946 resultados para [JEL:G12] Financial Economics - General Financial Markets - Asset Pricing
Resumo:
El capital financiero es muy volátil y si el inversor no obtiene una remuneración adecuada al riesgo que asume puede plantearse el retirar su capital del patrimonio de la empresa y, en consecuencia, producir un cambio estructural en cualquier sector de la economía. El objetivo principal es el estudio de los coeficientes de regresión (coeficiente beta) de los modelos de valoración de activos empleados en Economía Financiera, esto es, el estudio de la variación de la rentabilidad de los activos en función de los cambios que suceden en los mercados. La elección de los modelos utilizados se justifica por la amplia utilización teórica y empírica de los mismos a lo largo de la historia de la Economía Financiera. Se han aplicado el modelo de valoración de activos de mercado (capital asset pricing model, CAPM), el modelo basado en la teoría de precios de arbitraje (arbitrage pricing theory, APT) y el modelo de tres factores de Fama y French (FF). Estos modelos se han aplicado a los rendimientos mensuales de 27 empresas del sector minero que cotizan en la bolsa de Nueva York (New York Stock Exchange, NYSE) o en la de Londres (London Stock Exchange, LSE), con datos del período que comprende desde Enero de 2006 a Diciembre de 2010. Los resultados de series de tiempo y sección cruzada tanto para CAPM, como para APT y FF producen varios errores, lo que sugiere que muchas empresas del sector no han podido obtener el coste de capital. También los resultados muestran que las empresas de mayor riesgo tienden a tener una menor rentabilidad. Estas conclusiones hacen poco probable que se mantenga en el largo plazo el equilibrio actual y puede que sea uno de los principales factores que impulsen un cambio estructural en el sector minero en forma de concentraciones de empresas. ABSTRACT Financial capital is highly volatile and if the investor does not get adequate compensation for the risk faced he may consider withdrawing his capital assets from the company and consequently produce a structural change in any sector of the economy. The main purpose is the study of the regression coefficients (beta) of asset pricing models used in financial economics, that is, the study of variation in profitability of assets in terms of the changes that occur in the markets. The choice of models used is justified by the extensive theoretical and empirical use of them throughout the history of financial economics. Have been used the capital asset pricing model, CAPM, the model XII based on the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) and the three-factor model of Fama and French (FF). These models have been applied to the monthly returns of 27 mining companies listed on the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) or LSE(London Stock Exchange), using data from the period covered from January 2006 to December 2010. The results of time series and cross sectional regressions for CAPM, APT and FF produce some errors, suggesting that many companies have failed to obtain the cost of capital. Also the results show that higher risk firms tend to have lower profitability. These findings make it unlikely to be mainteined over the long term the current status and could drive structural change in the mining sector in the form of mergers.
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This dissertation examines the drivers and implications of international capital flows. The overarching motivation is the observation that countries not at the centre of global financial markets are subject to considerable spillovers from centre countries, notably from their monetary policy. I present new empirical evidence on the determinants of the observed patterns of international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, and study their effect on both financial markets and the real economy. In Chapter 2 I provide evidence on the determinants of a puzzling negative correlation observed between productivity growth and net capital inflows to developing and emerging market economies (EMEs) since 1980. By disaggregating net capital inflows into their gross components, I show that this negative correlation is explained by capital outflows related to purchases of very liquid assets from the fastest growing countries. My results suggest a desire for international portfolio diversification in liquid assets by fast growing countries is driving much of the original puzzle. In the reminder of my dissertation I pivot to study the foreign characteristics that drive international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, with a particular focus on the role of unconventional monetary policy in the United States (U.S.). In Chapter 3 I show that a significant portion of the heterogeneity in EMEs' asset price adjustment following the quantitative easing operations by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) during 2008-2014 can be explained by the degree of bilateral capital market frictions between these countries and the U.S. This is true even after accounting for capital controls, exchange rate regimes, and domestic monetary policies. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michal Ksawery Popiel, studies unconventional monetary policy in a small open economy, looking specifically at the case of Canada since the global financial crisis. We quantify the effect Canadian unconventional monetary policy shocks had on the real economy, while carefully controlling for and quantifying spillovers from U.S. unconventional monetary policy. Our results indicate that the Bank of Canada's unconventional monetary policy increased Canadian output significantly from 2009-2010, but that spillovers from the Fed's policy were even more important for increasing Canadian output after 2008.
