Real estate investment in global financial centers: risk, return and contagion

Global financial activity is heavily concentrated in a small number of world cities –international financial centers. The office markets in those cities receive significant flows of investment capital. The growing specialization of activity in IFCs and innovations in real estate investment vehicles lock developer, occupier, investment, and finance markets together, creating common patterns of movement and transmitting shocks from one office market throughout the system. International real estate investment strategies that fail to recognize this common source of volatility and risk may fail to deliver the diversification benefits sought.

A note on estimating market–based minimum capital risk requirements: a multivariate GARCH approach

Internal risk management models of the kind popularized by J. P. Morgan are now used widely by the world’s most sophisticated financial institutions as a means of measuring risk. Using the returns on three of the most popular futures contracts on the London International Financial Futures Exchange, in this paper we investigate the possibility of using multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs). We propose a method for the estimation of the value at risk of a portfolio based on a multivariate GARCH model. We find that the consideration of the correlation between the contracts can lead to more accurate, and therefore more appropriate, MCRRs compared with the values obtained from a univariate approach to the problem.

e-Government as a regulatory response to the financial crisis: the case of the UK

This paper seeks to discuss EU policies relating to securities markets, created in the wake of the financial crisis and how ICT and specifically e-Government can be utilised within this context. This study utilises the UK as a basis for our discussion. The recent financial crisis has caused a change of perspective in relation to government services and polices. The regulation of the financial sector has been heavily criticised and so is undergoing radical change in the UK and the rest of Europe. New regulatory bodies are being defined with more focus on taking a risk-based system-wide approach to regulating the financial sector. This approach aims to prevent financial institutions becoming too big to fail and thus require massive government bail outs. In addition, a new wave of EU regulation is in the wind to update risk management practices and to further protect investors. This paper discusses the reasons for the financial crisis and the UK’s past and future regulatory landscape. The current and future approach and strategies adopted by the UK’s financial regulators are reviewed as is the lifecycle of EU Directives. The regulatory responses to the crisis are discussed and upcoming regulatory hotspots identified. Discussion of these issues provides the context for our evaluation of the role e-Government and ICT in improving the regulatory system. We identify several processes, which are elementary for regulatory compliance and discuss how ICT is elementary in their implementation. The processes considered include those required for internal control and monitoring, risk management, record keeping and disclosure to regulatory bodies. We find these processes offer an excellent opportunity to adopt an e-Government approach to improve services to both regulated businesses and individual investors through the benefits derived from a more effective and efficient regulatory system.

Accounting quality, information risk and implied volatility around earnings announcements

We examine the impact of accounting quality, used as a proxy for information risk, on the behavior of equity implied volatility around quarterly earnings announcements. Using US data during 1996–2010, we observe that lower (higher) accounting quality significantly relates to higher (lower) levels of implied volatility (IV) around announcements. Worse accounting quality is further associated with a significant increase in IV before announcements, and is found to relate to a larger resolution in IV after the announcement has taken place. We interpret our findings as indicative of information risk having a significant impact on implied volatility behavior around earnings announcements.

The role of big data in governance: a regulatory and legal perspective of analytics in global financial services

This paper discusses how global financial institutions are using big data analytics within their compliance operations. A lot of previous research has focused on the strategic implications of big data, but not much research has considered how such tools are entwined with regulatory breaches and investigations in financial services. Our work covers two in-depth qualitative case studies, each addressing a distinct type of analytics. The first case focuses on analytics which manage everyday compliance breaches and so are expected by managers. The second case focuses on analytics which facilitate investigation and litigation where serious unexpected breaches may have occurred. In doing so, the study focuses on the micro/data to understand how these tools are influencing operational risks and practices. The paper draws from two bodies of literature, the social studies of information systems and finance to guide our analysis and practitioner recommendations. The cases illustrate how technologies are implicated in multijurisdictional challenges and regulatory conflicts at each end of the operational risk spectrum. We find that compliance analytics are both shaping and reporting regulatory matters yet often firms may have difficulties in recruiting individuals with relevant but diverse skill sets. The cases also underscore the increasing need for financial organizations to adopt robust information governance policies and processes to ease future remediation efforts.

Aplicação de modelos de avaliação por múltiplos no Brasil

Com base na literatura internacional, testa-se o desempenho de alguns Drivers de Valor comumente utilizados para avaliação de empresas pelos práticos em finanças através de modelos de regressão simples do tipo cross-section que estimam os Múltiplos de Mercado (?'s dos modelos). Utilizando dados de empresas listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo-Bovespa, diagnostica-se o comportamento dos diversos múltiplos no decorrer do período entre 1994-2004, atentando-se também para as particularidades das atividades desempenhadas pelas empresas da amostra (e seus possíveis impactos no desempenho de cada Driver de Valor) através de uma subseqüente análise com a separação das empresas da amostra em setores. Extrapolando os padrões de avaliação por múltiplos simples usados pelos analistas de empresas das principais instituições financeiras presentes no Brasil, verifica-se que a introdução de intercepto na formulação tradicional não oferece resultados satisfatórios na redução dos erros de apreçamento. Os resultados encontrados podem não ser genericamente representativos, dada a limitada disponibilidade de informações e as restrições impostas na obtenção da base de dados.

