Road to Proscription: The EU and Hezbollah since the Arab Spring. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2013

The European Union (EU) has traditionally taken a rather nuanced view of the activities of Hezbollah. Despite historic links to violent activity, Europe always remained reluctant to place the Lebanese militant group on its list of terrorist organisations. Internal divergences among member states, as well as the strategic-realist goals of the EU in both Lebanon and the Middle East more generally meant that such a listing never materialised. This remained the case even in the initial turmoil following the Arab uprisings, when Hezbollah’s relatively moderating objectives were viewed as a force for stability. However, the EU shifted policy in July 2013 by listing the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity. This paper will investigate the reasons behind this decision, as well as the likely implications and effectiveness of the new policy. Two principal catalysts were behind the decision. The first was a Hezbollah-linked bombing in Bulgaria which provided the focal point around which a consensus of the EU member states could emerge in the Council. Secondly, the escalation both of the Syrian conflict and Hezbollah’s role in it provided a more political and strategic impetus for the decision. This paper maintains that although a change in policy was somewhat necessary, it is questionable whether the artificial separation of Hezbollah’s political and military wings and the symbolic proscription of the latter is the most propitious choice to achieve European objectives.

On the periphery of global jihad. The North Caucasus: the illusion of stabilisation. OSW Point of View Number 45, November 2014

The situation in the North Caucasus has stabilised, in comparison with previous years, mainly as regards the activity of the Islamic military underground. This is an effect of ideological changes among the militants which have led to a dilution of the Caucasian armed struggle and its marginalisation in global jihad, since top priority has been granted to the Middle Eastern front. The factors which have contributed to this stabilisation are the organisational crisis in the Caucasus Emirate and the outflux of militants to the Middle East, as well the successful ‘carrot and stick’ policy adopted by Moscow. However, the partial stabilisation in the Caucasus is inherently precarious, being a contingent outcome of the situation rather than the result of systemic change. The region’s pressing problems remain unresolved; and these problems are generating chronic instability and cauing the Caucasus to drift away from Russia in civilisational terms. An economic or political crisis in the Russian Federation may result in the conflicts in the Caucasus unfreezing, including a reactivation of the idea of Chechen independence as well as the idea of the Caucasus Emirate, which is a part of global jihad.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

China on Russia’s intervention in Syria. OSW Commentary Number 193|19.01.2016

China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in Syria. The Chinese government perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism, and has emphasised the fact that Russia was acting in response to a request by the Syrian government. At the same time, Beijing has argued that the Syrian conflict cannot be resolved by military means and that a political compromise is necessary.

EU-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal.

The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and global powers in July 2015 was a major turning point in the emerging strategic landscape of the Middle East. The ‘nuclear deal’ led to the lifting by the EU and the US of nuclear-related sanctions, and is now operational. Other sanctions remain in place, however. Nevertheless, unhindered by US competition, European trade delegations have entered into a latter-day gold rush, led by the promise of the biggest untapped market in the world. As such, the EU has both an opportunity and a responsibility to help Iran reintegrate properly into the international system. But, in the face of an opaque clerical regime that relies on internal repression and military business conglomerates, Europe stands to lose if it continues to pursue its uncalculated and uncoordinated approach towards the Islamic Republic. This report offers recommendations to guide the EU towards a comprehensive EU strategy for relations with Iran. It maintains that there is no other option but to keep universal values and the rule of law at the core of the emerging bilateral relationship. In fact, the protection of the economic rights of European traders and investors allows the EU to push for wider reforms and the normalisation of relations.

Foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1982.

Hearings held March 11-May 13, 1981.

BALAÃO – O QUE OUVE AS PALAVRAS DE EL, TEM O CONHECIMENTO DE ELYON E VÊ A VISÃO DE SHADDAI: UM ESTUDO DE NÚMEROS 22-24

A presente pesquisa busca avaliar exegeticamente o texto que se encontra na Bíblia, especificamente no livro de Números capítulos 22-24 que relata sobre um personagem conhecido como Balaão. A pesquisa tem também como objeto o estudo sobre o panteão de divindades relatado no mesmo texto, assim como também o estudo dos textos descobertos em Deir Alla, na Jordânia, que apresentam um personagem designado como Balaão, possivelmente o mesmo personagem de Nm 22-24. A motivação que levou ao desenvolvimento dessa pesquisa foi o fato de se ter deparado com os conceitos dos diversos nomes divinos exibidos no texto, além da questão do profetismo fora de Israel, assim como as possibilidades hermenêuticas que se abrem para a leitura desse texto bíblico. O conceito geral sempre foi o de que Israel era a única nação onde existiam “verdadeiros” profetas e uma adoração a um único Deus, o “monoteísmo”. O que despertou interesse foi perceber, especialmente por meio da leitura dos livros bíblicos, que o profetismo não se restringiu somente a Israel. Ele antecede à formação do antigo Israel e já existia no âmbito das terras do antigo Oriente Médio, e que Israel ainda demorou muito tempo para ser monoteísta. Quem é esse Balaão, filho de Beor? Estudaremos sobre sua pessoa e sua missão. Examinaremos os textos de Deir Alla sobre Balaão e sua natureza de personagem mediador entre o divino e o humano. Esse personagem é apresentado como um grande profeta e que era famoso como intérprete de presságios divinos. Analisaremos a importante questão sobre o panteão de deuses que são apresentados na narrativa de Balaão nomeados como: El, Elyon Elohim e Shaddai, além de Yahweh. Entendemos, a princípio, que o texto possui uma conexão com a sociedade na qual foi criado e usando da metodologia exegética, faremos uma análise da narrativa em questão, buscando compreender o sentido do texto, dentro de seu cenário histórico e social. Cenário este, que nos apresentou esse profeta, não israelita, que profere bênçãos dos deuses sobre Israel e que, além disso, pronuncia maldições sobre os inimigos desse mesmo Israel. Percebemos que, parte do texto pesquisado é apresentado sob a ótica de Israel sobre as outras nações. A pesquisa defende, portanto, que o texto de Nm 22-24, além de nos apresentar um profeta fora de Israel igual aos profetas da Bíblia, defende que, o panteão de divindades também era adorado por Israel e que tais nomes são epítetos de uma mesma divindade, no caso YHWH. Defende, também, um delineamento de um projeto de domínio político e militar de Israel sobre as nações circunvizinhas.