Resumo:
The deepest financial crisis to strike the global economy since the Great Depression has unceremoniously called into question the very foundations of the Western economic model. The liberalisation of capital flows and the growing internationalisation of financial markets outpaced global regulatory and supervisory efforts. The repercussions of the financial crisis have given new dynamism to the reform of financial regulation both globally and within the European Union (EU). The Eurozone, by way of its own failings, has emerged as a stronger conceptual and legitimate entity since the onset of the crisis, but to what extent does this equate to a greater external role, in particular in the reform of international financial regulation? This paper argues that the Eurozone is currently not in a position to play an important role in the reform of international financial regulation, as it is a weak actor in the context of the EU financial architecture, which is still largely characterised by differing national regimes, a prevailing influence from the UK and fragmented external representation. The key finding from this study is that internal tensions in the EU are at the very heart of the Eurozone’s difficulties in playing a role in the reform of international financial regulation. Surmounting these tensions is a pre-requisite for the Eurozone if it is to overcome its structural weakness in international financial politics. However, the implications of such evolutions to the Eurozone, as an entity, and to European integration are far-reaching.
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Given the size of the financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic and the symmetry in the follow-up of the G-20 standards, Karel Lannoo argues in this Policy Brief that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) provides a good opportunity to put in place a more institutionalised framework. He finds that both blocs have reacted in similar ways to the financial crisis in strengthening their regulatory and supervisory frameworks and incorporating the G-20 recommendations into federal law. He also notes that consumer protection has been reinforced, certainly in the US, with the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And on the EU side, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will radically change banking supervision. In his view, inclusion of financial services could also be an opportunity to strengthen prudential rules and consumer protection provisions on both sides. Rather than leading to a reduction of consumer protection, as had been feared in the post-crisis environment, it could lead to an examination, exchange and recognition of best practices in regulation and enforcement. Finally, he concludes that inclusion of financial services would make it part of the permanent regulatory dialogue that will be established as a result of a successful TTIP.
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This book provides an update to the major 2012 study by the same authors on the dual role of the public sector as the provider of the ultimate riskless asset and, at the same time, the source of a potential major systemic risk. In this second edition, Brender and his colleagues concentrate again on the tension between the need for the public sector to sustain demand in the face of a deleveraging private sector and the longer-term challenges of sustainability for fiscal policy in the major developed economies of the US, Japan and the euro area. In short, their principal thesis is that sovereign debt is in crisis. This crisis is apparent in the euro area, but it is also real, if at present only latent, in the US and Japan. The book shows how this process has evolved in these three big developed economies – and how their policy choices impact on global financial markets.
Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014
Resumo:
From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2
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Through an Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (ECP) 11 eurozone countries (ECP-11) – among them the four biggest; Germany, France, Italy and Spain – have aspired to go ahead with the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (EU-FTT). Apart from generating substantial revenues for tight fiscal budgets, an EU-FTT could also contribute to the reduction of transactions, which are harmful for the efficient functioning of financial markets and the real economy. However, the willingness to go forward with the finalisation of an ambitious proposal has lost some momentum recently; some of the envisaged compromises may even threaten the viability of the whole project.
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To overcome the regulatory pitfalls, regulatory capacity and resources in financial markets governance need to be enhanced, not only at national but also at global levels. In order to shed light on policy issues and agendas in international financial policy cooperation, this paper focuses on the case of European financial integration and regulations. The analysis of policy developments at the European level in coordinating differing national interests, supervisory systems, and practices among EU member states highlights fundamental elements of global financial regulatory cooperation.
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Alistair Milne argues in this ECRI Commentary that ‘FinTech’ (newly emerging Financial Technologies) can play a crucial role in achieving European policy objectives in the area of financial markets. These notably include increasing access by smaller firms to trade credit and other forms of external finance and completing the banking and capital markets unions. He points out, however, that accomplishing these objectives will require a coordinated European policy response, focused especially on promoting common business processes and the adoption of shared technology and data standards.
Resumo:
• Before the financial and economic crisis, monetary policy unification and interest rate convergence resulted in the divergence of euroarea countries’ financial cycles. This divergence is deeply rooted in the financial integration spurred by currency union and strongly correlated with intra-euro area capital flows. Macro-prudential policy will need to deal with potentially divergent financial cycles, while catering for potential cross-border spillovers from domestic policies, which domestic authorities have little incentive to internalise. • The current framework is unfit to deal effectively with these challenges. The European Central Bank should be responsible for consistent and coherent application of macro-prudential policy, with appropriate divergences catering for national differences in financial conditions. The close link between domestic financial cycles and intra-euro area capital flows raises the question of whether macro-prudential policy in the euro area can be compatible with free flows of capital. Financial cycle divergence had its counterpart in the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, so effective implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure would support and strengthen macro-prudential policy.
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From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.
Resumo:
The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.
Resumo:
The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.
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This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs of customers.
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Since the end of 2014, inflation has been at or very close to zero. With very little ability to move the actual interest rate further into negative territory, the ECB has resorted to unconventional measures. The latest of these includes a programme to purchase corporate bonds, which started on 8 June 2016.