998 resultados para U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission
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"Conference sponsored by U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Office of Naval Research, [and] Stanford University."
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Reprint. Originally published: Washington : U.S. G.P.O., 1940. (Report / 76th Congress, 3d session, Senate ; no. 1182)
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"Fourth edition."
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v. 1 Classification; Rate territories; Traffic terms.--v. 2 Tariffs; Rate construction; Application.--v. 3 Claims; Traffic department; Special services.--v. 4 Foreign trade; Ocean transportation; Maritime terms.--v. 5 Interstate commerce; Law; Procedure; Before commission.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Photocopy. Springfield, Va. : U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 1977. -- v, 74 leaves ; 28 cm.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Imprint on cover: [Washington?] Civil Effects Test Operations [Office] U. S. Atomic Energy Commission.
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"TID-4583."
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Imprint on label mounted on t. p.: Washington, Oliphant Washington Service.
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Includes index.
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During the 1980s, terms such as interagency or multi-agency cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and interaction have became permanent features of both crime prevention rhetoric and government crime policy. The concept of having the government, local authorities, and the community working in partnership has characterized both left and right politics for over a decade. The U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in the U.S.. Circulars 8/84 and 44/90 released by the U.K. Home Office, and the British Morgan Report-coupled with the launch of government strategies in France, the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, and, more recently, in Belgium, New Zealand, and Canada-have all emphasized the importance of agencies working together to prevent or reduce crime. This paper draws upon recent Australian research and critically analyzes multi-agency crime prevention. It suggests that agency conflicts and power struggles may be exacerbated by neo-liberal economic theory, by the politics of crime prevention management, and by policies that aim to combine situational and social prevention endeavors. Furthermore, it concludes that indigenous peoples are excluded by crime prevention strategies that fail to define and interpret crime and its prevention in culturally appropriate ways.
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Este trabalho teve como objetivo avaliar o impacto radiológico atmosférico da Unidade de Concentrado de Urânio URA, Caetité, BA, através da modelagem da dispersão de radionuclídeos e a estimativa da dose efetiva anual (em mSv.ano-1). Para tal, utilizou-se o programa MILDOS-AREA que foi desenvolvido pelo Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) em conjunto com a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), para avaliar impacto radiológico ambiental atmosférico nas instalações de mineração e beneficiamento de urânio. O incremento de dose efetiva anual para três grupos críticos hipotéticos e oito grupos populacionais reais foi estimado com base na medida de fluxos de radônio e na estimativa das concentrações de radionuclídeos em particulados no ar dos principais termos fontes da URA (cava da mina, depósito de estéril e britador). Paralelamente, as medidas de concentração de radônio e taxa de kerma no ar, reportadas nos relatórios dos programas de monitoração ambiental pré-operacional (PMAPO) e operacional (PMAO) da URA, foram avaliadas. Os valores de dose efetiva anual estimados para os grupos críticos hipotéticos variaram de 1,78E-02 a 2,10E-02 mSv.ano-1, enquanto que para os grupos populacionais, variaram de 7,49E-05 a 1,56E-02 mSv.ano-1. A maior contribuição para o incremento da dose foi devida a inalação do radônio, sendo responsável por quase a totalidade da dose efetiva anual estimada. A média da concentração de atividade de radônio no entorno da URA foi 137,21 Bq m-3 e não sendo observada diferenças significativas entre as concentrações de radônio reportadas nos programas de monitoramento ambiental pré-operacional (valores de background) e operacional. Os valores médios de taxa de kerma no ar no entorno da URA foram de 0,136 μGy h-1. No entanto, em todos os pontos de monitoramento, os valores reportados no programa operacional foram inferiores aos valores reportados no programa pré-operacional (background), o que sugere problemas de medidas ou de coleta de dados durante a realização deste programa. O operador da URA utilizou para avaliação de impacto radiológico atmosférico, resultados apresentados em seus relatórios finais de análise de segurança (RFAS), um modelo próprio de simulação de