Iowa Department of Corrections Strategic Plan and Plan, Performance, 2007

Annual Report, Strategic Plan and Performance Plan

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890-1920)

The subject "Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890--1920)" should evoke several names and debates in the reader's mind. For a long time, Western scholars have been aware that the Russian economists Tugan-Baranovsky and Bortkiewicz were active participants to the Marxian transformation problem, that the mathematical models of Dmitriev prefigured forthcoming neoricardian based models, and that many Russian economists were either supporting the Marxian labour theory of value or being revisionists. Moreover, these ideas were preparing the ground for Soviet planning. Russian scholars additionally knew that this period was the time of introduction of marginalism in Russia, and that, during this period, economists were active in thinking the relation of ethics with economic theory. All these issues are well covered in the existing literature. But there is a big gap that this dissertation intends to fill. The existing literature handles these pieces separately, although they are part of a single, more general, history. All these issues (the labour theory of value, marginalism, the Marxian transformation problem, planning, ethics, mathematical economics) were part of what this dissertation calls here "The Russian synthesis". The Russian synthesis (in the singular) designates here all the attempts at synthesis between classical political economy and marginalism, between labour theory of value and marginal utility, and between value and prices that occurred in Russian economic thought between 1890 and 1920, and that embraces the whole set of issues evoked above. This dissertation has the ambition of being the first comprehensive history of that Russian synthesis. In this, this contribution is unique. It has always surprised the author of the present dissertation that such a book has not yet been written. Several good reasons, both in terms of scarce availability of sources and of ideological restrictions, may accounted for a reasonable delay of several decades. But it is now urgent to remedy the situation before the protagonists of the Russian synthesis are definitely classified under the wrong labels in the pantheon of economic thought. To accomplish this task, it has seldom be sufficient to gather together the various existing studies on aspects of this story. It as been necessary to return to the primary sources in the Russian language. The most important part of the primary literature has never been translated, and in the last years only some of them have been republished in Russian. Therefore, most translations from the Russian have been made by the author of the present dissertation. The secondary literature has been surveyed in the languages that are familiar (Russian, English and French) or almost familiar (German) to the present author, and which are hopefully the most pertinent to the present investigation. Besides, and in order to increase the acquaintance with the text, which was the objective of all this, some archival sources were used. The analysis consists of careful chronological studies of the authors' writings and their evolution in their historical and intellectual context. As a consequence, the dissertation brings new authors to the foreground - Shaposhnikov and Yurovsky - who were traditionally confined to the substitutes' bench, because they only superficially touched the domains quoted above. In the Russian synthesis however, they played an important part of the story. As a side effect, some authors that used to play in the foreground - Dmitriev and Bortkiewicz - are relegated to the background, but are not forgotten. Besides, the dissertation refreshes the views on authors already known, such as Ziber and, especially, Tugan-Baranovsky. The ultimate objective of this dissertation is to change the opinion that one could have on "value and prices in Russian economic thought", by setting the Russian synthesis at the centre of the debates.

Risk reduction practices in men who have sex with men in Switzerland: serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation.

The aim of this study was to identify predictors of intentional use of the HIV risk reduction practices of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation during unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with casual partners. A cross-sectional survey pertaining to the Swiss HIV behavioral surveillance system, using an anonymous self-administered questionnaire, was conducted in 2007 in a self-selected sample of men having sex with other men (MSM). Analysis was restricted to participants with UAI with casual partner(s) (N = 410). Logistic regression was used to estimate factors associated with intentional use of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation. In the previous 12 months, 71% of participants reported having UAI with a casual partner of different or unknown HIV-status. Of these, 47% reported practicing withdrawal, 38% serosorting, and 25% strategic positioning. In the 319 participants with known HIV-status, serosorting was associated with frequent Internet use to find partners (OR = 2.32), STI (OR = 2.07), and HIV testing in the past 12 months (OR = 1.81). Strategic positioning was associated with HIV-status (OR = 0.13) and having UAI with a partner of different or unknown HIV-status (OR = 3.57). Withdrawal was more frequently practiced by HIV-negative participants or participants reporting high numbers of sexual partners (OR = 2.48) and having UAI with a partner of unknown or different serostatus (OR = 2.08). Risk reduction practices are widely used by MSM, each practice having its own specificities. Further research is needed to determine the contextual factors surrounding harm reduction practices, particularly the strategic or opportunistic nature of their use.

Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Department of Administrative Services Strategic Plan, 2008-2011

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.