Nouveaux principes de lecture, à l'usage des Frères de Marie, de l'instruction chrétienne (5e édition)

[Abécédaire (français). 1851]

Acquired form of angioedema of the head and neck related to a deficiency in c1-inhibitor: a case report with a review of the literature.

Angioedema related to a deficiency in the C1-inhibitor protein is characterized by its lack of response to therapies including antihistamine, steroids, and epinephrine. In the case of laryngeal edema, mortality rate is approximately 30 percent. The first case of the acquired form of angioedema related to a deficiency in C1-inhibitor was published in 1972. In our paper, we present a case of an acquired form of angioedema of the oropharyngeal region secondary to the simultaneous occurrence of two causative factors: neutralization of C1-inhibitor by an autoantibody and the use of an angiotensin convertin enzyme inhibitor.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

On the closed-form approximation of short-time random strike options

In this paper we propose a general technique to develop first and second order closed-form approximation formulas for short-time options withrandom strikes. Our method is based on Malliavin calculus techniques andallows us to obtain simple closed-form approximation formulas dependingon the derivative operator. The numerical analysis shows that these formulas are extremely accurate and improve some previous approaches ontwo-assets and three-assets spread options as Kirk's formula or the decomposition mehod presented in Alòs, Eydeland and Laurence (2011).

Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.