"Creeping" civil war in the North Caucasus. OSW Commentary No. 50, 2011-03-15

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service. Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by implementing development programmes have not brought the desired results, because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place. It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbouring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these republics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Is there reason to hope for Minsk II? CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

In his comparison of the agreement concluded in the Belarus capital by the leaders of Russia, France, Ukraine and Germany on February 12th with the one reached on 5 September 2014, Michael Emerson asks what will be different this time? He observes first that there are additional provisions which may be significant and secondly, the strategic political and economic context is categorically different.

The Eastern Partnership Riga Summit should not be a non-event. EPC Commentary, 20 May 2015

The upcoming 21-22 May Eastern Partnership (EaP) Riga Summit will take place against the backdrop of the new geopolitical reality in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine. Given the extremely complex geopolitical context, the importance of the Summit and the message it delivers to the partner countries – particularly to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which have made European integration their foreign policy goal – cannot be underestimated. The Summit needs to send a strong, unambiguous signal reconfirming the EU’s commitment to the EaP, and offer a clear roadmap for the future. If the Summit turns out to be a non-event, with an empty declaration, it risks being perceived as rewarding the bullying policies of Russia.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

Skazani i a kni a zi a Kurbskago.

ch. 1. Istori i a Ioanna Groznago.--ch. 2. Perepiska s Ioannom i drugimi lit s ami.

Slavi︠a︡nskīĭ i vostochnyĭ ornament po rukopisi︠a︡m drevni︠a︡go i novago vremeni /

Added t.p. illustrated in color.

Poslanīe Rossīi : istinnoe znachenīe russkoĭ revoli͡ut͡sīi /

Translation of: Russia's message.

Napoléon et Alexandre Ier : L'alliance russe sous le premier empire.

"Ouvrage couronné deux fois par l'Académie française, Grand prix Gobert, 1893 et 1894."

Imperator Aleksandr Pervyæi, ego zhizn§ i ëtìsarstvovanåie,

Disbound Original Held in Oak Street Library Facility

Geist und Staat; historische Porträts.

Mode of access: Internet.

Correspondance inédite de l'empereur Alexandre et de Bernadotte pendant l'annee 1812

Lettres interceptées de l'empereur Napoléon: p. 56-66; Lettres interceptées du prince Eugène: p. 66-68.

Akty, otnosi a shchiesi a k istorii i u zhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii /

Imprint varies.

Des Herrn Peter Heinrich Bruce, eines ehemaligen Officiers in preussischen, russischen und grossbritannischen Diensten, Nachrichten von seinen Reisen in Deutschland, Russland, die Tartarey, Türkey, Westinden u.s.f. : nebst geheimen Nachrichten von Peter dem Ersten Czar von Russland /

Es la traducción alemana del original inglés, cuya primera edición es : Bruce, Peter Henry : Memoirs of Peter Bruce, esq. : a military officer, in the services of Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain / containing an account of his travels in Germany, Russia, Tartary, Turkey, the West Indies, &c., as also several very interesting private anecdotes of the Czar, Peter I of Russia. -- London : printed for the author's widow, and sold by T. Payne and son, 1782. -- [12], 446 p.; 27 cm. -- Sabin 8726.

Friedrich Wilhelm I., König von Preussen Ein beitrag zur Geschichte seines Lebens, seines Hofes und seiner Zeit

Mode of access: Internet.