On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Notes on species of the genus Agria R.-D. (Diptera, Sarcophagidae)

A key is given for the identification of females of all Holarctic species included into this genus, and keys are provided for distinguishing third instar larvae and puparia of two Palaeartic species. In addition to these, the description of the A. monachae (Kr.) female has been expanded.

Notes on Agents’ Behavioral Rules Under Adaptive Learning and Studies of Monetary Policy

These notes try to clarify some discussions on the formulation of individual intertemporal behavior under adaptive learning in representative agent models. First, we discuss two suggested approaches and related issues in the context of a simple consumption-saving model. Second, we show that the analysis of learning in the NewKeynesian monetary policy model based on “Euler equations” provides a consistent and valid approach.

Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers an evolutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is sufficiently low. Thus, the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

Notes on the male genitalia of species of Ravinia and Chaetoravinia (Diptera: Sarcophagidae)

Based on scanning electron microscope (SEM) estudies, the male genitalia of three species of Ravinia and two species of Chaetoravinia (Diptera: Sarcophagidae, subtribe Raviniina) are described and compared.

Halipegus dubius Klein, 1905 (Trematoda, Hemiuridae): a redescription, with notes on the working of the ovarian complex

A redescription of Halipegus dubius Klein, 1905, of Brazilian frogs Leptodactylus pentadactylus and L. ocellatus, is presented. The parasite was found exclusively in the buccal cavity, in number varying from 1 (in most instances) to 3, and exceptionally 25 (one instance). Morphological data were based on 40 whole-mounted specimens and 4 serially sectioned ones. Larval development takes place in planorbid snails (Biomphalaria glabrata and B. tenagophila) and in an undetermined species of cyclops. Working of the ovarian complex was followed by microscopical observation of life specimens. Constrating with the similarity of the four American species of Halipegus currently recognized as valid, they can be easily separated by the characters of their cercariae.

Notes on the biology of Amblyomma dissimile Kock, 1844 (Acari: Ixodida) on Bufo marinus (Linnaeus, 1758) from Brazil

Amblyomma dissimile is a common ectoparasite of cold blooded animals and is an accidental ectoparasite of some wild mammals. Details of the biology of specimens from the State of Amapá were studied in the laboratory in a humidity chamber at an average environmental temperature of 19.5 °C, using Bufo marinus as host for the time in Brazil. We also report the first record of this species in the State of Minas Gerais.

Personalitat de la Fundació. Notes sobre la nova regulació a Catalunya

És evident el traspàs per part de l’Estat del Benestar de diferents accions socials a la societat civil, que aglutina un conjunt d’entitats sense ànim de lucre anomenat actualment com a tercer sector o sector privat social que es configura com un nou espai que floreix com una nova realitat a l’economia occidental, on desenvolupen un paper important en la prestació de serveis socials. En aquest context, el present treball pretén en primer lloc conèixer la concepció actual de persones jurídiques i desgranar-ne les categories. Fer una breu visió de l’evolució històrica d’aquestes entitats fins arribar a la configuració actual de les mateixes. D’aquestes entitats, les Fundacions són un dels membres més antics, genuïns i actius del tercer sector i per aquest motiu, declinem la segona part del present treball en l’estudi de la seva regulació a Catalunya, fent un anàlisi crític de la regulació de les Fundacions que conté el Llibre III del Codi Civil Català. Es qüestiona si la configuració jurídica de la Fundació i el sistema de control administratiu sobre les mateixes està en concordança amb les característiques i funcions actuals de les fundacions arrel dels escàndols financers d’una de les entitats més representatives de Catalunya, el Palau de la Música Catalana. En la mateixa línia s’analitzaran les exempcions fiscals actuals per a determinar si són suficients i adients per a incentivar la seva proliferació en el nostre teixit social.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.