Inequality over the business cycle: Estimating income risk using micro-data on consumption

We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income, to evaluate the nature of increased income inequality in the 1980s and 90s. We decompose unexpected changes in family income into transitory and permanent, and idiosyncratic and aggregate components, and estimate the contribution of each component to total inequality. The model we use is a linearized incomplete markets model, enriched to incorporate risk-sharing while maintaining tractability. Our estimates suggest that taking risk sharing into account is important for the model fit; that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was mainly permanent; and that inequality is driven almost entirely by idiosyncratic income risk. In addition we find no evidence for cyclical behavior of consumption risk, casting doubt on Constantinides and Duffie s (1995) explanation for the equity premium puzzle.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Skill-biased technological change and the business cycle

Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.

Credible redistributive policies and migration across US States

Does worker mobility undermine governments ability to redistribute income? Thispaper analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractablemodel where both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. Wecalibrate the model to match skill premium and worker productivity at the state level,as well as the size and skill composition of migration flows. The calibrated modelis able to reproduce the large changes in skill composition as well as key qualitativerelationships of labor flows and redistribution policies observed in the data. Our resultssuggest that regional di¤erences in labor productivity are an important determinantof interstate migration. We use the calibrated model to compare the cross-section ofredistributive policies with and without worker mobility. The main result of the paperis that interstate migration has induced substantial convergence in tax rates acrossUS states, but no race to the bottom. Skill-biased in-migration has reduced the skillpremium and the need for tax-based redistribution in the states that would have hadthe highest tax rates in the absence of mobility.

Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Wage inequality in a frictional labor market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in thepast two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empiricsof inequality (e.g.Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we mayattribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand forhigh skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channelin which the wage premium for skill may grow -increased firm entry.We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types ofworkers and homogeneous firms must set wages and preferences forwhat type of worker they would like to hire. We find that both thewage differential and the demand for high skill workers can increasewith the proportion of high skill workers -these high skill workerstherefore 'create' their own demand without exogenous factors. Inaddition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with thebetween group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are providedin order to compare the findings with empirical results.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

English Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) ofthe good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong effect of even small toeholds, however wefind the effects are not so strong in the lab. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of thepayoff functions, which leads to relatively costless deviations from the equilibrium strategies.We find that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better than the Nash equilibrium.Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective, the cost to acquire them mightbe higher than the strategic benefit they bring. Finally our results show that in general theseller s revenues fall when the playing field is uneven.

Multinationals, technology networks and international takeovers

We formulate a knowlegde--based model of direct investment through mergers and acquisitions. M&As are realized to create comparative advantages by exploiting international synergies and appropriating local technology spillovers requiring geographical proximity, but can also represent a strategic response to the presence of a multinational rival. The takeover fee paid tends to increase with the strength of local spillovers which can thus work against multinationalization. Seller's bargaining power increases the takeover fee, but does not influence the investment decision. We characterize losers and winners from multinationalization, and show that foreign investment stimulates research but could result in a synergy trap reducing multinationals' profits.

Strike outcomes and wage settlements in Spain

This paper analyzes collective bargaining using Spanish firm level data. Centralto the analysis are the joint determination of wage and strike outcomes in adynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike andnon-strike outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place, we confirm a negativerelationship between strike duration and wage changes in a dynamic context.Furthermore, we find selection in wage equations induced by the strike outcome.In this sense, the possibility of wage determination processes being differentin strike and non-strike samples is not rejected by the data. In particular,wage dynamics are of opposite sing in both strike and non-strike equations.Finally, we find evidence of a 0.33 percentage points wage change strike premium.