Joint modeling of lithosphere and mantle dynamics: Evaluation of constraints from global tomography models

With the advances in technology, seismological theory, and data acquisition, a number of high-resolution seismic tomography models have been published. However, discrepancies between tomography models often arise from different theoretical treatments of seismic wave propagation, different inversion strategies, and different data sets. Using a fixed velocity-to-density scaling and a fixed radial viscosity profile, we compute global mantle flow models associated with the different tomography models and test the impact of these for explaining surface geophysical observations (geoid, dynamic topography, stress, and strain rates). We use the joint modeling of lithosphere and mantle dynamics approach of Ghosh and Holt (2012) to compute the full lithosphere stresses, except that we use HC for the mantle circulation model, which accounts for the primary flow-coupling features associated with density-driven mantle flow. Our results show that the seismic tomography models of S40RTS and SAW642AN provide a better match with surface observables on a global scale than other models tested. Both of these tomography models have important similarities, including upwellings located in Pacific, Eastern Africa, Iceland, and mid-ocean ridges in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean and downwelling flows mainly located beneath the Andes, the Middle East, and central and Southeast Asia.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.