Community Fisheries Development Office (CFDO) strategic plan, January 2004

In October 2000 the government of Cambodia announced a major change in fisheries management policy. The core elements of the new policy are the reduction of fishing lot concession areas by 56%, the broader participation of fishing communities in the management of fisheries and a focus on the efficient, sustainable and equitable use of the living aquatic resources. To facilitate the establishment and development of the Community Fisheries, support and monitor their activities, the Department of Fisheries was authorized1 to establish a Community Fisheries Development Office (CFDO). (Pdf contains 19 pages).

Reforming state-level coastal management and development policies: strategic retreat as an innovative, proactive and equitable coastal environmental management strategy

Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines include some of the most unique and biologically rich ecosystems in the United States that provide immeasurable aesthetic, habitat and economic benefits. Natural coastal ecosystems, however, are under increasing threat from rampant and irresponsible growth and development. Once a boon to local economies, complex natural forces – enhanced by global climate change and sea level rise - are now considered hazards and eroding the very foundation upon which coastal development is based. For nearly a century, beach restoration and erosion control structures have been used to artificially stabilize shorelines in an effort to protect structures and infrastructure. Beach restoration, the import and emplacement of sand on an eroding beach, is expensive, unpredictable, inefficient and may result in long-term environmental impacts. The detrimental environmental impacts of erosion control structures such as sea walls, groins, bulkheads and revetments include sediment deficits, accelerated erosion and beach loss. These and other traditional responses to coastal erosion and storm impacts- along with archaic federal and state policies, subsidies and development incentives - are costly, encourage risky development, artificially increase property values of high-risk or environmentally sensitive properties, reduce the post-storm resilience of shorelines, damage coastal ecosystems and are becoming increasingly unsustainable. Although communities, coastal managers and property owners face increasingly complex and difficult challenges, there is an emerging public, social and political awareness that, without meaningful policy reforms, coastal ecosystems and economies are in jeopardy. Strategic retreat is a sustainable, interdisciplinary management strategy that supports the proactive, planned removal of vulnerable coastal development; reduces risk; increases shoreline resiliency and ensures long term protection of coastal systems. Public policies and management strategies that can overcome common economic misperceptions and promote the removal of vulnerable development will provide state and local policy makers and coastal managers with an effective management tool that concomitantly addresses the economic, environmental, legal and political issues along developed shorelines. (PDF contains 4 pages)

The strategic behavior of rational novices

There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.

The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.

The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.

Reforming state-level coastal management and development policies: strategic retreat as an innovative, proactive and equitable coastal environmental management strategy

Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines include some of the most unique and biologically rich ecosystems in the United States that provide immeasurable aesthetic, habitat and economic benefits. Natural coastal ecosystems, however, are under increasing threat from rampant and irresponsible growth and development. Once a boon to local economies, complex natural forces – enhanced by global climate change and sea level rise - are now considered hazards and eroding the very foundation upon which coastal development is based. For nearly a century, beach restoration and erosion control structures have been used to artificially stabilize shorelines in an effort to protect structures and infrastructure. Beach restoration, the import and emplacement of sand on an eroding beach, is expensive, unpredictable, inefficient and may result in long-term environmental impacts. The detrimental environmental impacts of erosion control structures such as sea walls, groins, bulkheads and revetments include sediment deficits, accelerated erosion and beach loss. These and other traditional responses to coastal erosion and storm impacts- along with archaic federal and state policies, subsidies and development incentives - are costly, encourage risky development, artificially increase property values of high-risk or environmentally sensitive properties, reduce the post-storm resilience of shorelines, damage coastal ecosystems and are becoming increasingly unsustainable. Although communities, coastal managers and property owners face increasingly complex and difficult challenges, there is an emerging public, social and political awareness that, without meaningful policy reforms, coastal ecosystems and economies are in jeopardy. Strategic retreat is a sustainable, interdisciplinary management strategy that supports the proactive, planned removal of vulnerable coastal development; reduces risk; increases shoreline resiliency and ensures long term protection of coastal systems. Public policies and management strategies that can overcome common economic misperceptions and promote the removal of vulnerable development will provide state and local policy makers and coastal managers with an effective management tool that concomitantly addresses the economic, environmental, legal and political issues along developed shorelines. (PDF contains 4 pages)

An examination of strategic opportunities provided by the conference committee procedure in the U.S. Congress

Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.

Strategic partnership of stakeholders: a veritable tool for sustainable fishery resources in Nigeria

Fishery resources are very important resource from the aquatic environment to the Nigerian economy. Stakeholders involvement in its management is highly important therefore, this paper proposes two frameworks against which sustainable fishery should be based, vis-a-vis stakeholders participation. The paper showed that decision-making involving stakeholders would enhance the goals of sustainable fishery development and create unity of purpose among various stakeholders

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.