989 resultados para labor market imperfections
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The informal economy is a very important sector of the Indian economy. The National Council of Applied Economic Research estimates that the informal sector - "unorganised sector" - generates about 62% of GDP and provides for about 55% of total employment (ILO 2002, p. 14). This paper studies the characteristics of the workers in the informal economy and whether internal migrants treat this sector as a temporary location before moving on to the organised or formal sector to improve their lifetime income and living conditions. We limit our study to the Indian urban (non-agricultural) sector and study the characteristics of the household heads that belong to the informal sector (self-employed and informal wage workers) and the formal sector. We find that household heads that are less educated, come from poorer households, and/or are in lower social groups (castes and religions) are more likely to be in the informal sector. In addition, our results show strong evidence that the longer a rural migrant household head has been working in the urban sector, ceteris paribus, the more likely that individual has moved out of the informal wage sector. These results support the hypothesis that, for internal migrants, the informal wage labour market is a stepping stone to a better and more certain life in the formal sector.
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International production fragmentation has been a global trend for decades, becoming especially important in Asia where the manufacturing process is fragmented into stages and dispersed around the region. This paper examines the effects of input and output tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities at the firm level. For this purpose, we consider a simple heterogenous firm model in which firms are allowed to export their products and to use imported intermediate inputs. The model predicts that only productive firms can use imported intermediate inputs (outsourcing) and tend to have larger constant-output labor demand elasticities. Input tariff reductions would lower the factor shares of labor for these productive firms and raise conditional labor demand elasticities further. We test these empirical predictions, constructing Chinese firm-level panel data over the 2000--2006 period. Controlling for potential tariff endogeneity by instruments, our empirical studies generally support these predictions.
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All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.
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The literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues while the impact of capital foonation is largely neglected Job-creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock. In contrast, this paper explicitly deals with the long-run consequences of institutional shocks on capital foonation and employment. It is shown that the usual trade off between employment and wages disappears in the long run. In line with an appropriation model, the estimated values for the long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are substantially greater than one.
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An increasing number of bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (or regional trade agreements: RTAs) include "labor clauses" that require or urge the signatory countries to commit to maintaining a certain level of labor standards. This paper performs an empirical analysis of the impacts of such labor clauses provided in RTAs on working conditions that laborers in the RTA signatory countries actually face, using macro-level data for a wide variety of countries. The paper first examines the texts of labor provisions in more than 220 effective RTAs and (re-)classifies "RTAs with labor clauses" according to two criteria: (i) the agreement urges or expects the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor standards with internationally recognized standards, and (ii) the agreement stipulates the procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on labor-condition issues between the signatory countries. Based on this labor-clause RTA classification, the paper estimates the impacts of RTA labor clauses on working conditions in countries with two empirical specifications using the sample covering 136 countries or economies and years from 1995 through 2011. The estimation is extended to takes into account possible lags in the labor-condition effects of labor clauses as well as to consider potential difference in the impacts for countries in different income levels. The empirical results for the four measures of labor conditions (mean monthly real earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal occupational injury rate, and the number of the ILO's Core Conventions ratified) find no evidence for possible pro-labor-condition effects of RTA labor clauses overall, which should be consistent with the view of economics literature that questions the relevance of linking trade policy with issues in the domestic labor standards.
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Vol. 2, no. 5, May 1915, erroneously numbered v. 2, no. 4.
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Geographic area includes Adams, Kane, Kankakee, Tazewell, Union, and Woodford Counties, and Addison, Maywood, Moline and Woodridge municipal areas in Illinois.
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"April 1957."
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"December 1955."
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"June 1956."
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"January 1956."
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"November 1959."
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"October 1955."
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Chiefly tables.
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Report prepared by John W. Trutkow of James Bell Associates and Burt S. Barnow, Any B. Chasanov, and Abhay Pande of Lewin-ICF under Dept. of Labor contract no. 99-9-4701-75-077-01.