Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Dynamic Activity-Related Incentives for Physical Activity.

The present studies adopted the theoretical framework of activity- and purpose-related incentives (Rheinberg, 2008) to explain the maintenance of physical activity. We hypothesized that activity-related incentives (e.g., “fun”) increase more than purpose-related incentives (e.g., “health”) between the initiation and maintenance phase of physical activity. Additionally, change in activity-related incentives was hypothesized to be a better predictor of maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. Two correlative field studies with rehabilitation patients (Study 1) and Nordic Walkers (Study 2) were conducted to test the hypotheses. Participants’ incentives of physical activity were measured at the beginning of exercising and two weeks (Study 1; T2) and three months (Study 2; T2) later. At T2, participants were asked for their current physical activity. Both studies showed a greater change of activity-related incentives than purpose-related incentives. Furthermore, change in activity-related incentives was more predictive of the maintenance of physical activity than change in purpose-related incentives. The results showed the important role of activity-related incentives in maintenance of physical activity. The theoretical contribution to physical activity maintenance research and practical implications for health promotion programs were discussed.

New Patterns of Democracy in the Countries of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

The chapter introduces a new database on political-institutional patterns of democracy used in the contributions to the book. It provides an update and extension of Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) measurement of consensus and majoritarian democracy for the countries of the second wave of the CSES during the period 1997–2006, using 11 partly improved indicators. The chapter explores patterns of democracy by the means of factor analysis, construct additive indices, and present the resulting country scores of consensus and majoritarian democracy graphically. Two variants are presented, one featuring Lijphart’s (1999) classic ‘executives–parties’ and ‘federal–unitary’ dimensions, and another incorporating direct democracy into the framework, yielding an additional ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension

What Type of Resources? Household Effects and Female Electoral Participation

Mechanisms behind partner effects are contingent on women's individual resource endowment. While low and medium educated women most strongly profit from higher educational partner resources, i.e. from a compensatory mechanism, the resource “time” seems to particularly confine political involvement of women with both high professional status or no employment.