation massive de la population. Afin d'étudier le contenu et l'impact des expériences de guerre sur chaque niveau d'analyse, différentes stratégies méthodologiques ont été utilisées, des analyses quantitatives sur une enquête représentative d'opinion publique aux analyses qualitatives de contenu de médias et de discours politiques. L'étude 1 étudie l'impact des expériences de guerre individuelles et régionales sur l'acceptation et l'attribution de la culpabilité collective par les individus. Elle examine aussi l'impact du type de victimisation régionale : exposition à la violence symétrique (i.e., violence qui touche les membres de différents groupes ethniques, y compris les adversaires) et asymétrique. L'étude 2 se penche sur les circonstances structurelles et politiques qui augmentent l'attribution de culpabilité collective. Alors que les recherches précédentes ont mis l'accent sur le rôle de la victimisation passée, l'étude 2 teste l'hypothèse que la stratégie de démobilisation politique utilisée par les élites pour faire face à l'insatisfaction publique peut encourager l'attribution de la culpabilité à l'exogroupe. Les études 3 et 4 étudient, principalement dans le contexte croate, la construction rhétorique du récit de guerre politisé dominant (étude 3) et son entretien à travers la délégitimation publique des représentations alternatives (critiques] (étude 4). L'étude 4 examine aussi la probabilité qu'ont les membres de groupe fortement identifiés d'adhérer à des points de vue sur la guerre critiques et publiquement délégitimés.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.