Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: ""Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!

The effects of uncertainty avoidance on brand performance: Marketing creativity, product innovation and the brand duration

This paper investigates the link between brand performance and cultural primes in high-risk,innovation-based sectors. In theory section, we propose that the level of cultural uncertaintyavoidance embedded in a firm determine its marketing creativity by increasing the complexityand the broadness of a brand. It determines also the rate of firm product innovations.Marketing creativity and product innovation influence finally the firm marketingperformance. Empirically, we study trademarked promotion in the Software Security Industry(SSI). Our sample consists of 87 firms that are active in SSI from 11 countries in the period1993-2000. We use the data coming from SSI-related trademarks registered by these firms,ending up with 2,911 SSI-related trademarks and a panel of 18,213 observations. We estimatea two stage model in which first we predict the complexity and the broadness of a trademarkas a measure of marketing creativity and the rate of product innovations. Among severalcontrol variables, our variable of theoretical interest is the Hofstede s uncertainty avoidancecultural index. Then, we estimate the trademark duration with a hazard model using thepredicted complexity and broadness as well as the rate of product innovations, along with thesame control variables. Our evidence confirms that the cultural avoidance affects the durationof the trademarks through the firm marketing creativity and product innovation.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2007

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestrictedgrant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, andincome at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local publicspending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or otherrevenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% andliteracy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accountingfor corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar tothe average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital,the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains werepositive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending hadstronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reductionwas evenly spread across the country.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

El impacto de los servicios sanitarios sobre la salud

This paper reviews what has increased medical-care spending bought in terms of health benefitswith longitudinal data from the U.S and, more limited, from Spain. Health services contributionto health has been positive in average, especially during the last 50 years for the U.S andthe last 30 years for Spain. This contribution differs among countries and is much greater forsome diseases (cardiovascular) than for others (cancer). Benefits from health care interventionscan be valued on basis on the social willin gness to pay, observed or declared on the process ofestablishing health policy priorities. 30.000 euros per Quality Adjusted Life Year could providean efficiency threshold for financing publicly health services in Spain: Consensus andlegitimacy of the political process of establishing health priorities becomes, however, moreimportant than any approximate number. Attention is paid finally to bridging the gap betweenefficacy (the possibilities given by innovation and resources devoted to health care) andeffectiveness (the distance to the frontier) of the everyday working of a health system with itsinappropriate care and limited application of the existing knowledge.

Expertise and finance: Mergers motivated by technological change

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad quality projects is reduced. Experts can continue to charge a low rate of interest for financing because their expertise enables them to identify good quality projects and to avoid unprofitable investments. On the other hand, non-experts now charge a higher rate of interest in order to screen bad projects. More entrepreneurs, therefore, disclose their projects to experts to raise funds from them. Such experts are, however, able to copy the projects and disclosure to them invites the possibility of competition. Thus the entrepreneur and the expert may merge so as to achieve product market collusion. As well as rationalizing mergers, the model can also explain various forms of venture financing by experts such as corporate investors and business angels.

Drug innovation, prices and health

This article tries to reconcile economic-industrial policy with health policy when dealing with biomedical innovation and welfare state sustainability. Better health accounts for an increasingly large proportion of welfare improvements. Explanation is given to the welfare losses coming from the fact than industrial and health policy tend to ignore each other. Drug s prices reflecting their relative relative effectiveness send the right signal to the industry rewarding innovation with impact on quantity and quality of life- and to the buyers of health care services.The level of drug s public reimbursement indicates the social willingness to pay of the different national health systems, not only by means of inclusion, or rejection, in the basket of services covered, but especially establishing the proportion of the price that is going to be financed publicly.Reference pricing for therapeutic equivalents as the upper limit of the social willingness to pay- and two-tiered co-payments for users (avoidable and inversely related with the incremental effectiveness of de drug) are deemed appropriate for those countries concerned at the same time with increasing their productivity and maintaining its welfare state. Profits drive R&D but not its location. There is no intrinsic contradiction between high productivity and a consolidated National Health Service (welfare state) as the European Nordic Countries are telling us every day.

Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries,and why they are often reversed. It does so by focusing on the use oflobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postponecostly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Giventhe availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firmswill lobby for a sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic profits from awidening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be postponed. But asthe contributions required by the government grow with the size of thequality gap, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease thelobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and technologicalcatch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap",and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment.Therefore, cycles in protection will occur as a result of the use oflobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus sheds new light onthe impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbyingeffort over time, and on their implications for the timing and the timehorizon of trade reforms in developing countries.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.