Parsing executive processes: Strategic vs. evaluative functions of the anterior cingulate cortex

Event-related functional MRI and a version of the Stroop color naming task were used to test two conflicting theories of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) function during executive processes of cognition. A response-related increase in ACC activity was present when strategic processes were less engaged, and conflict high, but not when strategic processes were engaged and conflict reduced. This is inconsistent with the widely held view that the ACC implements strategic processes to reduce cognitive conflicts, such as response competition. Instead, it suggests that the ACC serves an evaluative function, detecting cognitive states such as response competition, which may lead to poor performance, and representing the knowledge that strategic processes need to be engaged.

The state library agency; its functions and organization, statement by the A. L. A. Library extension board, adopted by the A. L. A. executive board (for present use, subject to revision).

Appendices: State library extension agencies by form or organization. State library agencies by states.

Executive Order Number Seventeen, September 25, 2009

This Executive Order expects the State of Iowa executive agencies and Regent Institutions own, purchase, build and lease property, including office space, worth billions of dollars for educational, correctional, recreational, conservation, transportation, communication, public health, workforce and related public functions and the placement of state offices in historic central business districts "downtown" can strengthen and revitalize Iowa's cities and towns.

Pattern of Executive Remuneration in the Manufacturing Public Enterprises in Kerala

The study is undertaken by the researcher with the object of examining the remuneration pattern of executive personnel in the manufacturing public enterprises in Kerala so as to find out whether there is any rationale or criteria involved in remunerating executives. It is also envisaged to find out the pattern of executive remuneration in the various categories of industries and inter—industry disparities among the public sector enterprises. This is considered to be a very fruitful area for investigation, particularly in view of the generally prevailing notion that public sector executives in Kerala are not remunerated properly and glaring inequalities and disparities are existing among the various categories of industries and within the same industry. Therefore the study is to explore the criteria used for the determination of executive remuneration and the relative weightage of various factors such as size of the firm, rate of return sales volume etc of the organisation and various other factors such as qualification, experience, level of job and functions of executives. Further the study is extended to find out the role of 'pay' towards motivation and efficiency of the executive personnel

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Reorganization plan no. 16 of 1950 : transferring the functions of the General Services Administration relating to assistance to local school districts and water pollution control to the Federal Security Agency : report.

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

Reorganization plan no. 20 of 1950 : transferring of functions from the Secretary of State and the Department of State to the Administrator of General Services : report.

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

Reorganization plan no. 21 of 1950 : providing for abolition of the Maritime Commission and the transfer of its functions to the Department of Commerce : report (to accompany S. Res. 265)

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

Reorganization plan no. 19 of 1950 : transfer of employees' compensation functions from Federal Security Agency to Department of Labor : report.

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

Reorganization plan no. 18 of 1950 : building and space management functions : report (to accompany S. Res. 270)

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

[Consolidation and reorganization activities, status and results of internal audit services pursuant to Executive Order 10 (2003)] /

Illinois Executive Order 10 (2003) authorized the consolidation of the internal auditing functions from 26 designated agencies into a single statewide function covering 46 agencies/boards/commissions that report to the Governor. After further consolidation, internal audit coverage has been expanded to 36 agencies.

[Consolidation and reorganization activities, status and results of facilities management pursuant to Executive Order 2003-10] /

Illinois Executive Order 2003-10 authorized the consoldiation of facilities management for agencies, offices, divisions, departments, bureaus, boards and commissions directly responsible to the Governor into the Dept. of Central Management Services (CMS). Facilities management functions include the operation and maintenance of state-owned or state-leased facilties.

[Summary of the reorganization and merger of the Illinois Department of the Lottery, the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, and the Illinois Racing Board with the Illinois Department of Revenue, pursuant to Executive Order 9, which took effect on June 1, 2003]

In accordance with 15-ILCS 15/11, from Chapter 127, paragraph 1811, the following report is offered to summarize the reorganization of the Department of the Lottery, the Liquor Control Commission, and the Illinois Racing Board merger with the Department of Revenue, pursuant to Executive Order 9, which took effect on June 1, 2003. As part of the governor's ongoing effort to streamline state government and improve efficiency, the consolidation eliminated duplication by integrating administrative functions of the agencies with the Department of Revenue. The change resulted in savings of $3 million on an annual basis from 29 fewer positions and a reduction of leased office space at 7 Lottery locations throughout the state. Streamlined operations were achieved by merging human resource management, procurement, accounting, information technology, and other administrative support services. In addition, Lottery headquarters in Springfield and Chicago, as well as sales district office locations throughout the state were merged with existing Department of Revenue offices, significantly reducing state lease costs. Core functions of the Lottery, Liquor Control Commission, and Racing Board remain intact, and the boards and commission that oversee these entities retain their regulatory responsibilities. The department is considering recommending "clean-up" legislation to replace statutory references to the "Department of the Lottery" with the "Division of the Lottery" or "Department of Revenue Division of the Lottery".

Development of performance standards for ES : executive summary /

"The objective of the project was to develop methods for establishing output and input performance standards for the placement and placement-support functions of the United States Employment Service (ES)."

Are stress and mixed urinary incontinence associated with impaired executive control in community-dwelling older women?

Objectives: To assess whether stress or mixed urinary incontinence (UI) is associated with deficits in executive functioning among community-dwelling women. Design: An observational study comparing the performance, using multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) and Bonferroni post hoc test, of continent women and women with stress or mixed UI during executive control tasks. Setting: The research center of the Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal. Participants: One hundred and fifty-five community-dwelling women aged 60 and older participated in the study. Measurements: Based on the Urogenital Distress Inventory (UDI), participants were split into three groups: 35 continent women, 43 women with stress UI, and 78 women with mixed UI. Participants completed a battery of neuropsychological tests and a computerized dual-task test. Results: Women with mixed UI showed poorer performances than continent and stress UI women in executive control functions. Deficits were specific to tests involving switching and sharing/dividing attention between two tasks. Conclusion: Results of this study suggest that mixed UI can be associated with executive control deficits in community-dwelling older women. Future intervention studies in the treatment of UI should take the higher risk of an executive control deficit in women with UI under consideration.