Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Chrysomya albiceps (Wiedemann) and Hemilucilia segmentaria (Fabricius) (Diptera, Calliphoridae) used to estimate the postmortem interval in a forensic case in Minas Gerais, Brazil

ABSTRACT. Chrysomya albiceps (Wiedemann) and Hemilucilia segmentaria (Fabricius) (Diptera, Calliphoridae) used to estimate the postmortem interval in a forensic case in Minas Gerais, Brazil. The corpse of a man was found in a Brazilian highland savanna (cerrado) in the state of Minas Gerais. Fly larvae were collected at the crime scene and arrived at the laboratory three days afterwards. From the eight pre-pupae, seven adults of Chrysomya albiceps (Wiedemann, 1819) emerged and, from the two larvae, two adults of Hemilucilia segmentaria (Fabricius, 1805) were obtained. As necrophagous insects use corpses as a feeding resource, their development rate can be used as a tool to estimate the postmortem interval. The post-embryonary development stage of the immature collected on the body was estimated as the difference between the total development time and the time required for them to become adults in the lab. The estimated age of the maggots from both species and the minimum postmortem interval were four days. This is the first time that H. segmentaria is used to estimate the postmortem interval in a forensic case.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

On the concept of optimality interval

The approximants to regular continued fractions constitute `best approximations' to the numbers they converge to in two ways known as of the first and the second kind.This property of continued fractions provides a solution to Gosper's problem of the batting average: if the batting average of a baseball player is 0.334, what is the minimum number of times he has been at bat? In this paper, we tackle somehow the inverse question: given a rational number P/Q, what is the set of all numbers for which P/Q is a `best approximation' of one or the other kind? We prove that inboth cases these `Optimality Sets' are intervals and we give aprecise description of their endpoints.

One-sided tolerance interval in a two-way balanced nested model with mixed effects

In many research areas (such as public health, environmental contamination, and others) one deals with the necessity of using data to infer whether some proportion (%) of a population of interest is (or one wants it to be) below and/or over some threshold, through the computation of tolerance interval. The idea is, once a threshold is given, one computes the tolerance interval or limit (which might be one or two - sided bounded) and then to check if it satisfies the given threshold. Since in this work we deal with the computation of one - sided tolerance interval, for the two-sided case we recomend, for instance, Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [5]. Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4] performed the computation of upper tolerance limit in balanced and unbalanced one-way random effects models, whereas Fonseca et al [3] performed it based in a similar ideas but in a tow-way nested mixed or random effects model. In case of random effects model, Fonseca et al [3] performed the computation of such interval only for the balanced data, whereas in the mixed effects case they dit it only for the unbalanced data. For the computation of twosided tolerance interval in models with mixed and/or random effects we recomend, for instance, Sharma and Mathew [7]. The purpose of this paper is the computation of upper and lower tolerance interval in a two-way nested mixed effects models in balanced data. For the case of unbalanced data, as mentioned above, Fonseca et al [3] have already computed upper tolerance interval. Hence, using the notions persented in Fonseca et al [3] and Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4], we present some results on the construction of one-sided tolerance interval for the balanced case. Thus, in order to do so at first instance we perform the construction for the upper case, and then the construction for the lower case.

Experimental evidence that intra-specific competition in seagrass meadows reduces reproductive potential in the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus (Lamarck)

To better understand the biological controls that regulate sea urchin dynamics, we studied the effects of potential inter- and intra-specific competition for food on several biological variables of the main sea urchin in the Mediterranean (Paracentrotus lividus). We carried out a caging experiment in which we manipulated sea urchin density (natural vs. high density) and herbivorous fish (Sarpa salpa) accessibility (free access vs. exclusion) in a Posidonia oceanica meadow. No evidence of competition between fish and urchins was detected. Neither density-dependent mortality nor changes in the somatic variables were found; however, we detected that intra-specific competition affected the reproductive potential of P. lividus. The gonad index of urchins at high population densities was ca. 30% lower than that of urchins at natural densities. As a spawning event had just occurred when urchins were collected, these differences probably reflect differences in reserve content, which may compromise the following reproductive period and decrease survival in the long term, as the gonads are also used as storage organs. For the time period studied, mortality rates appeared to be independent of local densities. The results indicate that a long-term negative feedback mechanism appears to take place in P. lividus in response to increased population density.

Multicopy suppression of a gacA mutation by the infC operon in Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0: competition with the global translational regulator RsmA.

The gacA gene of the biocontrol strain Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0 codes for a response regulator which, together with the sensor kinase GacS (=LemA), is required for the production of exoenzymes and secondary metabolites involved in biocontrol, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN). A gacA multicopy suppressor was isolated from a cosmid library of strain CHA0 and identified as the infC-rpmI-rplT operon, which encodes the translation initiation factor IF3 and the ribosomal proteins L35 and L20. The efficiency of suppression was about 30%, as determined by the use of a GacA-controlled reporter construct, i.e. a translational hcnA'-'lacZ fusion. Overexpression of the rsmA gene (coding for a global translational repressor) reversed the suppressive effect of the amplified infC operon. This finding suggests that some product(s) of the infC operon can compete with RsmA at the level of translation in P. fluorescens CHA0 and that important biocontrol traits can be regulated at this level.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.