Illuminative evaluation as a method applied to Australian Government policy borrowing and implementation in higher education

Any government deciding to invoke widespread change in its higher education sector through implementation of new policies impacts on every institution and all staff and students, often in both the time taken up and the heightened emotions caused. The central phenomenon that this study addresses is the process and consequences of policy changes in higher education in Australia. The aim of this article is to record the research design through the perspective (evaluation research), theoretical framework (program evaluation) and methods (content analysis, descriptive statistical analysis and bibliometric analysis) applied to the investigation of the 2003 federal government higher education reform package. This approach allows both the intended and unintended consequences arising from the policy implementation of three national initiatives focused on learning and teaching in higher education in Australia to surface. As a result, this program evaluation, also known in some disciplines as policy implementation analysis, will demonstrate the applicability of illuminative evaluation as a methodology and reinforce how program evaluation will assist and advise future government reform and policy implementation, and will serve as a legacy for future evaluative research.Any government deciding to invoke widespread change in its higher education sector through implementation of new policies impacts on every institution and all staff and students, often in both the time taken up and the heightened emotions caused. The central phenomenon that this study addresses is the process and consequences of policy changes in higher education in Australia. The aim of this article is to record the research design through the perspective (evaluation research), theoretical framework (program evaluation) and methods (content analysis, descriptive statistical analysis and bibliometric analysis) applied to the investigation of the 2003 federal government higher education reform package. This approach allows both the intended and unintended consequences arising from the policy implementation of three national initiatives focused on learning and teaching in higher education in Australia to surface. As a result, this program evaluation, also known in some disciplines as policy implementation analysis, will demonstrate the applicability of illuminative evaluation as a methodology and reinforce how program evaluation will assist and advise future government reform and policy implementation, and will serve as a legacy for future evaluative research.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Valuers, liability and insurance obligations revisited

- Overview of negligence from the valuer’s perspective - Consideration of defences - Impact of lender conduct - Insurance obligations and impact for the valuer

Submission for the Queensland Government Parliamentary Inquiry into personal health promotion interventions using telephone and web-based technologies

Telephone and web-based technologies such as SMS, smartphone apps, gamification, online/mobile games, online quizzes and tools can be used in personal health interventions in two ways: health promotion or social marketing. In response to the Queensland government's call for submissions to the parliamentary inquiry, a social marketing and design submission from four of the faculties at Queensland University of Technology was submitted. There appears to be a great deal of confusion in government circles about the terms ‘social marketing’ and ‘health promotion’ and often they are used interchangeably when they are actually significantly different approaches. Social marketing is the science and practice of behaviour change and involves goods and services that offer a value proposition, and which incentivises citizens to change their behaviour voluntarily. However, social marketing is often mistakenly used to describe advertising and communication or social media marketing. This submission contains an overview of how technology interventions need to be implemented to be successful, provides examples of the evidence that telephone and web-based interventions can effectively influence public health outcome. This submission poses seven critical factors.

Submission to KPMG review of the Federal Government Initiative to “analyse dementia program and services funded by the Department of Social Services"

The comments I make are based on my nearly twenty years involvement in the dementia cause at both a national and international level. In preparation, I read two papers namely the Ministerial Dementia Forum – Option Paper produced by KPMG Management Consultants (2014) and Analysis of Dementia Programmes and Services Funded by the Department of Social Services: Conversation Starter prepared by KPMG as a preparation document for those attending a workshop in Brisbane on April 22nd 2015. Dementia is a complex “syndrome” and as is often said, “when you meet one person with dementia, you have met one” meaning that no two persons with dementia are the same. Even in dementia care, Australia is a “lucky country” and there is much to be said for the quality and diversity of dementia care available for people living with dementia. Despite this, I agree with the many views expressed in the material I read that there is scope for improvement, especially in the way that services are coordinated. In saying that, I do not purport to have all the solutions nor claim to have the knowledge required to comment on all the programs covered by this review. If I appear to be a “biased” advocate for Alzheimer’s Australia across the States and Territories, it is because I have seen constant evidence of ordinary people doing extraordinary things with inadequate resources. Dementia care is not cheap and if those funding dementia services are primarily only interested in economic outcomes and benefits, the real purpose of this consultation will be defeated. In addition, nowhere in the material I have read is there any recognition that in many instances program funding is a complex mix of government (at all levels) and private funding. This makes reviewing those programs more complex and less able to be coordinated at a Departmental level. It goes without saying therefore that the Federal Government is not” the only player in this game”. Of all those participating in this review, Alzheimer’s Australia is best placed to comment on programs as it is more connected to people living with dementia and has probably the best record of consulting with them. It would appear however that their role has been reduced to that of a “bit player”. Without wanting to be critical, the Forum Report which deals with the comments made at a gathering of 70 individuals and organisations, only three (3) or 4.28% were actual carers of people living with dementia. Even if it is argued that a number of organisations present represented consumers, the percentage goes up only marginally to 8.57% which is hardly an endorsement of the forum being “consumer driven”. The predominance of those present were service providers, each with their own agenda and each seeking advantage for their “business”. The final point I want to make before commenting on more specific, program related issues, is that many programs being reviewed have a much longer history than is reflected in the material I have read. Their growth and development was pioneered by Alzheimer’s Australia organisations across the country often with no government funding. Attempts to bring about better coordination of programs were often at the behest of Alzheimer’s Australia but in the main were ignored. The opportunity to now put this right is long overdue.