The impact of Foreign Direct Investment and trade openness on ICT expansion: A comparative analysis of Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern countries

This study investigates the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow and trade openness on the expansion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for the period of 1996 to 2005, in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. The results of regression analyses conducted indicate that while dissimilarities exist among the countries included in this study in terms of their level of socio-economic and political development, factors such as trade openness, education and the growth of GDP had a positive impact on their ICT development. While FDI inflow had positive impact on the expansion of ICTs on Asia-Pacific countries its impact on Middle Eastern countries was not statistically significant. The study results also show that governmental intervention in economic activities has a negative impact on ICT expansion in both regions. In the Middle East, regional conflict imposes additional negative impact on FDI inflow and trade openness and consequently, ICT expansion. The regression results show that those countries that implemented liberalization of their ICT sector were able to not only reduce the digital divide with other developed countries, but also increase their operations in both local and global markets.

The impact of information and communication technology (ICT), education and regulation on economic freedom in Islamic Middle Eastern countries

Our study investigated the impact of ICT expansion on economic freedom in the Middle East (Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). Our empirical analysis used archival data from 1995 to 2005; it showed that ICT expansion in the Middle East has been effective both in bridging the digital divide and also in promoting economic freedom in a region that was vulnerable to political, social, and global conflict. However, differences between countries, such as the educational attainment of their citizens and institutional resistance to technology acceptance, both enhanced and restricted the relationship between ICT and economic freedom.

ICT diffusion and foreign direct investment:a comparative study between Asia-Pacific and the Middle Eastern economies

This chapter investigates the impact of inward and outward FDI on ICT diffusion in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions for the period 1996-2008. The results indicate that while inward FDI has generally had a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion in Asia-Pacific economies, its impact on the Middle Eastern countries has been detrimental. In contrast, the results of this study also show that outward FDI has had, in general, the inverse effect, it has been in general positive and significant for the Middle East countries but insignificant for Asia-Pacific economies.

Do foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness explain the disparity in ICT diffusion between Asia-Pacific and the Islamic Middle Eastern countries?

This study investigates the impact of FDI and trade openness on ICT diffusion in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions from 1996-2005. The results indicate that while dissimilarities exist between the economies included in this study in terms of their level of socio-economic and political development, education and the growth of GDP have had a positive impact on ICT diffusion in both regions. However, while FDI has generally had a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion in Asia-Pacific economies, its impact on Middle Eastern economies has been detrimental. The results of this study also show that trade-openness has had, in general, a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion. Copyright © 2010, IGI Global.

Eltérő modernizációs perspektívák a közel-keleti muszlim államokban (Different modernization perspectives in the middle eastern muslim countries)

A tanulmány célja, hogy körüljárja a tágabb Közel-Keleten tapasztalható modernizációs válság hátterét, lehetséges belső okait és következményeit. A szerző rá kíván mutatni az egyes közel-keleti államok modernizációs lehetőségei közötti különbségekre. Az elemzés – interdiszciplináris megközelítést alkalmazva – a modernizáció gazdasági vetülete mellett a politikai és társadalmi kérdésekkel is foglalkozik. A tanulmány nem tér ki a közel-keleti államok makrogazdasági mutatóira, hiszen erről számos munka megjelent magyar nyelven is. / === / The goal of the paper is to analyze the background, potential causes and consequences of the modernization crisis on the boarder Middle East. The author points out the differences between the possibilities these countries have for modernization. The analyses uses an interdisciplinary approach and examines the economic, political and social aspects of modernization.

The Allelic Abundance of Afghanistan, a Pool for West and South Eurasian Genes and a Blockade against Eastern Admixture

In this study, I divided samples from individuals within Afghanistan based upon geography (i.e., north versus south). I determined allelic frequencies and other statistical parameters for 15 STR loci (i.e., D8S1179, D21S11, D7S820, CSF1PO, D3S1358, TH01, Dl3S317, D16S539, D2S1338, D19S433, vWA, TPOX, D18S51, D5S818, and FGA). I conducted pairwise comparisons with 19 neighboring Eurasian populations to assign Gstatistics and p-values. Categorizing the populations into five groups (i.e., Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus/Anatolia), I derived values for intra-population, inter-population, and total variance. Admixture analyses determined the highest allelic contributions to be from the Caucasus/ Anatolia, while negligible contributions were made by Central Asia and East Asia. A Correspondence Analysis revealed clustering of both northern and southern Afghanistan with Georgia, Turkey, northern Iran, and southern Iran of the Caucasus/ Anatolia and the Middle East. A Neighbor-Joining phylogenetic tree was constructed to generate bootstrap values over 1, 000 reiterations.

Democracy promotion and Turkey

The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey's involvement in the promotion of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, and World Bank.^ My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels. These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first, to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.^ I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the field is that I documented Turkey's case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of Turkey's involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between the identity and strategic interests in states' foreign policy decisions.^