279 resultados para JHA
Resumo:
A measurement of the multi-strange Xi(-) and Omega(-) baryons and their antiparticles by the ALICE experiment at the CERN Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is presented for inelastic proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV. The transverse momentum (p(T)) distributions were studied at mid-rapidity (vertical bar y vertical bar < 0.5) in the range of 0.6 < p(T) < 8.5 GeV/c Xi(-) for and Xi(+) baryons, and in the range of 0.8 < P-T < 5 GeV/c for Omega(-) and<(Omega)over bar>(+). Baryons and antibaryons were measured as separate particles and we find that the baryon to antibaryon ratio of both particle species is consistent with unity over the entire range of the measurement. The statistical precision of the current data has allowed us to measure a difference between the mean p(T) of Xi(-) ((Xi) over bar)(+) and Omega(-) ((Omega) over bar (+)). Particle yields, mean pi, and the spectra in the intermediate pi range are not well described by the PYTHIA Perugia 2011 tune Monte Carlo event generator, which has been tuned to reproduce the early LHC data. The discrepancy is largest for Omega(-)((Omega) over bar (+)). This PYTHIA tune approaches the pi spectra of Xi(-) and Xi(+) baryons below p(T) <0.85 GeV/c and describes the Xi(-) and Xi(+) spectra above p(T) > 6.0 GeV/c. We also illustrate the difference between the experimental data and model by comparing the corresponding ratios of (Omega(-) +(Omega) over bar (+))/(Xi(-) + Xi(+)) as a function of transverse mass. (C) 2012 CERN. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
The production of the prompt charm mesons D-0, D+, D*(+), and their antiparticles, was measured with the ALICE detector in Pb-Pb collisions at the LHC, at a centre-of-mass energy root s(NN) = 2.76 TeV per nucleon-nucleon collision. The p(t)-differential production yields in the range 2 < p(t) < 16 GeV/c at central rapidity, vertical bar y vertical bar < 0.5, were used to calculate the nuclear modification factor R-AA with respect to a proton-proton reference obtained from the cross section measured at root s = 7 TeV and scaled to root s = 2.76 TeV. For the three meson species, R-AA shows a suppression by a factor 3-4, for transverse momenta larger than 5 GeV/c in the 20% most central collisions. The suppression is reduced for peripheral collisions.
Resumo:
La presente indagine mira ad esaminare, in chiave innovativa, i rapporti tra l’Europa ed un reato prettamente europeo: il negazionismo. Sviluppatosi in maniera assolutamente predominante nel nostro continente, le ragioni della sua diffusione sono molteplici. Al di là della lotta a razzismo ed antisemitismo, il motivo principale va identificato nel ruolo “fondativo” che riveste la memoria dell’Olocausto in Europa, collocata nel cuore dell’universo valoriale su cui si reggono i due principali attori europei, ovverosia l’Unione europea e la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. La ricerca, dunque, ruota attorno a due poli tematici. Da un lato, sono state esaminate le politiche normative dell’Unione europea in materia di razzismo e xenofobia, entro cui spicca la promozione dell’incriminazione del negazionismo “allargato”, cioè esteso alle condotte di negazione non solo dell’Olocausto, ma anche degli altri crimini internazionali. Dall’altro lato, l’analisi della trentennale giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo in materia ha evidenziato come, con riguardo alle manifestazioni negazioniste, sia stato elaborato uno “statuto speciale”, che si risolve nel perentorio diniego di tutela per questa categoria di opinioni, sottratte a monte all’ordinario giudizio di bilanciamento in quanto giudicate incompatibili con i valori sottesi alla CEDU. Lo scopo di questo lavoro riposa nel tentativo di individuare le interazioni tra questi due sistemi istituzionali, per interpretare una tendenza che converge con nettezza verso un incremento della repressione penale della parola. Da questo complesso intreccio di norme e principi, di hard law e soft law, sarà possibile enucleare la natura giuridica ed il contenuto delle richieste di incriminazione rivolte agli Stati membri. Una volta appurato che agli Stati è concesso di restringere il campo di applicazione del reato di negazionismo, adottando degli indici di pericolosità delle condotte, sarà analizzata la tenuta di questi “elementi opzionali del reato” alla luce dei principi penalistici di tassatività, materialità, offensività e laicità.
