The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.

Transitions in partnership and parental status, gender, and political and civic participation

Participation research has documented the effect of partner and parenthood status, thereby ignoring the dynamic aspect of status changes. Based on theoretical insights on changes in political resources and interest, this study looks at partnership and parenthood as dynamic characteristics. Using data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), it examines to what extent important life-cycle transitions in partnership and parental status influence various forms of political and civic participation and whether they affect men and women's participation differently. Our regression analyses reveal that particularly the entry into separation or divorce is a main key point driving change in political and civic participation. Its effect is also highly gendered. Following separation, women participate less in voting, whereas men's participation rates are not affected in a negative way. Separation even increases men's level of anticipated activism. Children entering or leaving the household do not seem to represent key points of change in political and civic participation of the couple. Yet, the transition to having school-aged children significantly increases some types of participation, at least for women.

Appropriateness of colonoscopy in Europe (EPAGE II): presentation of methodology, general results, and analysis of complications.

BACKGROUND AND STUDY AIMS: Appropriate use of colonoscopy is a key component of quality management in gastrointestinal endoscopy. In an update of a 1998 publication, the 2008 European Panel on the Appropriateness of Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (EPAGE II) defined appropriateness criteria for various colonoscopy indications. This introductory paper therefore deals with methodology, general appropriateness, and a review of colonoscopy complications. METHODS:The RAND/UCLA Appropriateness Method was used to evaluate the appropriateness of various diagnostic colonoscopy indications, with 14 multidisciplinary experts using a scale from 1 (extremely inappropriate) to 9 (extremely appropriate). Evidence reported in a comprehensive updated literature review was used for these decisions. Consolidation of the ratings into three appropriateness categories (appropriate, uncertain, inappropriate) was based on the median and the heterogeneity of the votes. The experts then met to discuss areas of disagreement in the light of existing evidence, followed by a second rating round, with a subsequent third voting round on necessity criteria, using much more stringent criteria (i. e. colonoscopy is deemed mandatory). RESULTS: Overall, 463 indications were rated, with 55 %, 16 % and 29 % of them being judged appropriate, uncertain and inappropriate, respectively. Perforation and hemorrhage rates, as reported in 39 studies, were in general < 0.1 % and < 0.3 %, respectively CONCLUSIONS: The updated EPAGE II criteria constitute an aid to clinical decision-making but should in no way replace individual judgment. Detailed panel results are freely available on the internet (www.epage.ch) and will thus constitute a reference source of information for clinicians.

Predictors of political orientation among US-born Mexican Americans: cultural identification, acculturation attitudes and socioeconomic status

With each passing election, U.S. political campaigns have renewed their efforts in courting the “Latino vote,” yet the Latino population is not a culturally homogenous voting bloc. This study examined how cultural identifications and acculturation attitudes in U.S. born Mexican Americans interacted with socioeconomic status (SES) to predict political orientation. Individuals who held stronger Mexican identity and supported biculturalism as an acculturation strategy had a more liberal orientation, while belonging to a higher SES group and holding stronger assimilation attitudes predicted a less liberal orientation. Mexican cultural identification interacted with SES such that those who held a weaker Mexican identity, but came from a higher social class were less liberal and more moderate in their political orientation. Weak Mexican identification and higher SES also predicted weaker endorsement of bicultural acculturation attitudes, which in turn, mediated the differences in political orientation. The acceptance of one’s ethnic identity and endorsement of bicultural attitudes predicted a more liberal political orientation. In light of these findings, political candidates should be cautious in how they pander to Latino constituents—referencing the groups’ ethnic culture or customs may distance constituents who are not strongly identified with their ethnic culture.

Executive Order Number Forty-Two, July 2005

Excecutive order signed by Governor Thomas Vilsck. Grants voting rights to disqualified electors who have discharged their sentence, probation or parole.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Judicial Voter Guide: A Guide to Iowa’s Judicial Retention Elections, 2006

This guide is a informaitonal guide for judicial voters. Frist PDF verison is condensed, the second PDF verison is full text with biographies of judges.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.