Political philosophy, ethnology, and time: a study of the notion of historical handicap

This article starts by identifying the crucial importance of the notion of historical handicap for the present-day social sciences of Latin America. Such notion is not an original invention made by Latinamericanists. On the contrary, I demonstrate that the genealogy of the notion of historical handicap must be sought in the tradition of Western political philosophy. Such genealogy must take into account the way it was integrated into ethnological descriptions. When and how did the Other become the backward, the primitive? While this relation was secondary for ancient Greek thought, theories of historical development became the main source of ethnological categories in the modern era. Interestingly enough, this modern synthesis suited the practical purpose of justifying two successive waves of European imperialistic: the era of discoveries, and 19th century colonialism. The article concludes by raising questions about the present role and application of the social sciences.

Nietzsche and Neo-Kantian historiography: points of contact

In the German academies of Nietzsche's period of writing, the Kantian tradition was largely displaced in favor of two independent schools that have since been labeled "Neo-Kantianism." This paper presents four key theses about philosophy of history from four Neo-Kantian thinkers, how they follow from their adaptation of the Kantian tradition, and how Nietzsche critically engaged the very same issues in the formation of his own historical theory. Although there is little direct influence between orthodox Neo-Kantianism and Nietzsche, their comparison on these points will illuminate their unique adaptations of the Kantian tradition.

THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

Kirjallisuutta

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

PASSIONS AND EVIL IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

A bridge between engineering and language learning : automation and German in an online course

Artikkeli luettavissa osassa: Part 2. - ISBN 9789522163172(PDF). - Liitteenä työpaperi

Sivistyksestä sivilisaatioon. Kulttuurikäsitys J. V. Snellmanin historiallisessa ajattelussa

