Topics in equilibrium and nonequilibrium thermodynamics: computing crystalline free energies and engineering Maxwell’s demon.

This dissertation covers two separate topics in statistical physics. The first part of the dissertation focuses on computational methods of obtaining the free energies (or partition functions) of crystalline solids. We describe a method to compute the Helmholtz free energy of a crystalline solid by direct evaluation of the partition function. In the many-dimensional conformation space of all possible arrangements of N particles inside a periodic box, the energy landscape consists of localized islands corresponding to different solid phases. Calculating the partition function for a specific phase involves integrating over the corresponding island. Introducing a natural order parameter that quantifies the net displacement of particles from lattices sites, we write the partition function in terms of a one-dimensional integral along the order parameter, and evaluate this integral using umbrella sampling. We validate the method by computing free energies of both face-centered cubic (FCC) and hexagonal close-packed (HCP) hard sphere crystals with a precision of $10^{-5}k_BT$ per particle. In developing the numerical method, we find several scaling properties of crystalline solids in the thermodynamic limit. Using these scaling properties, we derive an explicit asymptotic formula for the free energy per particle in the thermodynamic limit. In addition, we describe several changes of coordinates that can be used to separate internal degrees of freedom from external, translational degrees of freedom. The second part of the dissertation focuses on engineering idealized physical devices that work as Maxwell's demon. We describe two autonomous mechanical devices that extract energy from a single heat bath and convert it into work, while writing information onto memory registers. Additionally, both devices can operate as Landauer's eraser, namely they can erase information from a memory register, while energy is dissipated into the heat bath. The phase diagrams and the efficiencies of the two models are solved and analyzed. These two models provide concrete physical illustrations of the thermodynamic consequences of information processing.

Map of Elizabeth Town, N.J. at the time of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1783. Showing that part of the free borough and town of Elizabeth, which is now the site of the city of Elizabeth.

Scale ca. 1:7,300.

Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness. In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility. In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry. In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment. Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders. By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.

Indenture - 1773

An indenture dated October 1, 1773 between Mary Willson (daughter of Andrew Willson) and Hill Carney and Sarah his wife and Mary their daughter. Mary "hath put herself and by this presents doth voluntarily and of her own free will and accord put herself Apprentice to Hill Carney Sarah his wife and Mary their daughter".

Le néo-sujet du droit criminel. Effets secondaires des psychotropes sur l’anthropologie pénale

Cette thèse a fait l'objet d'une publication: Le nouveau sujet du droit criminel : effets secondaires de la psychiatrie sur la responsabilité pénale / Christian Saint-Germain. — Montréal : Liber, [2014]. — 358 pages ; 23 cm. ISBN 9782895784654.

¿Tenemos libre albedrío? Objeciones empíricas y filosóficas a Benjamin Libet.

Benjamin Libet ha argumentado que cambios específicos en la actividad electroencefalográfica del córtex cerebral son registrados varios cientos de milisegundos antes que las personas tengan la intención consciente para actuar. Según Libet este hallazgo prueba que los movimientos voluntarios se inician de manera inconsciente. Siendo así, pone en duda nuestra percepción de libre albedrío según la cual nosotros somos iniciadores conscientes de nuestras acciones voluntarias. En este artículo haré objeciones empíricas a su modelo experimental argumentando que Libet no mide en realidad lo que él cree que está midiendo y, que el uso de electroencefalografía con electrodo de registro en cuero cabelludo no suministra datos fiables que permitan correlacionar cambios de la actividad cerebral y fenómenos psíquicos. También haré objeciones teóricas a las conclusiones filosóficas derivadas de sus experimentos, argumentado que la acción simple (mover el dedo) no puede ser una acción paradigmática para estudiar libre albedrío y que Libet al no estudiar la naturaleza de las intenciones distales ni su probable rol causal en la formación de intenciones proximales, no puede demostrar que el cerebro decide inconscientemente iniciar la acción. Concluyo que Libet nunca llega a probar que no actuamos por nuestro propio libre albedrío.

