Unemployment in an estimated new Keynesian model

We reformulate the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework by embedding the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí (2011a,b). Weestimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while treatingthe unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. Our approach overcomes the lack of identification of wage markup and laborsupply shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) intheir criticism of New Keynesian models, and allows us to estimate a"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated modelcan be used to analyze the sources of unemployment fluctuations.

The economic effects of a Spanish trade boycott against Catalan products

We study the potential consequences of a hypothetical trade boycott against Catalan products organized by some sectors of the Spanish society mainly for political reasons. A symmetric trade boycott would have two effects: a reduction of Catalan exports to Spain and a partial process of import substitution in Catalonia. In order to quantify the economic impact of the boycott, we compare the "actual" Catalan economy, as described in the input-output table for 2005, with a "simulated" Catalan economy that takes into account the effects of a boycott on the trade exchanges between Catalonia and Spain.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

(Re-) Shaping hatred: Anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany, 1890-2006

In this paper, we assess the determinants of long-run persistence of localculture, and examine the success of policy interventions designed to change attitudes.We analyze anti-Semitic attitudes drawing on individual-level survey results fromGermany s social value survey in 1996 and 2006. On average, we find that historicalvoting patterns for anti-Semitic parties between 1890 and 1933 are powerfulpredictors of anti-Jewish attitudes today. There is evidence that transmission takesplace both vertically (parent to child) and horizontally (among peers). Policy modifiedGerman views on Jews in important ways: The cohort that grew up under the Naziregime shows significantly higher levels of anti-Semitism. After 1945, the victoriousAllies implemented denazification programs in their zones of occupation. We usedifferences in these policies between the occupying powers as a source of identifyingvariation. The US and French zones today still show high anti-Semitism, reflecting anambitious botched attempt at denazification. In contrast, the British and Soviet zones,register much lower levels of Jew-hatred.

Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

The contribution of schooling in development accounting: Results from a nonparametric upper bound

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were toincrease their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on theincrease in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number ofschooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms ofendogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compareour results with the standard development accounting approach, andprovide an update on the results using the standard approach for a largesample of countries.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Slow recoveries: A structural interpretation

An analysis of the performance of GDP, employment and otherlabor market variables following the troughs in postwar U.S. businesscycles points to much slower recoveries in the three most recentepisodes, but does not reveal any significant change over time in therelation between GDP and employment. This leads us to characterizethe last three episodes as slow recoveries, as opposed to jobless recoveries.We use the estimated New Keynesian model in Galí-Smets-Wouters (2011) to provide a structural interpretation for the slowerrecoveries since the early nineties.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

How important is the intensive margin of labor adjustment?

Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.

Sources of comparative advantage in polluting industries (with appendix)

We study the determinants of comparative advantage in polluting industries. We combine dataon environmental policy at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the industry levelto show that countries with laxer environmental regulation have a comparative advantage in polluting industries. Further, we address the potential problem of reverse causality. We propose aninstrument for environmental regulation based on meteorological determinants of pollution dispersion identified by the atmospheric pollution literature. We find that the effect of environmentalregulation on the pattern of trade is causal and comparable in magnitude to the effect of physicaland human capital.

The network origins of aggregate fluctuations

This paper argues that in the presence of intersectoral input-output linkages, microeconomicidiosyncratic shocks may lead to aggregate fluctuations. In particular, itshows that, as the economy becomes more disaggregated, the rate at which aggregatevolatility decays is determined by the structure of the network capturing such linkages.Our main results provide a characterization of this relationship in terms of the importanceof different sectors as suppliers to their immediate customers as well as theirrole as indirect suppliers to chains of downstream sectors. Such higher-order interconnectionscapture the possibility of "cascade effects" whereby productivity shocks to asector propagate not only to its immediate downstream customers, but also indirectlyto the rest of the economy. Our results highlight that sizable aggregate volatility isobtained from sectoral idiosyncratic shocks only if there exists significant asymmetryin the roles that sectors play as suppliers to others, and that the "sparseness" of theinput-output matrix is unrelated to the nature of aggregate fluctuations.