dispersão, denominado Impacto Ambiental Radiológico (IAR7). Uma comparação entre o MILDOS-AREA e o IAR7, utilizando os mesmos parâmetros de entrada reportados no RFAS sugere que o IAR7 subestimou as concentrações de radônio no ar para os grupos críticos hipotéticos. Os resultados de simulação com o MILDOS-AREA mostram que as doses efetivas estimadas para os grupos críticos hipotéticos são inferiores a 0,3 mSv.ano-1 que é a restrição de dose estabelecida pela Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear. Recomenda-se que o código MILDOS-AREA seja utilizado no Brasil, para fins de licenciamento e controle, tendo em vista que o mesmo é um código validado e já utilizado em outros países para avaliar impacto radiológico ambiental atmosférico em instalações de mineração e beneficiamento de urânio
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his essay is premised on the following: a conspiracy to fix or otherwise manipulate the outcome of a sporting event for profitable purpose. That conspiracy is in turn predicated on the conspirators’ capacity to: (a) ensure that the fix takes place as pre-determined; (b) manipulate the betting markets that surround the sporting event in question; and (c) collect their winnings undetected by either the betting industry’s security systems or the attention of any national regulatory body or law enforcement agency.
Unlike many essays on this topic, this contribution does not focus on the “fix”– part (a) of the above equation. It does not seek to explain how or why a participant or sports official might facilitate a betting scam through either on-field behaviour that manipulates the outcome of a game or by presenting others with privileged inside information in advance of a game. Neither does this contribution seek to give any real insight into the second part of the above equation: how such conspirators manipulate a sports betting market by playing or laying the handicap or in-play or other offered betting odds. In fact, this contribution is not really about the mechanics of sports betting or match fixing at all; rather it is about the sometimes under explained reason why match fixing has reportedly become increasingly attractive as of late to international crime syndicates. That reason relates to the fact that given the traditional liquidity of gambling markets, sports betting can, and has long been, an attractively accessible conduit for criminal syndicates to launder the proceeds of crime. Accordingly, the term “winnings”, noted in part (c) of the above equation, takes on an altogether more nefarious meaning.
This essay’s attempt to review the possible links between match fixing in sport, gambling-related “winnings” and money laundering is presented in four parts.
First, some context will be given to what is meant by money laundering, how it is currently policed internationally and, most importantly, how the growth of online gambling presents a unique set of vulnerabilities and opportunities to launder the proceeds of crime. The globalisation of organised crime, sports betting and transnational financial services now means that money laundering opportunities have moved well beyond a flutter on the horses at your local racetrack or at the roulette table of your nearest casino. The growth of online gambling platforms means that at a click it is possible for the proceeds of crime in one jurisdiction to be placed on a betting market in another jurisdiction with the winnings drawn down and laundered in a third jurisdiction and thus the internationalisation of gambling-related money laundering threatens the integrity of sport globally.
Second, and referring back to the infamous hearings of the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organised Crime in Interstate Commerce of the early 1950s, (“the Kefauver Committee”), this article will begin by illustrating the long standing interest of organised crime gangs – in this instance, various Mafia families in the United States – in money laundering via sports gambling-related means.
Third, and using the seminal 2009 report “Money Laundering through the Football Sector” by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an inter-governmental body established in 1989 to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system), this essay seeks to assess the vulnerabilities of international sport to match fixing, as motivated in part by the associated secondary criminality of tax evasion and transnational economic crime.
The fourth and concluding parts of the essay spin from problems to possible solutions. The underlying premise here is that heretofore there has been an insularity to the way that sports organisations have both conceptualised and sought to address the match fixing threat e.g., if we (in sport) initiate player education programmes; establish integrity units; enforce codes of conduct and sanctions strictly; then our integrity or brand should be protected. This essay argues that, although these initiatives are important, the source and process of match fixing is beyond sport’s current capacity, as are the possible solutions.