The dynamics of spending and absorption of aid : panel data analysis

In September 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to make the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth the fundamental objectives of lending operations in its poorest member countries. This paper studies the spending and absorption of aid in PRGF-supported programs, verifies whether the use of aid is programmed to be smoothed over time, and analyzes how considerations about macroeconomic stability influence the programmed use of aid. The paper shows that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the economy. In addition, the paper finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or spending of aid.

第2章 開発途上国と債務管理におけるガバナンス

「公的債務管理の概念」は18世紀から一部先進国で導入され、20世紀後半から租税制度や金融・財政政策との関連、先進国の事例も含めた財政・金融危機、あるいは民営化や地方分権化実施の試みに伴い、さまざまな議論が展開された。しかし、歳入基盤が不安定であったり、税制が未整備なために国内外で常に資金調達を行わねばならない開発途上国がどのように公的債務を管理すべきか、その行政システムや関連法、ガバナンスの構築に関する取組みは1990年代終盤から2000年代初にかけて本格的に始まったばかりである。債務問題と公的債務管理に関する先行研究のレビュー、IMF・世界銀行作成した公的債務管理に関するガイドラインや、これをもとに実施された試験的プログラムの報告書等をもとに債務管理上のガバナンス要件や途上国における現状を検討すると、(1)国際機関が定める「公的債務」の定義と実際、(2)組織としての「政府」におけるガバナンス問題、(3)公会計制度の整備(あるいは国際的な普遍化)が課題として挙げられる。

Artisan procedures to generate uniform tilings

This paper try to prove how artisans c ould discover all uniform tilings and very interesting others us ing artisanal combinatorial pro cedures without having to use mathematical procedures out of their reac h. Plane Geometry started up his way through History by means of fundamental drawing tools: ruler and co mpass. Artisans used same tools to carry out their orna mental patterns but at some point they began to work manually using physical representations of fi gures or tiles previously drawing by means of ruler and compass. That is an important step for craftsman because this way provides tools that let him come in the world of symmetry opera tions and empirical knowledge of symmetry groups. Artisans started up to pr oduce little wooden, ceramic or clay tiles and began to experiment with them by means of joining pieces whether edge to edge or vertex to vertex in that way so it can c over the plane without gaps. Economy in making floor or ceramic tiles could be most important reason to develop these procedures. This empiric way to develop tilings led not only to discover all uniform tilings but later discovering of aperiodic tilings.

Artisan procedures to generate uniform tilings

This paper try to prove how artisans c ould discover all uniform tilings and very interesting others us ing artisanal combinatorial pro cedures without having to use mathematical procedures out of their reac h. Plane Geometry started up his way through History by means of fundamental drawing tools: ruler and co mpass. Artisans used same tools to carry out their orna mental patterns but at some point they began to work manually using physical representations of fi gures or tiles previously drawing by means of ruler and compass. That is an important step for craftsman because this way provides tools that let him come in the world of symmetry opera tions and empirical knowledge of symmetry groups. Artisans started up to pr oduce little wooden, ceramic or clay tiles and began to experiment with them by means of joining pieces whether edge to edge or vertex to vertex in that way so it can c over the plane without gaps. Economy in making floor or ceramic tiles could be most important reason to develop these procedures. This empiric way to develop tilings led not only to discover all uniform tilings but later discovering of aperiodic tilings.

ANALISANDO A RELAÇÃO DOS VOLUMES DE EXPORTAÇÃO E DE IMPORTAÇÃO, PIB, TAXAS DE CÂMBIO E INFLAÇÃO NO PERÍODO DE 2004 A 2014.

Esta dissertação visa deslumbrar uma análise macroeconômica do Brasil, especialmente no que se refere à relação dos índices mensais dos volumes das exportações e das importações com os volumes mensais do PIB, da Taxa SELIC e as Taxas de Câmbio, conforme dados coletados no período de janeiro de 2004 a dezembro de 2014, através de pesquisa literária referente aos históricos sobre cada conceito envolvido no âmbito da macroeconomia das varáveis estudadas. Foi realizado um estudo de caso embasado em dados de sites governamentais, no período delimitado, empregando-se o método de regressão linear, com base na Teoria da correlação de Pearson, demonstrando os resultados obtidos no período do estudo para as varáveis estudadas. Desta maneira, conseguiu-se estudar e analisar como as variáveis dependentes (resposta): volume das exportações e volume das importações estão relacionadas com as varáveis independentes (explicativas): PIB, Taxa Selic e taxa de Câmbio. Os resultados apurados no presente estudo permitem identificar que existe correlação moderada e negativa, quando analisadas a Taxa Selic e a Taxa de Câmbio com os volumes das exportações e das importações, enquanto o PIB apresenta correlação forte e positiva na análise com os volumes das exportações e das importações

