Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Department of Administrative Services Strategic Plan, 2008-2011

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

A Gestão da Formação na Sucursal da Mundiserviços em Cabo Verde

O presente Relatório de Estágio insere-se no âmbito da Unidade Curricular de Estágio, realizado na empresa MundiServiços, Consultoria de Gestão e Formação, Sucursal de Cabo Verde, conducente ao grau de Mestre em Ciências da Educação com especialização na área de Formação de Adultos. A Sucursal da MundiServiços em Cabo Verde centra a sua intervenção no mercado cabo-verdiano essencialmente em dois eixos: Consultoria na área de Gestão de Recursos Humanos e Formação Profissional. O meu Projecto de Estágio tem a sua incidência na área da Formação Profissional e visa responder a uma solicitação da ARFA - Agência de Regulação e Supervisão de Produtos Farmacêuticos e Alimentares - organização cliente da MundiServiços em Cabo Verde. Neste contexto, o Projecto de Estágio tem como finalidade a realização de um Estudo de Diagnóstico de Necessidades de Formação e a Elaboração de um Plano Estratégico de Formação que possa satisfazer as necessidades organizacionais, profissionais e pessoais da Agência e dos seus trabalhadores. Este trabalho enquadra-se numa medida estratégica da entidade, que passa pelo desenvolvimento de competências chave dos seus recursos humanos, como forma de responder a novos desafios estratégicos e organizacionais e de aumentar a motivação e satisfação interna dos seus trabalhadores. De acordo com os objectivos pré-estabelecidos para a execução deste estudo, tentou-se combinar as metodologias qualitativa e quantitativa, com recurso a diferentes técnicas de recolha, análise e tratamento de dados, com a principal finalidade de obter informações que permitam responder, de forma efectiva, à solicitação da agência, transformando as necessidades formativas dos trabalhadores em potencialidades.

Iowa Department of Corrections, Strategic Plan 2008-2012, October 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Corrections including,goals and mission.

Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage 2007-2010 Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage (CAPI) 2007-2010 Strategic Plan including,goals and mission.

Iowa Civil Rights Commission Strategic Plan 2005-2006

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Civil Rights Commission Strategic Plan 2005-2006 including,goals and mission.