Resumo:
En la sociedad europea crece la preocupación por el retorno de tendencias fascistas y neonazis y por la extensión de ideologías xenófobas y antisemitas, algunas de ellas alimentadas a partir de tesis de negacionistas de aquellos trágicos eventos de nuestra historia reciente. La lucha frente a los discursos negacionistas se ha llevado más allá del ámbito social y académico, y se ha propuesto la incorporación en los ordenamientos jurídicos europeos de tipos penales específicos que incriminan este tipo de discurso: negar, banalizar, o justificar el Holocausto u otros genocidios o graves crímenes contra la humanidad. Esta legislación, que encuentra su mayor expresión en la Decisión marco 2008/913/JAI, aunque castiga un discurso socialmente repugnante, sin embargo presenta dudas en cuanto a su legitimidad con un sistema de libertades erigido sobre el pilar del pluralismo propio de los Estados democráticos. Surge así la cuestión de si pueden estar surgiendo «nuevos» delitos de opinión y a ello se dedica entonces la presente tesis. El objetivo concreto de este trabajo será analizar esta política-criminal para proponer una configuración del delito de negacionismo compatible con la libertad de expresión, aunque se cuestionará la conveniencia de castigar penalmente a través de un específico delito este tipo de conductas. En particular se pretende responder a tres preguntas: en primer lugar, ¿el discurso negacionista debe ampararse prima facie por la libertad de expresión en un ordenamiento abierto y personalista y cuáles podrían ser las «reglas» que podrían servir como criterio para limitar este género de manifestaciones? La segunda pregunta sería entonces: ¿Cómo podría construirse un tipo penal respetuoso con los principios constitucionales y penales que específicamente incriminara este género de conductas? Y, como última pregunta: ¿Es conveniente o adecuada una política criminal que lleve a crear un específico delito de negacionismo?
Resumo:
In order to explore the diversity and selective signatures of duplication and deletion human copy number variants (CNVs), we sequenced 236 individuals from 125 distinct human populations. We observed that duplications exhibit fundamentally different population genetic and selective signatures than deletions and are more likely to be stratified between human populations. Through reconstruction of the ancestral human genome, we identify megabases of DNA lost in different human lineages and pinpoint large duplications that introgressed from the extinct Denisova lineage now found at high frequency exclusively in Oceanic populations. We find that the proportion of CNV base pairs to single nucleotide variant base pairs is greater among non-Africans than it is among African populations, but we conclude that this difference is likely due to unique aspects of non-African population history as opposed to differences in CNV load.
Resumo:
Objectives: To assess the efficacy and tolerability of aminosidine compared with sodium stibogluconate for treating visceral leishmaniasis.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. In the academic year 1991-1992, Utrecht University, on my initiative, started to offer courses in European criminal law. This initiative came at a symbolic moment, just prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaty of Maastricht1 and the outlining of European policy in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Director of the Legal Department, Paul DEMARET, was aware of the significance of this development and I have been given the opportunity to teach this subject at the College of Europe since 1995. Since then, JHA has evolved into one of the main areas of EU legislation. Now we are again on the threshold of an important historical feat. In June 2003, the European Convention reached agreement concerning a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.2 The use of the term “Constitution” for the future EU Treaty is not simply cosmetic. The realisation has dawned that EU integration must be embedded in a treaty document which also regulates the rights and duties of citizens, not just with respect to European citizenship, but also with respect to, for example, Justice. Where JHA is concerned, this result acknowledges that the harmonisation of criminal law and criminal procedure and transnational cooperation cannot preclude the harmonisation of principles of due law and fair trial. Despite the substantial Europeanisation of criminal law, many criminal lawyers are defending the achievements and typicalities of their national criminal law like never before. EU initiatives are assessed from the perspective of the national agenda and national achievements. We are still too far removed from a European criminal law policy that is both European and enjoys national support. The core issue is therefore not how to keep our criminal (procedural) law national and free from European influences, but rather how to ensure democratic decision making, the quality of the constitutional state and the guarantees of criminal law in a national administrative model which has to operate increasingly interactively within a European and international context. In this contribution, the contours of the Europeanisation of criminal law are outlined and analysed. First, attention will be paid to the EC and, second, to the JHA. Following this, an evaluation and a look ahead at the current IGC are indicated.
Resumo:
A majority of national governments across the EU have long tried to cordon off their practices of mass interception of communications data and cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts, arguing that they remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’ on grounds of national security. In light of the revelations that some EU member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) are running their own secret interception programmes, however, the question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. This commentary, by a team of JHA specialists at CEPS, offers four important legal reasons why the covert surveillance programmes of member states should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of EU intervention.