From Bildung to Civilisation. Conception of Culture in J. V. Snellman’s Historical Thinking The research explores Johan Vilhelm Snellman’s (1806–1881) conception of culture in the context of his historical thinking. Snellman was a Finnish, Swedish-speaking journalist, teacher and thinker, who held a central position in the Finnish national discourse during the nineteenth century. He has been considered as one of the leading theorists of a Finnish nation, writing widely about the themes such as the advancement of the national education, Finnish language and culture. Snellman is already a widely studied person in Finnish intellectual history, often characterised as a follower of G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophical system. My own research introduces a new kind of approach on Snellman’s texts, emphasising the conceptual level of his thought. With this approach, my aim is to broaden the Finnish research tradition on conceptual history. I consider my study as a cultural history of concepts, belonging also to the field of intellectual history. My focus is on one hand on the close reading of Snellman’s texts and on the other hand on contextualising his texts to the European intellectual tradition of the time. A key concept of Snellman’s theoretical thinking is his concept of bildning, which can be considered as a Swedish counterpart of the German concept of Bildung. The Swedish word incorporated all the main elements of the German concept. It could mean education or the so-called high culture, but most fundamentally it was about the self-formation of the individual. This is also the context in which Snellman’s concept of bildning has often been interpreted. In the study, I use the concept of bildning as a starting point of my research but I broaden my focus on the cognate concepts such as culture (kultur), spirit (anda) and civilisation. The purpose of my study is thus to illustrate how Snellman used and modified these concepts and from these observations to draw a conclusion about the nature of his conception of culture. Snellman was an early Finnish philosopher of history but also interested in the practice of the writing of history. He did not write any historical presentations himself but followed the publications in the field of history and introduced European historical writing to the Finnish, Swedish-speaking reading audience in his newspapers. The primary source material consists of different types of Snellman’s texts, including philosophical writings, lecture material, newspaper articles and private letters. I’m reading Snellman’s texts in the context of other texts produced both by his Finnish predecessors and contemporaries and by Swedish, German and French writers. Snellman’s principal philosophical works, Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit (1841) and Läran om staten (1842), were both written abroad. Both of the works were contributions to contemporary debates on the international level, especially in Germany and Sweden. During the 1840s and 1850s Snellman had two newspapers of his own, Saima and Litteraturblad, which were directed towards the Swedish-speaking educated class. Both of the newspapers were very popular and their circulations were among the largest of their day in Finland. The topics of his articles and reviews covered literature, poetry, philosophy and education as well as issues concerning the economic, industrial and technical development in Finland. In his newspapers Snellman not only brought forth his own ideas but also spread the knowledge of European events and ideas to his readers. He followed very carefully the cultural and political situation in Western Europe. He also followed European magazines and newspapers and was well acquainted with German, French and also English literature – and of course Swedish literature to with which he had the closest ties. In his newspapers Snellman wrote countless number of literary reviews and critics, introducing his readers to European literature. The study consists of three main chapters in which I explore my research question in three different, yet overlapping contexts. In the first of these chapters, I analyse Snellman’n theoretical thinking and his concepts of bildning, kultur, anda and civilisation in the context of earlier cultural discourse in Finland as well as the tradition of German idealistic philosophy and neo-humanism. With the Finnish cultural discourse I refer to the early cultural discussion in Finland, which emerged after the year 1809, when Finland became an autonomous entity of its own as a Grand Duchy of Russia. Scholars of the Academy of Turku opened a discussion on the themes such as the state of national consciousness, the need for national education and the development of the Finnish language as a national language of Finland. Many of these academics were also Snellman’s teachers in the early years of his academic career and Snellman clearly formulated his own ideas in the footsteps of these Finnish predecessors. In his theoretical thinking Snellman was a collectivist; according to him an individual should always be understood in connection with the society, its values and manners, as well as to the traditions of a culture where an individual belongs to. In his philosophy of the human spirit Snellman was in many ways a Hegelian but his notion of education or ‘bildning’ includes also elements that connect him with the wider tradition of German intellectual history, namely the neo-humanist tradition and, at least to some extent, to the terminology of J. G. Herder or J. G. Fichte, for example. In this chapter, I also explore Snellman’s theory of history. In his historical thinking Snellman was an idealist, believing in the historical development of the human spirit (Geist in German language). One can characterise his theory of history by stating that it is a mixture of a Hegelian triumph of the spirit and Herderian emphasis on humanity (Humanität) and the relative nature of ‘Bildung’. For Snellman, the process of ‘bildning’ or ‘Bildung’ is being realised in historical development through the actions of human beings. Snellman believed in the historical development of the human civilization. Still Snellman himself considered that he had abandoned Hegel’s idea about the process of world history. Snellman – rightly or wrongly – criticised Hegel of emphasising the universal end of history (the realisation of the freedom of spirit) at the expense of the historical plurality and the freedom of each historical era. Snellman accused Hegel of neglecting the value and independency of different historical cultures and periods by imposing the abstract norm, the fulfilment of the freedom of spirit, as the ultimate goal of history. The historicist in Snellman believed in the individuality of each historical period; each historical era or culture had values, traditions and modes of thought of its own. This historicist in Snellman could not accept the talk about one measure or the end of history. On the other hand Snellman was also a universalist. He believed that mankind had a common task and that task was the development of ‘Bildung’, freedom or humanity. The second main chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I explore the Finnish nationalistic discourse from the cultural point of view by analysing the notions such as a nation, national spirit or national language and showing how Snellman formulated his own ideas in a dialogic situation, participating in the Finnish discourse but also reacting to international discussions on the themes of the nation and nationality. For Snellman nationality was to a great extent the collective knowledge and customs or practices of the nation. Snellman stated that nationality is to be considered as a form of ‘bildning’. This could be seen not simply as affection for the fatherland but also for the mental identity of the nation, its ways of thinking, its practices, national language, customs and laws, the history of the nation. The simplest definition of nationality that Snellman gives is that nationality is the social life of the people. In the second part of the chapter I exam Snellman’s historical thinking and his understanding about historical development, interaction between different nations and cultures in the course of history, as well as the question of historical change; how do cultures or civilisations develop and who are the creators of culture? Snellman did not believe in one dominating culture but understood the course of history as a dialogue between different cultures. On the other hand, his views are very Eurocentric – here he follows the ideas of Hegel or for example the French historian François Guizot – for Snellman Europe represented the virtue of pluralism; in Europe one could see the diversity of cultures which, on the other hand, were fundamentally based on a common Christian tradition. In the third main chapter, my focus is on the writing of history, more precisely on Snellman’s ideas on the nature of history as a science and on the proper way of writing historical presentations. Snellman wrote critics on the works of history and introduced his readers to the writing of history especially in France, Sweden and German-speaking area – in some extend also in Britain. Snellman’s collectivistic view becomes evident also in his reviews on historical writing. For Snellman history was not about the actions of the states and their heads, nor about the records of ruling families and battles fought. He repeatedly stressed that history is a discipline that seeks to provide a total view of a phenomenon. A historian should not only collect information on historical events, since this information touches only the surface of a certain epoch or civilisation; he has to understand an epoch as totality. This required an understanding about the major contours in history, connections between civilisations and an awareness of significant turning points in historical development. In addition, it required a holistic understanding about a certain culture or historical era, including also the so-called inner life of a specific nation, a common people and their ways of life. Snellman wrote explicitly about ‘cultural history’ in his texts, referring to this kind of broad understanding of a society. In historical writing Snellman found this kind of broader view from the works of the French historians such as François Guizot and Jules Michelet. In all of these chapters, I elaborate the conceptual dimension of Snellman’s historical thinking. In my study I argue that Snellman not only adopted the German concepts of Bildung or Kultur in his own thinking but also developed the Swedish concepts in a way that include personal and innovative aspects. Snellman’s concept of bildning is not only a translation from ‘Bildung’ but he uses the Swedish concept in a versatile way that includes both the moral aspect of human development and social dimension of a human life. Along with ‘bildning’ Snellman used also the terms ‘kultur’ and ‘civilisation’ when referring to the totality of a certain nation or historical era, including both the so-called high culture (arts, science, religion) and the modes of thought as well as ways of life of the people as a whole. Unlike many of his Finnish contemporaries, Snellman did not use civilisation as a negative concept, lacking the moral essence of German term ‘Bildung’ or ‘Kultur’. Instead, for Snellman civilisation was a neutral term and here he comes close to the French tradition of using the term. In the study I argue that Snellman’s conception of culture in fact includes a synthesis of the German tradition of ‘Bildung’ and the French tradition of ‘civilisation’.

