Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.

Investigation of County Treasurers' Tax-Sale Registration Fees, June 2007

On January 2, 2007, the Ombudsman received a complaint regarding the fee that county treasurers charge registrants at annual tax sales. The complainant said generally that many of the state’s counties, especially larger ones, appeared to be charging higher fees than was thought to be allowed by law. Investigation The investigation was conducted by Assistant Ombudsman Bert Dalmer. For purposes of this report, all investigative actions are ascribed to the Ombudsman. In early 2007, the Ombudsman surveyed tax-sale registration fees in 10 of the state’s 99 counties. Interviews of 10 county treasurers and/or some of their deputies were conducted. In addition, the Ombudsman researched the Iowa Code and relevant case law. The Ombudsman also consulted with the Iowa State Auditor and the president of the Iowa State County Treasurers Association.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Iowa Individual Income Tax School District, Tax Year 1997

Iowa School District Surtax Report 1997