Liberdade e negação da vontade: análise do ser-livre como representação e na angústia

Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be

Human behaviour modelled as a statistico-deterministic turing machine

'Free will' and its corollary, the concept of individual responsibility are keystones of the justice system. This paper shows that if we accept a physics that disallows time reversal, the concept of 'free will' is undermined by an integrated understanding of the influence of genetics and environment on human behavioural responses. Analysis is undertaken by modelling life as a novel statistico-deterministic version of a Turing machine, i.e. as a series of transitions between states at successive instants of time. Using this model it is proven by induction that the entire course of life is independent of the action of free will. Although determined by prior state, the probability of transitions between states in response to a standard environmental stimulus is not equal to 1 and the transitions may differ quantitatively at the molecular level and qualitatively at the level of the whole organism. Transitions between states correspond to behaviours. It is shown that the behaviour of identical twins (or clones), although determined, would be incompletely predictable and non-identical, creating an illusion of the operation of 'free will'. 'Free will' is a convenient construct for current judicial systems and social control because it allows rationalization of punishment for those whose behaviour falls outside socially defined norms. Indeed, it is conceivable that maintenance of ideas of free will has co-evolved with community morality to reinforce its operation. If the concept is free will is to be maintained it would require revision of our current physical theories.

La represión sexual como tema recurrente en la obra de Federico García Lorca

The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that sexual repression is a recurring theme throughout a selection of works by Federico García Lorca. The introductory chapter focuses on the sexual theories of Sigmund Freud and Michel Foucault in setting the foundation for an analysis of sexually frustrated characters. In chapter two, an analysis of Lorca's rural trilogy reveals how marginalized female characters struggle to preserve societal customs that subjugate them to the patriarchal hegemony by limiting their free will and their sexual freedom. The subsequent chapter elaborates on the theme of repression in poems where the oppressed voice expresses and denounces the intolerance and persecution of those who condemn homosexuality through metaphors of darkness, impurity, and barren love. Chapter four analyzes two avant-garde plays where the underlying message is that of a society that hampers the expression of homosexual love by silencing desire and forcing individuals to mask their identities. The conclusion demonstrates once more the effects of society on sexual freedom, as well as explaining that the recurrence of repressed women is not a pretext in portraying the homosexual saga, but a pre-text in presenting them as an equally marginalized group.

Interpretación Modesta de la Responsabilidad Moral: Lectura de Strawson desde el sentido histórico y situado de la humanidad

En esta monografía reseño la forma como Peter Strawson enmarca el debate de la responsabilidad moral en un lugar que denomino más cerca de lo humano. Considero que son las actitudes reactivas, propuestas por Peter Strawson, una pieza fundamental para entender qué es la responsabilidad moral. Esta perspectiva no está libre de contradictores, es por ese motivo que plantearé una interpretación de la idea de Strawson que tiene como objetivo responder algunas críticas que recaen sobre esta forma de conceptualizar las relaciones interpersonales. Construiré la defensa alrededor de la interpretación de la responsabilidad moral que entiende la asignación de la responsabilidad moral como un tipo de lenguaje que adquiere su significado en la medida que se usa. De manera análoga, planteo el interrogante de si es posible pensar en un sistema de responsabilidad moral que se justifica en la medida que se usa. Considero que esta idea tiene sentido con algo denominado la circularidad virtuosa. La pregunta que sale a la luz de inmediato es ¿cómo es posible usar un sistema de responsabilidad moral que se va justificando en la medida que se usa? En realidad, no solo es en la medida que se usa, sino también en el trascurso en el que los seres humanos se reconocen unos con otros y entablan ciertas prácticas. Para entender y justificar esta cuestión planteo una interpretación de la postura de Strawson que denomino “Interpretación Modesta de la Responsabilidad Moral”.

Locke, on freedom and will

This article aims to discuss Locke`s compatibilism, that is, the lokean thesis that freedom is compatible with the natural necessity. To this end, it is analized the chapter Of The Power (XXI, book II of the An Essay concerning Human Understanding), in which Locke clarifies the concepts of freedom and will. Although Locke, at times, involves himself with the incongruent thesis on compatibilism, he is a compatibilist. The impression that Locke would defend incompatibilists` theories ends up being abandoned when we analyze carefully his general argument about will and freedom. Locke literally defends that the volunteer does not differ from the necessary. As a compatibilist, Locke maintains that will is not free. Thus, the free man can not be the one that is free to want. A man regarded as a free agent is the one that has freedom of action, not freedom of will.

Vir sapiens dominabitur astris: astrological knowledge and practices in the Portuguese medieval court (king João I to king Afonso V)

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em História Medieval