EU-Mercosur trade relations: impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs. CEPS Working Document No. 372, February 2013

The issue of “trade and exchange rate misalignments” is being discussed at the G20, IMF and WTO, following an initiative by Brazil. The main purpose of this paper is to apply the methodology developed by the authors to exam the impacts of misalignment on tariffs in order to analyse the impacts of misalignments on the trade relations between two customs unions – the EU and Mercosur, as well as to explain how tariff barriers are affected. It is divided into several sections: the first summarises the debate on exchange rates at the WTO; the second explains the methodology used to determine exchange rate misalignments; the third and fourth summarises the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of ‘misalignment tariffication’; the fifth reviews the effects of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs and its consequences for the trade negotiations between the two areas; and the last concludes and suggests a way to move the debate forward in the context of regional arrangements.

The response speed of the International Monetary Fund. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/03, 16 July 2013

The more severe a financial crisis, the greater has been the likelihood of its management under an IMF-supported programme and the shorter the time from crisis onset to programme initiation. Political links to the United States have increased programme likelihood but have prompted faster response mainly for ‘major’crises. Over time, the IMF’s response has not been robustly faster, but the time sensitivity to the more severe crises and those related to fixed exchange rate regimes did increase from the mid-1980s. Similarly, democracies had tended to stall programme initiation but have become more supportive of financial markets’ demands for quicker action.

Does the European Semester deliver the right policy advice? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/12, 20 September 2013

The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.

Global and regional financial safety nets: lessons from Europe and Asia. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/06 [07?], November 2013

The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the European crisis (2009) have both contributed to the development and deepening of regional safety net arrangements. This paper analyses the relationships between global and regional financial safety nets, and uncovers the potential tensions and operational challenges associated with the involvement of several institutional players with potentially different interests, analytical biases and governance. The G20 has acknowledged the importance of these new players for the international monetary system, but the principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements are far too broad and ad hoc to contribute to a coherent and effective architecture. This paper tries to establish some lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the current European crisis in order to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, equity and governance of these arrangements. In particular, it proposes changes to the IMF articles of agreement to allow for lending or guarantees to regional arrangements directly and it establishes some key desirable features and practices of regional mechanisms that should be adopted everywhere to ensure some global consistency, particularly in the field of macroeconomic surveillance, programme design and conditionality.

Changing trade patterns, unchanging European and global governance. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/02, February 2014

The world economy is going through its biggest transformation in a relatively short space time. There have been many explanations for this phenomenon but the unprecedented scale and pace of this change and, most crucially, its implications, still seems little understood. In turn, there has been little preparation for, or adjustment to, this changing world, though if the change continues at this pace, the effectiveness of many global institutions in their current form will be threatened. We highlight the dramatic degree of the shifts taking place in world GDP and trade and include fresh projections of what world trade patterns might look like in 2020, should the trends observed over the past decade to continue. We also show the resulting shift in trade relationships for many key countries. European member states tend to have quite different trading partners’ profiles, and this heterogeneity is quite likely to become more pronounced with time. This, in turn, suggests a significant challenge for the effective functioning of the euro area and weakens the original rationale of its creation. If our projections to 2020 are broadly right, then many established frameworks for the running of the world economy and its governance are not going to be fit for purpose, and will need to change. The global monetary system itself, and global organisations such as the IMF, G7, and G20 are going to have to adapt considerably if they want to remain legitimate representatives of the world order. The alternative is their relegation to irrelevance.

A New Deal for growth and jobs in the Eurozone revisited. EPC Commentary, 27 January 2014

At the EPC breakfast on 28 January, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde will launch a book on Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery, containing detailed policy analysis and recommendations. The book is a further sign that there is now wide-spread recognition that it is high time for Europe to take more action to deliver jobs and growth.

Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

It’s not just Russia: Currency crisis in the Commonwealth of independent states. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/01, February 2015

The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.