927 resultados para Central bank independence
Resumo:
This study empirically analyzes the sources of the exchange rate fluctuations in India by employing the structural VAR model. The VAR system consists of three variables, i.e., the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate, and the relative output of India and a foreign country. Consistent with most previous studies, the empirical evidence demonstrates that real shocks are the main drives of the fluctuations in real and nominal exchange rates, indicating that the central bank cannot maintain the real exchange rate at its desired level over time.
Resumo:
In April 1998, the RBI, the Indian central bank, formally announced a shift in its policy framework from monetary targeting to a multiple indicator approach, and since then, under this framework, the bank has considered a range of economic and financial variables as policy indicators for drawing policy perspectives. This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of this current policy framework in India by analyzing the causal relationships of each indicator variable on the objective variables. The results reveal that, except for bank credit, all indicator variables considered in this study have a causal relationship with at least either output or price level, suggesting that most preannounced economic and financial variables have served as useful policy indicators under the multiple indicator approach.
Resumo:
Since the abolition of the official peg and the introduction of a managed float in April 2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar has operated the daily two–way auctions of foreign exchange aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations. Despite the reforms to the foreign exchange regime, however, informal trading of foreign exchange remains pervasive. Using the daily informal exchange rate and Central Bank auction data, this study examines the impacts of auctions on the informal market rate. First, a VAR analysis indicates that the official rate did not Granger cause the informal rate. Second, GARCH models indicate that the auctions did not reduce the conditional variance of the informal rate returns. Overall, the auctions have only a quite modest impact on the informal exchange rate.
Resumo:
The central bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP) has improved its monetary policy measures since the 2000s. After rationalizing the country's banking sector since late-1990s, its monetary policy and the uniiversal/commercial banks' (UCBs) behavior in allocating their assets has changed since mid-2000s. Though further and more detailed studies are nesessary, based on the results of simple correlation analyses conducted in this paper suggest a possible mixture of the country's monetary policy and their own decision-making in asset allocations, instead of a "follow-through" attitude.
Resumo:
Há mais de uma década o controle dos níveis de preço na economia brasileira é realizado dentro do escopo do Regime de Metas de Inflação, que utiliza modelos macroeconômicos como instrumentos para guiar as tomadas de decisões sobre política monetária. Após um período de relativo êxito (2006 - 2009), nos últimos anos apesar dos esforços das autoridades monetárias na aplicação das políticas de contenção da inflação, seguindo os mandamentos do regime de metas, esta tem se mostrado resistente, provocando um debate em torno de fatores que podem estar ocasionando tal comportamento. Na literatura internacional, alguns trabalhos têm creditado aos choques de oferta, especialmente aos desencadeados pela variação dos preços das commodities, uma participação significativa na inflação, principalmente em economias onde os produtos primários figuram como maioria na pauta exportadora. Na literatura nacional, já existem alguns trabalhos que apontam nesta mesma direção. Sendo assim, buscou-se, como objetivo principal para o presente estudo, avaliar como os choques de oferta, mais especificamente os choques originados pelos preços das commodities, têm impactado na inflação brasileira e como e com que eficiência a política monetária do país tem reagido. Para tanto, foi estimado um modelo semiestrutural contendo uma curva de Phillips, uma curva IS e duas versões da Função de Reação do Banco Central, de modo a verificar como as decisões de política monetária são tomadas. O método de estimação empregado foi o de Autorregressão Vetorial com Correção de Erro (VEC) na sua versão estrutural, que permite uma avaliação dinâmica das relações de interdependência entre as variáveis do modelo proposto. Por meio da estimação da curva de Phillips foi possível observar que os choques de oferta, tanto das commodities como da produtividade do trabalho e do câmbio, não impactam a inflação imediatamente, porém sua relevância é crescente ao longo do tempo chegando a prevalecer sobre o efeito autorregressivo (indexação) verificado. Estes choques também se apresentaram importantes para o comportamento da expectativa de inflação, produzindo assim, uma indicação de que seus impactos tendem a se espalhar pelos demais setores da economia. Através dos resultados da curva IS constatou-se a forte inter-relação entre o hiato do produto e a taxa de juros, o que indica que a política monetária, por meio da fixação de tal taxa, influencia fortemente a demanda agregada. Já por meio da estimação da primeira função de reação, foi possível perceber que há uma relação contemporânea relevante entre o desvio da expectativa de inflação em relação à meta e a taxa Selic, ao passo que a relação contemporânea do hiato do produto sobre a taxa Selic se mostrou pequena. Por fim, os resultados obtidos com a segunda função de reação, confirmaram que as autoridades monetárias reagem mais fortemente aos sinais inflacionários da economia do que às movimentações que acontecem na atividade econômica e mostraram que uma elevação nos preços das commodities, em si, não provoca diretamente um aumento na taxa básica de juros da economia.
