Historiografia da inserção do Brasil no regime internacional de acumulação nas eras FHC e Lula: do regional ao multilateral

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

A aproximação entre os Estados Unidos e a Índia e o processo de negociação do acordo nuclear civil (2008)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Análise da formação de Complexos Regionais de Segurança (CRS): um estudo comparativo entre a América do Sul e o leste asiático

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

A atuação internacional do Brasil para as mudanças climáticas: as COP de 2009 a 2015

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

A atuação internacional do Brasil para as mudanças climáticas: as COP de 2009 a 2015

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

I sistemi multipolari. Analisi storica e teorica.

This research undertakes to provide a typology of multipolar systems. Multipolarity plays a key role in IR theory, for it is strictly associated with the history of European politics since the seventeenth century to the end of World War Two. Despite wide investigation, one can doubt the matter has received a definitive treatment. Trouble is that current studies often consider multipolarity as a one-dimensional concept. They obviously reckon that multipolarism is substantially different from other systems and deserves attention, but generally fail to distinguish between different types of multipolar systems (the few exceptions are listed in chapter one). The history of international politics tells us a different story. Multipolar power systems may share some general characteristics, but they also show a wide array of difference, and understanding this difference requires a preliminary work of classification. That is the purpose of the present study. The work is organized as follows. In chapter one, we provide a cursory review of the literature on multipolarity, with particular reference to the work of Duncan Snidal and Joseph Grieco. Then we propose a four-cell typology of multipolar systems to be tested via historical analysis. The first type, hegemony, is best represented by European international system to the time of Napoleonic France, and is discussed in chapter two. Type number two is the traditional concert of Europe, which history is detailed in chapter three. Type number three is the reversal of alliances, which closest example, the diplomatic revolution of 1756, is discussed in chapter four. Finally, chapter five is devoted to the chain-gang system, and the European politics from Bismarck’s late years to World War One represents a good illustration of how it works. In chapter six we proceed to draw a first evaluation of the main results achieved in the previous chapters, in order to see if, and to what extent, our typology serves the purpose of explaining the nature of multipolar systems.

Giochi diplomatici. Sport e politica estera nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1943-1953)

Questa tesi di dottorato, partendo dall’assunto teorico secondo cui lo sport, pur essendo un fenomeno periferico e non decisivo del sistema politico internazionale, debba considerarsi, in virtù della sua elevata visibilità, sia come un componente delle relazioni internazionali sia come uno strumento di politica estera, si pone l’obiettivo di investigare, con un approccio di tipo storico-politico, l’attività internazionale dello sport italiano nel decennio che va dal 1943 al 1953. Nello specifico viene dedicata una particolare attenzione agli attori e alle istituzioni della “politica estera sportiva”, al rientro dello sport italiano nel consesso internazionale e alla sua forza legittimante di attrazione culturale. Vengono approfonditi altresì alcuni casi relativi a «crisi politiche» che influirono sullo sport e a «crisi sportive» che influenzarono la politica. La ricerca viene portata avanti con lo scopo primario di far emergere, da un lato se e quanto coscientemente lo sport sia stato usato come strumento di politica estera da parte dei governi e della diplomazia dell’Italia repubblicana, dall’altro quanto e con quale intensità lo sviluppo dell’attività internazionale dello sport italiano abbia avuto significative ripercussioni sull’andamento e dai rapporti di forza della politica internazionale.

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.

Political limits on the world oil trade : firm-level evidence from US firms

International politics affect trade patterns, especially for firms in extractive industries. We construct the firm-level dataset for the U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2010 to test whether the state of international relations with the trading partners of the U.S. affect importing behavior of the U.S. firms. To measure "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners we use voting records for the UN General Assembly. We find that the U.S. firms, in fact, import significantly less oil from the political opponents of the U.S. Our conjecture is that the decrease in oil imports is mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated U.S. firms that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas.

Why do oil importers diversify their import sources politically? : evidence from U.S. firm-level data

International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run.

Political influence in commercial and financial oil trading : the evidence from US firms

International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.

Migration in the Central Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 02/2013

In the last decade irregular immigration has emerged as a “security” challenge (in the language of International Relations military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region particularly in the central, sub-region1. The designation of this issue as a “security challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial and will be discussed further down. This paper focuses on the situation in the central Mediterranean involving mainly four countries namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of which have long standing historic links and bilateral relations and participate in the so called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean. Two of these Central Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are EU member states and Tunisia has a long standing relationship with the EU [Association Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya so far has no formal relations at all with the EU. This paper analyses some of the aspects of migration in the central Mediterranean focusing on the link between the domestic and international politics of the issue in Italy and Malta and contrasting the different approaches taken. For example, although Italy and Malta both resort to self-help and both try to involve the EU in helping them tackle the problem, they do this in a markedly different way: Italy uses the EU as a supplement to its independent and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the EU as the major solution to the problem. Lacking the power and influence to deal with the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as primarily a multilateral issue or one that can only be tackled in concert with stronger powers in the region preferably within an EU context. On the other hand, Italy has been keen in involving the EU but decided to go it alone when this option turned out to be a dead end. In this paper I also try to show the extent (or limitations) to which multilateral initiatives such as the “5+5” and Euro operation really play a decisive role in incentivizing or facilitating inter-state cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity (norms) and the extent to which it is implemented as well as a number of connected issues. The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean Boat People, have been referred to by various names in the literature, all of which may be more or less deficient in actually defining them all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or “irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of international protection, “migrants at sea” and “boat people”. The use of “boat people” dispenses with the need of having to define the various categories of migrants involved and is thus preferred in this paper.

The Enlarged European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: Problems and Solutions. OSW Point of View, October 2003

The EU enlargement is scheduled to take place in 2004. After this date, it should be a priority for the EU to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy towards its nearest neighbours, i.e. countries bordering the Member States, which cannot join the EU in the nearest future due to their location or weaknesses of their political and economic systems. There are at least three reasons for this. Firstly, good relations with neighbours will underlie the broadly understood security of the Community. Relations with the nearest neighbours will determine both military security of the EU (including the combating of terrorism) and its ability to prevent other threats such as illegal migration, smuggling, etc. Secondly, good economic relations with neighbours may contribute to the Member States' economic growth in the longer term. And finally, the EU's ability to develop an effective and adequate policy towards its nearest neighbours will demonstrate its competence as a subject of international politics. In other words, the EU will not be recognised as a reliable political player in the global scene until it develops an effective strategy for its neighbourhood.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.