Att tala om det osägbara : Nicolaus Cusanus cirkulära filosofi i verket De coniecturis med särskild hänsyn till Nelson Pikes tankar om unio mystica

In my dissertation called Speaking of the unsayable: The circular philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa in his work De coniecturis, I presuppose an internal (conceptual) relation between the personal experience of God of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) in 1438 and, on the other hand, his philosophy. I hence try to describe the precise character of this relation. Referring to the Norwegian scholars Egil Wyller and Viggo Rossvær, I assume that there is a circularity in Cusanus’ philosophy which appears as self-references (= a sentence refers to itself: A is explained by B and B is explained by A). Wyller finds three phases in the thought of Cusanus (1. De docta ignorantia I-III, 2. De coniecturis I-II, 3. all subsequent works). Rossvær finds it impossible to presuppose certain phases, as the philosophy of Cusanus continuously proceeds and remains open to new ideas. As Cusanus however treats his experience of God far more consciously in his second work De coniecturis than in De docta ignorantia, I find it possible to distinguish between the earlier Cusanus (De docta ignorantia including his earlier works) and the later Cusanus (De coniecturis, about 1444, as well as the following works). Cusanus creates a philosophy of language in outline expressed in De coniecturis, in which he presents two concepts of necessity, i.e. absolute necessity and logical, or reasonable, necessity. These are interrelated in the sense that the mind, or the self, logically affirms the absolute, or unsayable, necessity, which shows itself in the mind and which the mind affirms conjecturally. The endeavour conceptually to understand absolute necessity implies intuitive (or intellectual) contemplation, or vision (investigatio symbolica), in which the four mental unities (the absolute, the intellectual, the rational and the sensuous) work together according to the rules described in De coniecturis. In De coniecturis Cusanus obviously turns from a negative concept of the unsayable to a paradigmatic, which implies that he looks for principles of speaking of the unsayable and presents the idea of a divine language (divinaliter). However, he leaves this idea behind after De coniecturis, although he continues to create new concepts of the unsayable and incomprehensible. The intellectual language of absolute seeing is expressed in the subjunctive, i.e. conditionally. In order to describe the unsayable, Cusanus uses tautologies, the primary one of which is a concept of God, i.e. non aliud est non aliud quam non aliud (the non-other is non-other than the nonother). Wyller considers this the crucial point of the philosophy of Cusanus (De non aliud), described by the latter as the definition of definitions, i.e. the absolute definition. However, this definition is empty regarding its content. It demonstrates that God surpasses the coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum) and that he is “superunsayable” (superineffabilis), i.e. he is beyond what can be conceived or said. Nothing hence prevents us from speaking of him, provided that he is described as unsayable (= the paradigmatic concept of the unsayable). Here the mode of seeing is decisive. Cusanus in this context (and especially in his later literary production) uses modalities which concern possibility and necessity. His aim is to conduct any willing reader ahead on the way of life (philosophia mentalis). In De coniecturis II he describes the notion of human self-consciousness as the basis of spiritual mutuality in accordance with the humanistic tradition of his time. I mainly oppose the negatively determined concept of Christian mysticism presented by the German philosopher Kurt Flasch and prefer the presentation of Burkhard Mojsisch of the translogical and conjectural use of language in De coniecturis. In particular, I take account of the Scandinavian research, basically that of Johannes Sløk, Birgit H. Helander, Egil Wyller and Viggo Rossvær, who all consider the personal experience of God described by Cusanus a tacit precondition of his philosophy.

The Arctic Ocean between Greenland and Nova Zemla and between the 60th and 82d parallel of latitude from Swedish, Danish, British, Russian and German surveys and explorations up to 1871

Kartta kuuluu A. E. Nordenskiöldin kokoelmaan