Resumo:
As cooperativas de crédito são instituições financeiras que têm como finalidade principal a prestação de serviços bancários e de intermediação financeira voltando-se para a geração de benefícios ao cooperado, através de benefícios econômicos encontrados sob a forma cooperativada. Considerando o objetivo destas organizações, o presente trabalho teve por objetivo avaliar a eficiência das mesmas considerando duas vertentes: 1) a atividade de intermediação financeira; e 2) a atividade de prestação de serviços bancários, a partir de variáveis contábeis. A técnica utilizada para a avaliação da eficiência foi a Análise Envoltória de Dados e foram analisados os determinantes da eficiência por meio de regressões do tipo Tobit. A amostra é composta por 315 cooperativas singulares listadas na base de dados do Banco Central do Brasil e foram utilizados os dados dos balancetes anuais e semestrais (soma dos semestres para as contas de resultado de cada ano) apresentados para período de 2007 a 2014. Os resultados indicaram baixa eficiência das cooperativas na prestação de serviços bancários, com 73% da amostra apresentando ineficiência ao longo de todos os anos do período em análise. Na atividade de intermediação financeira 20 cooperativas foram eficientes ao longo do período completo, com as demais apresentando graus de ineficiência abaixo de 16% em todos os anos. Quanto aos determinantes da eficiência, verificou-se como principais fatores na atividade de intermediação financeira a Imobilização, a Insolvência, o Descasamento Passivo e as Despesas Administrativas, enquanto na atividade de prestação de serviços os principais determinantes foram a Captação por Floating e as Despesas Administrativas. Os resultados da eficiência na intermediação financeira indicaram baixos graus de ineficiência, enquanto os altos graus de ineficiência na prestação de serviços bancários alertaram para a pouca importância dada ao fornecimentos destes serviços e para a importância de se utilizar dois modelos distintos para a avaliação da eficiência em cooperativas de crédito, dado o comportamento desvinculado entre as duas atividades avaliadas.
Resumo:
En la última década, la organización del sistema financiero español ha tenido una convulsión de un alcance inimaginable y puede decirse sin ningún género de dudas que el cambio ha sido histórico. De un sistema en el que el reparto de las instituciones financieras estaba representado por las Cajas de Ahorro y la banca en un 50% por cada grupo, se ha pasado a un escenario en el que las Cajas de Ahorro han desaparecido casi en su totalidad y la banca ha ocupado completamente todo el sistema financiero español. Difícilmente se puede explicar este cambio por factores exclusivamente atribuibles a unas u otras instituciones ya que, en buena lógica, una crisis económica afecta con distinta intensidad a cada una de las empresas y, por lo tanto, hubiese cabido esperar que el mantenimiento de algunas cajas de ahorros ante el embate de la crisis hubiese significado que quedasen algunas en funcionamiento. Pero ¿todas? También hubiera cabido esperar que la crisis hubiera afectado a más bancos, pero ¿tan pocos? ¿Tan bien estaban o sabían más que las demás entidades financieras? En esta comunicación vamos a tratar de analizar el comportamiento del Banco de España en este proceso y ver hasta qué punto sus decisiones o falta de decisiones han contribuido a profundizar en la crisis económica y en el hundimiento de todo el sector de cajas de ahorro españolas.
Resumo:
This paper focuses on the possible instruments for ‘ex-ante’/’preventive’/’precautionary’ interventions which can be deployed by the ESM and the ECB in order to prevent a debt crisis in a eurozone country. The potential of Eurobonds will also be discussed in this crisis management perspective. The first part of this paper traces the underlying trends of the evolution of interest rates in eurozone countries over the last decades. The second part discusses the principles of a preventive intervention in sovereign bond markets for the purpose of lowering borrowing costs of countries facing refinancing constraints; the limits and main issues of an ex-ante intervention will be underlined. In the third part, the properties of the ESM’s precautionary financial assistance and secondary market support facility will be discussed in details. The ECB preemptive intervention policies and, in particular, the OMT will be analyzed in the fourth part of the paper. The most likely course of action – a combined intervention by the ESM and the ECB – will be discussed in the fifth part. Finally, I will point out the core challenges of introducing Eurobonds as additional instruments to mitigate the rise of borrowing costs in the short term.
Resumo:
Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.
Resumo:
The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a breakthrough. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.
Resumo:
New obstacles to the European banking union have emerged over the last year, but a successful transition remains both necessary and possible. The key next step will be in the second half of 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) will gain supervisory authority over most of Europe’s banking system. This needs to be preceded by a rigorous balance sheet assessment that is likely to trigger significant bank restructuring, for which preparation has barely started. It will be much more significant than current discussions about a bank resolution directive and bank recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The 2014 handover, and a subsequent change in the European treaties that will establish the robust legal basis needed for a sustainable banking union, together define the policy sequence as a bridge that can allow Europe to cross the choppy waters that separate it from a steady-state banking policy framework.
Resumo:
From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.
Resumo:
After more than a decade of indecision, the EU is finally now set to implement a consistent regulatory architecture for clearing and settlement. Following the agreement on a European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the European Commission has proposed harmonised rules for centralised settlement depositaries (CSDs), while the European Central Bank is moving forward with its plans for a central eurozone settlement engine. This paper analyses three components of the new post-trade infrastructure measures: 1) the regulatory framework for and supervision of central counterparties under the new EMIR legislation, 2) the authorisation requirements of trade repositories and 3) the draft CSD Regulation and the progress with the ECB’s Target 2 Securities project. It then discusses the impact of the new rules, and argues that, analogous to the unexpected impact of MiFID on trading infrastructures, a similar EMIR revolution may be on its way.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5
Resumo:
Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.