CSCE Commission examines: "Africa's Helsinki" : the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) in South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, and Nigeria (Codel Deconcini: August 4 to 19, 1991) /

"October 1991."

Implementation of the Helsinki accords : hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, European perspective on Bosnian conflict, February 22, 1993.

"CSCE 103-1-3."

Agricultural credit and cooperation in Germany. Report to the British Board of Agriculture and Fisheries of an inquiry into agricultural credit and agricultural cooperation in Germany with some notes on German livestock insurance by J.R. Cahill.

English ed. pub. as Papers by command, Cd. 6626.

Semiannual report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe : report submitted to the Committee on International Relations.

Issues for 3rd (December 1977)- submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism

Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist's favour(1-5). This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the altruist's gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore are more likely to help the altruist in the future(5-7). Such complex indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by finding cooperative partners(8-10). Second, altruistic behaviour in the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus(11,12). As mucus may be preferred over typical client ectoparasites(13), clients must make cleaners feed against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to 'cooperative' than 'unknown cooperative level' cleaners, which shows that clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an `image-scoring' than in a 'non-image-scoring' situation.

Trust and cooperation in buyer–seller relationships and networks. The co-evolution of structural balance and trust in iterated PD games

Our study has two aims: to elaborate theoretical frameworks and introduce social mechanisms of spontaneous co-operation in repeated buyer-seller relationships and to formulate hypotheses which can be empirically tested. The basis of our chain of ideas is the simple two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. On the one hand, its repeated variation can be applicable for the distinction of the analytical types of trust (iteration trust, strategy trust) in co-operations. On the other hand, it provides a chance to reveal those dyadic sympathy-antipathy relations, which make us understand the evolution of trust. Then we introduce the analysis of the more complicated (more than two-person) buyer-seller relationship. Firstly, we outline the possible role of the structural balancing mechanisms in forming trust in three-person buyer-seller relationships. Secondly, we put forward hypotheses to explain complex buyer-seller networks. In our research project we try to theoretically combine some of the simple concepts of game theory with certain ideas of the social-structural balance theory. Finally, it is followed by a short summary.