Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

Synapses in digital medium: computational investigations of neural basis of anticipation

Anticipation is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between the deepest philosophical theories about the nature of life and cognition on one hand and the empirical biological sciences steeped in reductionist and Newtonian conception of causality. Three conceptions of anticipation have been emerging from the literature that may be operationalised in a way leading to a viable empirical programme. The discussion of the research into a novel dynamical concept of anticipating synchronisation lends credence to such a possibility and suggests further links between the three anticipation paradigms. A careful progress mindful to the deep philosophical concerns but also respecting empirical evidence will ultimately lead towards unifying theoretical and empirical biological sciences and may offer progress where reductionist science have been so far faltering.

Intuitions in the Face of Diversity

In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent empirical challenges to intuition-use. Chapters 3-5 concern the contemporary challenge. I present the empirical evidence the challenge uses, present what I argue to be the strongest version of the challenge, and defend that challenge against some objections. How one characterises intuitions is incredibly important in philosophical methodology. If we are to properly evaluate philosophical methods vis-a-vis their use of something called intuitions { if we are to assess the empirical challenge { it is important to be clear exactly what we mean by `intuitions'. Part II focuses on this. Chapter 6 argues there is little consensus among philosophers as to what intuitions are and their role in philosophy. Chapter 7 questions whether philosophers have developed an idiolect in which `intuition' has distinctive meaning | as frequently supposed. Chapter 8 points out a common misunderstanding about intuitions in philosophy; using quantitative tools to challenge the idea that an increased use of `intuition' in philosophy is the result of an increased use of intuition. So, the developing picture is one of confusion, without a clear idea of what sense of `intuition' is important. Fortunately, Chapter 9 sets us back on the right track. It sets out a positive programme for evaluative methodology: methodologists should adopt a permissive conception of intuitions and make fine distinctions between different intuitions, so long as we can track those distinctions while philosophising.

Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical enquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.

Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature.

Utmaningen från andra berättelser : En studie om moraliskt omdöme, utvidgat tänkande och kritiskt reflekterande berättelser i dialogbaserad feministisk etik

The present study has a threefold aim: First, the theoretical aim is to give a contribution to refinement of the theory of dialogue based feminist ethics, concerning the understanding of judgment and narration within such an ethics.  The study also has an empirical aim, defined as to clarify what kind of knowledge, relevant to the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor, can be received from dialogical interpretation and analysis of a limited selection of critically reflecting life stories. Third, a methodological aim is defined as to develop an approach to interpretation and analysis of reflecting life stories, which renders the storyteller visible as a reflecting moral subject, and makes the story accessible as a source of knowledge for the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor. The thesis combines philosophical reflection and argumentation, with a narrative-hermeneutic method for interpretation of life stories, relating the two to each other in a hermeneutic process.  The theoretical reflection draws on Seyla Benhabibs theory of communicative ethics. A dialogue based model for moral justification and a likewise dialogue based model for political legitimacy are at the heart of this universalistic theory, although in combination with a conception of a narratively and hermeneutically constituted context sensitive moral judgment, based on Hannah Arendt’s concept “enlarged thought”. In the reflection, this model is related to other feminist theorizing within the tradition of dialogue based feminist ethics, as found in the works of Iris M. Young, Georgia Warnke and Shari Stone-Mediatore. The empirical study draws on three critically reflecting life stories from Israeli-Palestinian women activists for a just peace. The methodology for interpretation and analysis that is worked out combines dialogical interpretation as presented in Arthur W. Frank’s socio-narratology with a method for structural analysis derived from Shari Stone-Mediatores theory of storytelling as an expression of political resistance struggle. The results show that some stories drawing on marginalized experiences have a potential­ to stimulate further public debate through their capacity to enable a stereoscopic seeing, elucidating a tension between ideologically structured discourse and non-linguistic experience; implying that narrative-hermeneutic competence should be considered crucial for public debate.  

