Age-specific survival of male Golden-cheeked Warblers on the Fort Hood Military Reservation, Texas

Population models are essential components of large-scale conservation and management plans for the federally endangered Golden-cheeked Warbler (Setophaga chrysoparia; hereafter GCWA). However, existing models are based on vital rate estimates calculated using relatively small data sets that are now more than a decade old. We estimated more current, precise adult and juvenile apparent survival (Φ) probabilities and their associated variances for male GCWAs. In addition to providing estimates for use in population modeling, we tested hypotheses about spatial and temporal variation in Φ. We assessed whether a linear trend in Φ or a change in the overall mean Φ corresponded to an observed increase in GCWA abundance during 1992-2000 and if Φ varied among study plots. To accomplish these objectives, we analyzed long-term GCWA capture-resight data from 1992 through 2011, collected across seven study plots on the Fort Hood Military Reservation using a Cormack-Jolly-Seber model structure within program MARK. We also estimated Φ process and sampling variances using a variance-components approach. Our results did not provide evidence of site-specific variation in adult Φ on the installation. Because of a lack of data, we could not assess whether juvenile Φ varied spatially. We did not detect a strong temporal association between GCWA abundance and Φ. Mean estimates of Φ for adult and juvenile male GCWAs for all years analyzed were 0.47 with a process variance of 0.0120 and a sampling variance of 0.0113 and 0.28 with a process variance of 0.0076 and a sampling variance of 0.0149, respectively. Although juvenile Φ did not differ greatly from previous estimates, our adult Φ estimate suggests previous GCWA population models were overly optimistic with respect to adult survival. These updated Φ probabilities and their associated variances will be incorporated into new population models to assist with GCWA conservation decision making.

Haldane's Mackindergarten: a radical experiment in British military education

This article critically evaluates a course that was conceived and run at the LSE by Sir Halford Mackinder for officers of the Britsh Army between 1907 and 1932.There is an examination of the nature of the syllabus,the aims and objectives of this course.An explanation is also given as to why the army cut it seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives’

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.