Integrated reporting and directors’ concerns about personal liability exposure: Law reform options

Integrated reporting () holds significant promise as a new reporting paradigm that is holistic, strategic, responsive, material, and relevant across multiple time frames. However, its uptake in Australia is being hampered by directors’ concerns about personal liability exposure, particularly for forward-looking statements that subsequently prove to be unfounded. This article seeks to illuminate the bases for these liability concerns by outlining the similarities between and the operating and financial review requirements under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and the relevant grounds for liability for misleading and deceptive disclosures, and breach of directors’ duties. In light of this discussion, this article proposes four possible reform options, ranging from minor adaptations to the Framework to far-reaching reforms of the Corporations Act. As assurance is desirable to ensure that reliance can be placed on integrated reports, the development of a legal safe harbour for auditors of forward-looking information is also canvassed.

Receivers' future liability for costs

In Juniper Property Holdings No.15 Pty Ltd v Caltabiano [2015] QSC 95, Jackson J considered what he described as a 'novel point' as to whether the court had jurisdiction to make a determination of the liability of receivers and managers appointed to the plaintiff to pay any costs orders that may be made in favour of the defendant.

Natural hazards and land use planning: How resilient must a landowner be?

The past decade has seen an increase in the occurrence of natural hazards and the experience in Australia has led to a reconsideration of the planning for natural hazards by government and to the adoption of a whole-of-nation resilience-based approach to disaster management. A key component of creating community resilience is the integration of disaster management with government and community strategic planning in relation to the social, built, economic and natural environments. Joint responsibility of government and the community for ‘land use planning systems and building control arrangements [which] reduce, as far as is practicable, community exposure to unreasonable risks from known hazards’, is a critical element of a resilient community. As the responsibility for the implementation of land use planning policies in Australia is generally with local governments, this paper will examine whether, in light of improved predictive technology, the failure of a local government to adequately foresee and make provision for a known hazard will give rise to liability for damage or loss of property caused by that hazard.

Hail to the thief: A tribute to Kazaa

This paper considers the ongoing litigation against the peer to peer network Kazaa. Record companies and Hollywood studios have faced jurisdictional and legal problems in suing this network for copyright infringement. As Wired Magazine observes: ’The servers are in Denmark. The software is in Estonia. The domain is registered Down Under, the corporation on a tiny island in the South Pacific. The users - 60 million of them - are everywhere around the world.' In frustration, copyright owners have launched copyright actions against intermediaries - like Internet Service Providers such as Verizon. They have also embarked on filing suits of individual users of file-sharing programs. In addition, copyright owners have called for domestic and international law reform in respect of digital copyright. The Senate Committee on Government Affairs in the United States Congress has reviewed the controversial use of subpoenas in suits against users of file-sharing peer to peer networks. The United States has encouraged other countries to adopt provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US) in bilateral and regional free trade agreements.

Robbery under arms: Copyright law and the Australia-United States free trade agreement

TThis article considers the radical, sweeping changes to Australian copyright law wrought by the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement 2004 (AUSFTA). It contends that the agreement will result in a “piracy of the public domain”. Under this new regime, copyright owners will be able to obtain greater monopoly profits at the expense of Australian consumers, libraries and research institutions, as well as intermediaries, such as Internet service providers. Part One observes that the copyright term extension in Australia to life of the author plus 70 years for works will have a negative economic and cultural impact — with Australia’s net royalty payments estimated to be up to $88 million higher per year. Part Two argues that the adoption of stronger protection of technological protection measures modelled upon the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (U.S.) will override domestic policy–making processes, such as the Phillips Fox Digital Agenda Review, and judicial pronouncements such as the Stevens v Sony litigation. Part Three questions whether the new safe harbours protection for Internet service providers will adversely affect the sale of Telstra. This article concludes that there is a need for judicial restraint in interpreting the AUSFTA. There is an urgent call for the Federal Government to pass ameliorating reforms — such as an open–ended defence of fair use and a mechanism for orphan works. There is a need for caution in negotiating future bilateral trade agreements — lest the multinational system for the protection of copyright law be undermined.

Insolvency specialists and government enquiries: A unique opportunity to contribute to the public good

This lecture addresses the contribution of research by insolvency specialists to the development of insolvency law and practice, in particular to the (re-)design of insolvency systems. It draws on examples from Australia of government enquiries to reform insolvency law as well as other areas of law with which it intersects. It comments on the role that insolvency specialists can play in such policy debates – not only insolvency academics but also scholarly practitioners – for the public good.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Don't argue with the ref! - Legal liability for incorrect decisions of sports' officials

This paper continues the conversation from recent articles examining potential remedies available for incorrect decisions by sports officials. In particular, this article focuses on bringing an action against an official in negligence for pure economic loss. Using precedent cases, it determines that such an action would have a low chance of success, as a duty of care would be difficult to establish. Even if that could be overcome, an aggrieved player or team would still face further hurdles at the stages of breach, causation and defences. The article concludes by proposing some options to further reduce the small risk of liability to officials.