The Philosophy of Dissonant Children : Stanley Cavell's Wittgensteinian Philosophical Therapies as an Educational Conversation

Education is often understood as a process whereby children come to conform to the norms teachers believe should govern our practices. This picture problematically presumes that educators know in advance what it means for children to go on the way that is expected of them. In this essay Viktor Johansson suggests a revision of education, through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell, that can account for both the attunement in our practices and the possible dissonance that follows when the teacher and child do not go on together. There is an anxiety generated by the threat of disharmony in our educational undertakings that may drive teachers toward philosophy in educational contexts. Here Johansson offers a philosophical treatment of this intellectual anxiety that teachers may experience when they, upon meeting dissonant children, search for epistemic justifications of their practices—a treatment whereby dissonant children can support teachers in dissolving their intellectual frustrations.

Principles of High Quality Documentation for Provenance: A Philosophical Discussion

Computer technology enables the creation of detailed documentation about the processes that create or affect entities (data, objects, etc.). Such documentation of the past can be used to answer various kinds of questions regarding the processes that led to the creation or modification of a particular entity. The answer to such questions is known as an entity's provenance. In this paper, we derive a number of principles for documenting the past, grounded in work from philosophy and history, which allow for provenance questions to be answered within a computational context. These principles lead us to argue that an interaction-based model is particularly suited for representing high quality documentation of the past.

Ranah minang: the changing conception of a traditional minangkabau homeland

The Minangkabau people of West Sumatra, Indonesia, view the physical world as having two distinct components, Ranah Minang (which is itself further divided) and the rantau. Ranah Minang is the traditional, ancient homeland of the group, while the rantau is everything beyond the boundaries of their ancestral lands. This distinction is institutionalised in the folklore of the group and serves as a characterizing dichotomy in their worldview. Even today, when the outlines of the ancestral home are indistinct and the region has been overlaid with the modern administrative structure of modern Indonesia, the distinction between Ranah Minang and the rantau remains strong in societal perceptions and occurs repeatedly, not just in traditional folklore, but in modern expressions of traditional culture. This paper will describe the spatial division of territory in Minangkabau culture as it exists in the folklore of the group and will discuss the ways in which this traditional perception is manifested in modern society. Further, it will discuss the changing nature of the conception of Ranah Minang with respect to the physical landscape as well as to the institutions and structures of society.

Che Vuoi? Politico-philosophical remarks on Leo Strauss' Spinoza

Rumors surrounding the Hebraic-American classical philosopher Leo Strauss’ supposed influence on leading neoconservative politicians and commentators make reconsidering Leo Strauss’ thought and legacy a philosophical task of the first political importance today. A host of articles have appeared by students and (more recently) books by Stephen Smith (2006), Heinrich Meier (2006) and Catherine and Michael Zuckert (2006). This essay is proffered as a critical contribution, by a non-Straussian student, to this literature. Its methodology and justification is to return to and reconsider Strauss’ earliest works, on the ‘political theology’ of Benedict de Spinoza. The paper argues two theses. The first is that the popular depiction of Strauss as an esoteric Nietzschean hiding behind a ‘noble’ classical or theological veneer importantly misses the mark. The second is that Strauss’ early work shows his proximity, via Jacobi, to the Heideggerian disclosure of the groundless grounds of philosophical reason, given which one must extra-rationally choose reason over faith. One striking implication of this argument, in the contemporary political climate, is to underscore the unlikely convergence between the philosophical sources of neoconservative and the ‘post-structuralist’ thought associated with much of the intellectual left in France and the Anglophone world. Yet in contrast to the widespread image of Strauss, I argue that the mature Strauss’ continuing commitment to this decisionistic framework is in fact most clear is his ‘exoteric,’ public statements on religion – i.e. it is not the ‘esoteric’ purloined letter Strauss’ critics seek out. The reason for Strauss’ continuing public advocacy of the impossibility of reason’s disproving faith, I propose, highlights the primarily political (versus philosophical) nature of this turn: in Strauss’ conservative acceptance of the political necessity of religion for social order, framed in terms of a revised commitment to the ‘medieval’ (versus modern) enlightenment of Maimonides and Farabi.

Life and Death: The Religious, Philosophical and Moral Dilemmas in Medicine

Religious beliefs often play a major role in the decisions that are made in the home and the hospital concerning issues at the beginning and end of life. Only recently, however, due to rapidly advancing medical technology, have religious, moral, and philosophical beliefs taken such a controversial role. One of the major questions that has arisen from these various controversies is whether or not we have the right to posses control over the biological functions of our bodies. The answer is a difficult one, and it may be one that cannot be answered, but the attempt at an answer is what is at the heart of medical ethics.