Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.

Le choix du tout-à-l'automobile à Montréal (1953-1967) : un contexte propice à l’aménagement de l'échangeur Turcot

En l’espace d’une décennie, Montréal s’est durablement transformée. Du milieu des années 1950, où elle représente une ville développée certes, mais dépourvue d'autoroutes, à 1967, année de l’Exposition universelle, la métropole du Québec confirme son choix du tout-à-l’automobile. Le développement autoroutier qu’elle réalise à cette époque doit alors être en mesure de répondre aux besoins de la société à court comme à long terme. Ce réseau perdure toujours de nos jours. Nous souhaitons décomposer la trame de cette période mouvementée afin de comprendre comment Montréal a pu adopter cette orientation aussi rapidement. Il est question d’aborder les éléments ayant permis de centraliser le thème de la circulation à Montréal. La réponse des autorités et la volonté de planifier la ville à long terme nous conduisent ensuite à une réalisation accélérée d’un réseau autoroutier métropolitain d’envergure dont l’échangeur Turcot représente l’aboutissement en 1967. Cette étude permet de mieux examiner l’histoire de ce projet autoroutier majeur qui a constitué un des symboles forts de la modernisation de Montréal et du Québec. L’échangeur Turcot construit dans les années 1960 est le fruit d’une conjoncture particulière, correspondant à des besoins et des attentes tout autre que ceux qui prévalent actuellement. Nous concluons ainsi en nous questionnant sur la construction actuelle du nouvel échangeur Turcot, et en affirmant qu’elle ne correspond peut-être pas aux besoins d’une métropole du XXIe siècle.

Suppliers' Associations in the Japanese Automobile Industry

This paper analyzes the structure and functions of suppliers' associations (kyoryokukai) in the automobile industry in Japan. The bilateral assembler-supplier relationship has received much attention recently as a source of Japanese industrial competitiveness. However, this paper argues that the hitherto neglected area of inter-supplier coordination in technology diffusion is at least as important as the bilateral assembler-supplier relationship in accounting for the overall performance of the Japanese automotive industry. On the basis of company visits and a largescale survey of first-tier suppliers conducted by the author, the paper analyzes the reasons why suppliers' associations were established, why they continue to exist today, and their effects on economic performance.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Rights and Ownership online

Legal Issues slides to use as a part of the preparation for exam. Supplement to other existing resources

COMP1205: Digital rights and ownership

links and notes on ownership and digital rights

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.