860 resultados para political equilibrium
Resumo:
This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.
Resumo:
Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.
Resumo:
We present a stylized intertemporal forward-looking model able that accommodates key regional economic features, an area where the literature is not well developed. The main difference, from the standard applications, is the role of saving and its implication for the balance of payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-looking behaviour for agents, the rate of private saving is exogenously determined and so no neoclassical financial adjustment is needed. Also, we focus on the similarities and the differences between myopic and forward-looking models, highlighting the divergences among the main adjustment equations and the resulting simulation outcomes.
Resumo:
This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.
Resumo:
This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.
Resumo:
The aim of the paper is to identify the added value from using general equilibrium techniques to consider the economy-wide impacts of increased efficiency in household energy use. We take as an illustrative case study the effect of a 5% improvement in household energy efficiency on the UK economy. This impact is measured through simulations that use models that have increasing degrees of endogeneity but are calibrated on a common data set. That is to say, we calculate rebound effects for models that progress from the most basic partial equilibrium approach to a fully specified general equilibrium treatment. The size of the rebound effect on total energy use depends upon: the elasticity of substitution of energy in household consumption; the energy intensity of the different elements of household consumption demand; and the impact of changes in income, economic activity and relative prices. A general equilibrium model is required to capture these final three impacts.
Resumo:
This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.
Resumo:
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].
Resumo:
This paper employs an unobserved component model that incorporates a set of economic fundamentals to obtain the Euro-Dollar permanent equilibrium exchange rates (PEER) for the period 1975Q1 to 2008Q4. The results show that for most of the sample period, the Euro-Dollar exchange rate closely followed the values implied by the PEER. The only significant deviations from the PEER occurred in the years immediately before and after the introduction of the single European currency. The forecasting exercise shows that incorporating economic fundamentals provides a better long-run exchange rate forecasting performance than a random walk process.
Resumo:
I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.
Resumo:
This article investigates the history of land and water transformations in Matadepera, a wealthy suburb of metropolitan Barcelona. Analysis is informed by theories of political ecology and methods of environmental history; although very relevant, these have received relatively little attention within ecological economics. Empirical material includes communications from the City Archives of Matadepera (1919-1979), 17 interviews with locals born between 1913 and 1958, and an exhaustive review of grey historical literature. Existing water histories of Barcelona and its outskirts portray a battle against natural water scarcity, hard won by heroic engineers and politicians acting for the good of the community. Our research in Matadepera tells a very different story. We reveal the production of a highly uneven landscape and waterscape through fierce political and power struggles. The evolution of Matadepera from a small rural village to an elite suburb was anything but spontaneous or peaceful. It was a socio-environmental project well intended by landowning elites and heavily fought by others. The struggle for the control of water went hand in hand with the land and political struggles that culminated – and were violently resolved - in the Spanish Civil War. The displacement of the economic and environmental costs of water use from few to many continues to this day and is constitutive of Matadepera’s uneven and unsustainable landscape. By unravelling the relations of power that are inscribed in the urbanization of nature (Swyngedouw, 2004), we question the perceived wisdoms of contemporary water policy debates, particularly the notion of a natural scarcity that merits a technical or economic response. We argue that the water question is fundamentally a political question of environmental justice; it is about negotiating alternative visions of the future and deciding whose visions will be produced.
Resumo:
This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.