Heterozygote advantage and the maintenance of polymorphism for multilocus traits.

Explaining how polymorphism is maintained in the face of selection remains a puzzle since selection tends to erode genetic variation. Provided an infinitely large unsubdivided population and no frequency-dependance of selective values, heterozygote advantage is the text book explanation for the maintenance of polymorphism when selection acts at a diallelic locus. Here, we investigate whether this remains true when selection acts at multiple diallelic loci. We use five different definitions of heterozygote advantage that largely cover this concept for multiple loci. Using extensive numerical simulations, we found no clear associations between the presence of any of the five definitions of heterozygote advantage and the maintenance of polymorphism at all loci. The strength of the association decreases as the number of loci increases or as recombination decreases. We conclude that heterozygote advantage cannot be a general mechanism for the maintenance of genetic polymorphism at multiple loci. These findings suggest that a correlation between the number of heterozygote loci and fitness is not warranted on theoretical ground.

Phenotypes influencing low physical activity in maintenance dialysis.

OBJECTIVE: The "Pas à Pas" initiative aimed at evaluating the weekly physical activity (PA) and its determinants in a large cohort of dialysis patients. SETTING: Physical inactivity is a risk factor for mortality in maintenance dialysis patients and is still poorly documented in this population. DESIGN: A prospective national epidemiological study was performed. SUBJECTS: A total of 1,163 patients on maintenance dialysis (hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis) were included. INTERVENTION AND MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: PA was recorded during seven consecutive days using a pedometer to measure daily step numbers. RESULTS: Median age was 63 years (Q1 51-Q3 75). Sixty-three percent were sedentary (<5000 steps/day) with a median of 3,688 steps/day (1,866-6,271)]. PA level was similar between hemodialysis patients and those on peritoneal dialysis (3,693 steps [1,896-6,307] vs. 3,320 [1,478-5,926], P = .33). In hemodialysis patients, PA was lower on dialysis days compared with nondialysis days (2,912 [1,439-5,232] vs. 4,054 [2,136-7,108], respectively, P < .01). PA gradually decreased with age, 57% being sedentary between 50 and 65 years and 83% of patients after 80 years. Beyond this age effect, we identified, for the first time, specific phenotypes of patients with lower PA, such as inflammation, cardiovascular disease, protein energy wasting, obesity, and diabetes. By contrast, previous kidney transplantation and a higher muscle mass were associated with higher PA. CONCLUSIONS: Dialysis patients present a very low level of PA with high sedentary. Acting on patient's modifiable phenotypes may help to increase PA to improve morbidity, mortality, and quality of life.

Optimal public rationing and price response

We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and costs of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumers' cost information and in response to the rationing rule. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold. Wealth information is not used. Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium total consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth. [Authors]

The impotence of price controls: failed attempts to constrain pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece.

BACKGROUND: While the prices of pharmaceuticals are relatively low in Greece, expenditure on them is growing more rapidly than almost anywhere else in the European Union. OBJECTIVE: To describe and explain the rise in drug expenditures through decomposition of the increase into the contribution of changes in prices, in volumes and a product-mix effect. METHODS: The decomposition of the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Greece over the period 1991-2006 was conducted using data from the largest social insurance fund (IKA) that covers more than 50% of the population. RESULTS: Real drug spending increased by 285%, despite a 58% decrease in the relative price of pharmaceuticals. The increase in expenditure is mainly attributable to a switch to more innovative, but more expensive, pharmaceuticals, indicated by a product-mix residual of 493% in the decomposition. A rising volume of drugs also plays a role, and this is due to an increase in the number of prescriptions issued per doctor visit, rather than an increase in the number of visits or the population size. CONCLUSIONS: Rising pharmaceutical expenditures are strongly determined by physicians' prescribing behaviour, which is not subject to any monitoring and for which there are no incentives to be cost conscious.

Local Roads Maintenance Workers’ Manual, June 2006

This manual describes best roadway maintenance practices for Iowa's local roads and streets, from the center line to shoulders, ditches, and drainage, with chapters on public relations, bridge maintenance, and snow and ice control. Each chapter contains safety tips, information(as appropriate) on managing quality control, and a list of references for further information.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Study of Iowa's Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa Legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF)revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs.

Study of Iowa’s Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF) revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs. With input from Iowa’s cities, counties and other interested groups, the Iowa DOT completed this report for submittal to the legislature.

Study of Iowa’s Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF) revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs.

IROme, a New High-Throughput Molecular Tool for the Diagnosis of Inherited Retinal Dystrophies-A Price Comparison with Sanger Sequencing.

The molecular diagnosis of retinal dystrophies (RD) is difficult because of genetic and clinical heterogeneity. Previously, the molecular screening of genes was done one by one, sometimes in a scheme based on the frequency of sequence variants and the number of exons/length of the candidate genes. Payment for these procedures was complicated and the sequential billing of several genes created endless paperwork. We therefore evaluated the costs of generating and sequencing a hybridization-based DNA library enriched for the 64 most frequently mutated genes in RD, called IROme, and compared them to the costs of amplifying and sequencing these genes by the Sanger method. The production cost generated by the high-throughput (HT) sequencing of IROme was established at CHF 2,875.75 per case. Sanger sequencing of the same exons cost CHF 69,399.02. Turnaround time of the analysis was 3 days for IROme. For Sanger sequencing, it could only be estimated, as we never sequenced all 64 genes in one single patient. Sale cost for IROme calculated on the basis of the sale cost of one exon by Sanger sequencing is CHF 8,445.88, which corresponds to the sale price of 40 exons. In conclusion, IROme is cheaper and faster than Sanger sequencing and therefore represents a sound approach for the diagnosis of RD, both scientifically and economically. As a drop in the costs of HT sequencing is anticipated, target resequencing might become the new gold standard in the molecular diagnosis of RD.

Effective Shoulder Design and Maintenance, 2007

Granular shoulders are an important element of the transportation system and are constantly subjected to performance problems due to wind- and water-induced erosion, rutting, edge drop-off, and slope irregularities. Such problems can directly affect drivers’ safety and often require regular maintenance. The present research study was undertaken to investigate the factors contributing to these performance problems and to propose new ideas to design and maintain granular shoulders while keeping ownership costs low. This report includes observations made during a field reconnaissance study, findings from an effort to stabilize the granular and subgrade layer at six shoulder test sections, and the results of a laboratory box study where a shoulder section overlying a soft foundation layer was simulated. Based on the research described in this report, the following changes are proposed to the construction and maintenance methods for granular shoulders: • A minimum CBR value for the granular and subgrade layer should be selected to alleviate edge drop-off and rutting formation. • For those constructing new shoulder sections, the design charts provided in this report can be used as a rapid guide based on an allowable rut depth. The charts can also be used to predict the behavior of existing shoulders. • In the case of existing shoulder sections overlying soft foundations, the use of geogrid or fly ash stabilization proved to be an effective technique for mitigating shoulder rutting.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.