Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

System analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Video-on-Demand architecture: Kangaroo

Architectural design and deployment of Peer-to-Peer Video-on-Demand (P2PVoD) systems which support VCR functionalities is attracting the interest of an increasing number of research groups within the scientific community; especially due to the intrinsic characteristics of such systems and the benefits that peers could provide at reducing the server load. This work focuses on the performance analysis of a P2P-VoD system considering user behaviors obtained from real traces together with other synthetic user patterns. The experiments performed show that it is feasible to achieve a performance close to the best possible. Future work will consider monitoring the physical characteristics of the network in order to improve the design of different aspects of a VoD system.

Diagnostic yield of short-term video-EEG monitoring for epilepsy and PNESs: a European assessment.

INTRODUCTION: Although long-term video-EEG monitoring (LVEM) is routinely used to investigate paroxysmal events, short-term video-EEG monitoring (SVEM) lasting <24 h is increasingly recognized as a cost-effective tool. Since, however, relatively few studies addressed the yield of SVEM among different diagnostic groups, we undertook the present study to investigate this aspect. METHODS: We retrospectively analyzed 226 consecutive SVEM recordings over 6 years. All patients were referred because routine EEGs were inconclusive. Patients were classified into 3 suspected diagnostic groups: (1) group with epileptic seizures, (2) group with psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNESs), and (3) group with other or undetermined diagnoses. We assessed recording lengths, interictal epileptiform discharges, epileptic seizures, PNESs, and the definitive diagnoses obtained after SVEM. RESULTS: The mean age was 34 (±18.7) years, and the median recording length was 18.6 h. Among the 226 patients, 127 referred for suspected epilepsy - 73 had a diagnosis of epilepsy, none had a diagnosis of PNESs, and 54 had other or undetermined diagnoses post-SVEM. Of the 24 patients with pre-SVEM suspected PNESs, 1 had epilepsy, 12 had PNESs, and 11 had other or undetermined diagnoses. Of the 75 patients with other diagnoses pre-SVEM, 17 had epilepsy, 11 had PNESs, and 47 had other or undetermined diagnoses. After SVEM, 15 patients had definite diagnoses other than epilepsy or PNESs, while in 96 patients, diagnosis remained unclear. Overall, a definitive diagnosis could be reached in 129/226 (57%) patients. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates that in nearly 3/5 patients without a definitive diagnosis after routine EEG, SVEM allowed us to reach a diagnosis. This procedure should be encouraged in this setting, given its time-effectiveness compared with LVEM.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Motion analysis in terms of wireless video capsule endoscopy

El treball presentat suposa una visió general de l'"Endoscopia amb Càpsula de Vídeo Wireless" i la inspecció de sequències de contraccions intestinals amb les últimes tecnologies de visió per computador. Després de la observació preliminar dels fonaments mèdics requerits, la aplicació de visió per computador es presenta en aquestos termes. En essència, aquest treball proveïx una exhaustiva selecció, descripció i avaluació de cert conjunt de mètodes de processament d'imatges respecte a l'anàlisi de moviment, en el entorn de seqüències d'imatges preses amb una càpsula endoscòpica. Finalment, es presenta una aplicació de software per configurar i emprar de forma ràpida i fàcil un entorn experimental.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Desenvolupament d'un videojoc en 3D

La industria de los videojuegos crece exponencialmente y está ya superando a otras industrias punteras del ocio. En este proyecto, nos hemos planteado la realización de un videojuego con visualización en el espacio real 3D. Para la realización del videojuego se ha usado el siguiente software: Blender para diseñar los modelos 3D, C++ como lenguaje de programación para desarrollar el código y un conjunto de librerías básicas para desarrollar un videojuego llamadas Ogre3d (Motor Gráfico). La lógica del movimiento 3D y los choques entre las partículas del juego ha sido diseñada enteramente en este proyecto acorde con las necesidades del videojuego, y de forma compatible a los ficheros de Blender y a las librerías OGRE3D.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

As the world turns: short-term human spatial memory in egocentric and allocentric coordinates

We aimed to determine whether human subjects' reliance on different sources of spatial information encoded in different frames of reference (i.e., egocentric versus allocentric) affects their performance, decision time and memory capacity in a short-term spatial memory task performed in the real world. Subjects were asked to play the Memory game (a.k.a. the Concentration game) without an opponent, in four different conditions that controlled for the subjects' reliance on egocentric and/or allocentric frames of reference for the elaboration of a spatial representation of the image locations enabling maximal efficiency. We report experimental data from young adult men and women, and describe a mathematical model to estimate human short-term spatial memory capacity. We found that short-term spatial memory capacity was greatest when an egocentric spatial frame of reference enabled subjects to encode and remember the image locations. However, when egocentric information was not reliable, short-term spatial memory capacity was greater and decision time shorter when an allocentric representation of the image locations with respect to distant objects in the surrounding environment was available, as compared to when only a spatial representation encoding the relationships between the individual images, independent of the surrounding environment, was available. Our findings thus further demonstrate that changes in viewpoint produced by the movement of images placed in front of a stationary subject is not equivalent to the movement of the subject around stationary images. We discuss possible limitations of classical neuropsychological and virtual reality experiments of spatial memory, which typically restrict the sensory information normally available to human subjects in the real world.