890 resultados para tactical voting
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Political scientists have long noted that Congressional elections are often uncompetitive, often extremely so. Many scholars argue that the cause lies in the partisan redistricting of Congressional districts, or “gerrymandering”. Other scholars emphasize polarization created by a fragmented news media, or the candidate choices made by a more ideological primary electorate. All these explanations identify the cause of party-safe elections in institutions of various kinds. This dissertation, by contrast, presents a structural explanation of uncompetitive elections. My theory is that population composition and patterns of migration are significant causes and predictors of election results in Florida. I test this theory empirically by comparing the predictions from four hypotheses against aggregate data, using the county as the unit of analysis. The first hypothesis is that Florida can be divided into clearly distinguishable, persistent partisan sections. This hypothesis is confirmed. The second hypothesis is that Florida voters have become increasingly partisan over time. This hypothesis is confirmed. The third hypothesis is that the degree of migration into a county predicts how that county will vote. This hypothesis is partially confirmed, for the migration effect appears to have waned over time. The last hypothesis is that the degree of religiosity of a county population is a predictor of how that county will vote. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of statistical analysis. By identifying the structural causes of party-safe elections, this dissertation not only broadens our understanding of elections in Florida, but also sheds light on the current polarization in American politics.
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Peer reviewed
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Peer reviewed
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.
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This paper compares different optimization strategies for the minimization of flight and passenger delays at two levels: pre-tactical, with on-ground delay at origin, and tactical, with airborne delay close to the destination airport. The optimization model is based on the ground holding problem and uses various cost functions. The scenario considered takes place in a busy European airport and includes realistic values of traffic. Uncertainty is introduced in the model for the passenger allocation, minimum time required for turnaround and tactical uncertainty. Performance of the various optimization processes is presented and compared to ratio by schedule results.
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Previous research examining the outcomes of free votes concludes that voting behaviour is determined in large part by MPs’ personal preferences. However, most studies do not measure preferences directly and ignore other possible determinants of voting behaviour. This piece illustrates the need to address these shortcomings before one concludes that preferences explain the outcomes of free votes. I illustrate this by examining a series of divisions on the issue of House of Lords reform. Using direct measures of preferences and controlling for alternative explanations, the analysis suggests MPs’ preferences had little effect on voting behaviour on this issue.