Citizens vs. banks: institutional drivers of financial market litigiousness in Brazil

This article analyzes the institutional drivers of Brazil’s alarmingly high levels of litigation between clients and financial institutions. Most of the policy oriented literature that explores that phenomenon discusses the impacts of a perceived debtor-friendly bias of Brazilian courts on generating feedback loops of litigation that further increases interest rates and creates adverse selection within the pool of potential debtors. This literature therefore addresses the way courts behave once disputes reach their doorstep; conversely, we take a step back to understand the underlying reasons for why such a large number of disputes end up in courts in the first place. We accordingly attribute endemic litigation in Brazilian financial markets to a framework of political, economic and legal institutions and circumstances, which this article aims to unbound and explain.

Estimating economic interactions of financial suppliers in Thailand

This paper presents a methodology to estimate and identify different kinds of economic interaction, whenever these interactions can be established in the form of spatial dependence. First, we apply the semi-parametric approach of Chen and Conley (2001) to the estimation of reaction functions. Then, the methodology is applied to the analysis financial providers in Thailand. Based on a sample of financial institutions, we provide an economic framework to test if the actual spatial pattern is compatible with strategic competition (local interactions) or social planning (global interactions). Our estimates suggest that the provision of commercial banks and suppliers credit access is determined by spatial competition, while the Thai Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives is distributed as in a social planner problem.

Grau de evidenciação da contabilidade de hedge nos maiores bancos brasileiros e europeus

Ao se reportar resultados voláteis e, sem a devida evidenciação contábil (disclosure), pode-se transmitir uma imagem negativa aos investidores e levantar dúvidas em relação aos resultados futuros, a transparência e a capacidade de gerenciamento do risco por parte dos gestores das instituições financeiras. Nas últimas décadas, a utilização da contabilidade de hedge para a gestão do risco e resultado tem estado em evidência nos grandes bancos do Brasil e do exterior. Isto ocorre pois é onde se dá a convergência das demonstrações financeiras tanto em 2005 na Europa quanto em 2010 no Brasil para o novo padrão contábil internacional (IFRS) aplicado pelo IASB. Este padrão tem exigido dos bancos grandes esforços para estar em conformidade com as novas regras estabelecidas. Nesta mesma lógica, enquanto a contabilidade de hedge nos bancos assume um papel de destaque na gestão dos riscos e resultados; a divulgação precisa e concisa das demonstrações financeiras fornece aos acionistas, investidores e demais usuários importantes informações sobre o desempenho e a condução do negócio. Isto proporciona ao mercado uma melhor condição de avaliar os riscos envolvidos e de estimar os resultados futuros para a tomada de decisão de investimento. Dentro deste contexto, foi avaliado a qualidade e o grau de evidenciação das demonstrações contábeis dos principais bancos brasileiros e europeus aos requisitos do IFRS 7, IFRS 9 e outros mais de elaboração do próprio autor. Todos esses requisitos referem-se à divulgação de informações qualitativas e quantitativas pertinentes a contabilidade de hedge. Portanto, estão associados a estratégias de gestão de risco e resultado. A avaliação do grau de evidenciação das demonstrações financeiras ao IFRS 7 e IFRS 9 foi feita através de um estudo exploratório onde se analisou as notas explicativas em IFRS dos dez maiores bancos no Brasil e na Europa pelo critério “tamanho dos ativos”. Os resultados obtidos neste estudo indicam que 59,6% das instituições analisadas cumprem as exigências do IFRS7. Outra descoberta é que o índice de cumprimento dos bancos brasileiros é maior que os bancos europeus; 68,3% vs. 50,8%. Em relação ao IFRS 9 o percentual é de apenas 23% o que é explicado pelo fato da norma ainda não estar em vigor em ambas as regiões onde poucas instituições tem se antecipado de forma voluntária para atendê-la. A avaliação da qualidade das notas explicativas referente ao hedge contábil foi feita de maneira discricionária através da observação das informações prestadas para atender aos requisitos do IFRS 7 e 9 e dos demais requisitos adicionados pelo autor. Os resultados obtidos indicam que as notas carecem de maior detalhamento dos instrumentos de hedge utilizados, bem como os objetivos de cada hedge, para dar maior transparência ao usuário da informação sobre os riscos protegidos nos respectivos balanços. O crescimento do volume de informações prestadas nas notas explicativas dos grandes bancos brasileiros e europeus após a adoção do IFRS não configurou um aumento proporcional do conteúdo informacional, prevalecendo, ainda, a forma sobre a essência. Este movimento abre espaço para discussões futuras com os agentes de mercado sobre o tamanho e o conteúdo informacional adequado nas notas explicativas, com o intuito de buscar um equilíbrio entre o custo e o benefício da divulgação da informação sob a ótica da relevância e da materialidade.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Growth with stability: financing for development in the new international context

Includes bibliography

Gobernabilidad e integración financiera: ámbito global y regional

Incluye Bibliografía

Opportunities for convergence and regional cooperation: Unity Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes Bibliography