Arguments by definition : Felipe Calderón’s war on drugs and the power to persuade

Les études rhétoriques ont documenté la pertinence de la rhétorique présidentielle et le pouvoir du président de définir les enjeux publics par le discours. Cette recherche porte sur les pratiques rhétoriques par lesquelles l'ancien président mexicain Calderón a défini la lutte contre la drogue qui a caractérisé son administration. Je soutiens que Calderón a avancé une définition du problème de la drogue par des pratiques de définition telles que l'association, la dissociation et les symboles de condensation. Mon analyse 1) identifie les pratiques rhétoriques de définition qui ont caractérisé la lutte à la drogue de Calderón; 2) examine les implications de ces pratiques; et 3) aborde les limites auxquelles les politiciens font face en tentant de modifier des définitions préalablement avancées. En conclusion, j’explique comment les métaphores et les pratiques de définition de Calderón ont ouvert un espace rhétorique où les droits humains pouvaient être révoqués et la violence encouragée.

Reforming Federal Systems: Insights from Australia, Canada, Germany and Switzerland

Série de l'Observatoire des fédérations

Color adjectives and radical contextualism

Radical contextualists have observed that the content of what is said by the utterance of a sentence is shaped in far-reaching ways by the context of utterance. And they have argued that the ways in which the content of what is said is shaped by context cannot be explained by semantic theory. A striking number of the examples that radical contextualists use to support their view involve sentences containing color adjectives (“red”, “green”, etc.). In this paper, I show how the most sophisticated analysis of color adjectives within the explanatory framework of compositional truth conditional semantics—recently developed by Kennedy and McNally (Synthese 174(1):79–98 2010)—needs to be modified to handle the full range of contextual variation displayed by color adjectives.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.

Effort and affect: engaging with film performance

In order to consider our emotional and physical involvement with film this chapter explores the rapport between camera and performer and how this impacts on the construction of engagement, drawing on critical approaches across the disciplines of film, dance and philosophy to describe our spatial, emotional and sensuous relationship to characters and bodies on-screen. Concern with the relationship between what is happening on screen and the shaping of our engagement is developed through attention to the effort of a particular performance, using close analysis to make sense of the affect invited by qualities of movement and how they are presented in moment from Rosemary’s Baby (Polanski, 1968).

Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

What is the subaltern of the comparative philosophy of religion?

It is claimed that Comparative Philosophy of Religion (CPR) mistakenly builds on the dogmas of comparative religion (or history of religions) and philosophy of religion. Thus, the belief that there are things common and therefore comparable between two or more traditions and that these objects of comparison are of philosophical or theological significance are questions that continue to trouble the field. Just what does one compare, how does one choose what to compare or why, through what methodological and epistemic tools, and who is it that carries out the tasks? But what has remained unasked and unanalyzed are the larger meta-questions concerning the motivation, civilizational presuppositions, cultural parochialism, or legacies of orientalism, modernity, and (post-)colonialism that together affect the boundedness of certain key categories and thematic issues in the comparative enterprise such as God or the Transcendent, Creation, the Problem of Evil, the Afterlife, Sin, Redemption, Purpose, and the End. Is difference with respect to alterity and altarity permissible? If so, what a postcolonial, differently gendered, cross-cultural critique would look like and what is left of CPR are two such questions explored here.