Civil-Military Relations in Croatia: Politicisation and Politics of Reform.

This article argues that since 2000 successive Croatian governments have shown themselves increasingly dedicated to reforming civil-military relations. However, their efforts have been hampered by four key obstacles. First, the need to implement defence reforms in the context of an unwieldy set of civil-military relationships, political and institutional rivalries, a lack of civil and military defence expertise and a continuing legacy of politicisation. Second, the need to cut defence spending as a proportion of the overall budget whilst taking on new military roles and improving the capability of the armed forces. Third, the need to balance the demands of the NATO accession process while implementing a balanced and fundamental reform of the armed forces as a whole. Finally, the need to implement root and branch personnel reforms and downsizing in the OSRH while simultaneously recruiting and retaining quality personnel and addressing the wider social issue of unemployment.

Taming the tigers? Reforming the security sector in Southeast Asia

Despite global trends towards military reform characterized by processes of professionalization and democratization, militaries in Southeast Asia have continued to play prominent roles in domestic politics since 11 September. This suggests that wider patterns of global military reform have not had as great an impact on the control, capacity and cooperative functions of armed forces in Southeast Asia as they may have elsewhere. In order to explore why the security sector reform agenda has had so little impact in the region, we investigate recent patterns of civil-military relations in Southeast Asia by focusing on the experiences of four of the region's militaries: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We argue that the security sector reform agenda is informed by a predominantly North American approach to civil-military relations based on a number of core assumptions that do not reflect Southeast Asian experiences. Hence, we ask whether the reform agenda itself could be modified to better suit the Southeast Asian context. We suggest that although the regional military sector has not reformed along a 'Western' path it is nonetheless possible to see other types of, and potential for, reform.

A hatalmi viszonyok a világgazdaság és a katonai szektor a XXI. században = Power relations in the world economy and the military sector in 21st century

A bipoláris világrendszer megszűnése a XX. század utolsó évtizedében új helyzetet teremtett a globális politikai és gazdasági viszonyokban, ugyanakkor nem mellékesen a hadiiparban is. A szerző, szem előtt tartva a hatalmi viszonyok jövőbeli elkerülhetetlen átrendeződését, elsősorban a katonai szektor előtt álló, a XXI. századra előrevetíthető kihívásokat, lehetőségeket, a szektor jövőbeli pályáját tekinti át. A hadiiparral kapcsolatban indokolt a hidegháború utáni világ fegyverkezési helyzetének, fegyveres erőinek számbavétele csakúgy, mint a releváns elméleti keretek ismertetése, továbbá a fontos globális szereplők biztonságpolitikájának vizsgálata. A katonai szektor jelenének és jövőjének alapos elemzése nem nélkülözheti a katonai kiadások jelenlegi – a világgazdasági válság által befolyásolt – és a következő évtizedekben várható alakulásának vizsgálatát. Végül, de nem utolsó sorban a szerző áttekinti a XXI. századi haditechnikai forradalom már most látható és a jövőben valószínűsíthető vívmányait, a fontosabb haditechnikai tendenciákat, illetve elemzi a nemzetközi fegyverpiac helyzetét. __________________ The end of the Cold War led to a new situation in global political and economic affairs, as well as in the military sector. The author, taking into consideration the inevitable future power shifts, provides an overview of the challenges, possibilities and future paths of the military sector. Relevant issues include assessing the arms and armed forces of the post-Cold War era, as well as the analysis of theoretical frameworks and the security policies of the important global actors. Understanding the present and the future of the military sector is not possible without the thorough analysis of military expenditures and their likely future trends. The author also overviews the outcomes of the 21st century revolution in military technology and analyses the global arms market.

A mérsékelt iszlamista mozgalmak szerepe az "arab tavaszt" követő politikai átmenetben (The Role of Moderate Islamist Movements in the Political Transition Following the Arab Spring)

Up to January 2011 authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East had widely been considered stable due to the armed forces, the underdeveloped political institutions, the economic embeddedness of the regimes, the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab societies and, eventually the characteristics of Islam. Middle Eastern political systems are often considered to belong to a special sub-group of non-democratic regimes called “liberalized autocracies”. The 2011 events show that there is a new, as yet non-defined political structure emerging. Although there are different interpretations of the developments, there is a consensus on the determinant role of the Islamist organizations in the development of the new political structure. The results of the Egyptian and Tunisian parliamentary elections show that the secular political parties could not attract the public, while in Tunisia the long forbidden Hizb an-Nahda could form a government. In Egypt Hizb al-Hurriya established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 won almost half of the parliamentary mandates, and to a great surprise, the Salafi Hizb an-Nour also received 24.3% of the votes. On the basis of the above developments the thesis of the Islamist re-organization of the Middle East, i.e. of a new wave of Islamism was elaborated, according to which the main political winners of the revolts in the Arab countries are the Islamist organizations, which could step in and fill in the political vacuum. While some speak of an Islamist autumn or Islamist winter as the result of the Arab Spring, others prefer the term Islamic revolutions.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces��� missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces��� relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces��� role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez: Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in Venezuela

Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous political system and established neo-populist structures that rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant support from the poor and those who felt economically and politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.” President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support. In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Altered Landscape or Arms Race? Making Sense of Military Spending in South America

In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of $51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000 expenditures. The five-year moving average of arms transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from 2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004.[1] These figures and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin America is engaged in an arms race. Other reasons, however, account for Latin America’s large military expenditure. Among them: Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged modernization efforts, recently made possible by six years of consistent regional growth.[2] A generational shift is at hand. Armed Forces are beginning to shed the stigma and association with past dictatorial regimes.[3] Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies, rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia’s spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the 1990s.[4] Concerns remain, however: Venezuela continues to demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must all continue to be monitored; and Brazil’s military purchases, although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation of equipment.[5] These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and garnering greater participation in transparent procurement mechanism.[6] The United States can do its part by supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the transparency process. _________________ [1] Bromley, Mark, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 12,13, and 16 [2] Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power Point presentation, slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25th-26th, 2010 [3] Yopo, Boris, “¿Carrera Armamentista en la Regiόn?” La Tercera, November 2nd, 2009, http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895_197084_9.shtml, accessed October 8th, 2010 [4] Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 49,50,53 and 54 [5] Ibid., Guevara, Iñigo, Pg. 22 [6] Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 18 and 19

A OAB no processo de transformação da sociedade brasileira: a seccional potiguar como espaço de redemocratização (1979-1988)

The period known as the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985) was a period of history marked by Brazil's control of state power by the Armed Forces together, this started with the Civil-Military Coup of April 1964. Was characterized as a time where political freedoms of expression and were placed in check by authoritarian and repressive measures taken by the military governments. The sectional potiguar of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB / RN), and the Federal Council of the institution, supported the establishment of this scam, but from the 1970s undertook measures that sought to corroborate the struggles around democracy the country, which has consolidated its image as a defender of democratic order. With the title inspired by the XII Meeting of OAB in October 1988, the research aims to analyze the participation of OAB / RN and its members within the Brazilian democratization. This analysis begins in 1979 with the participation of the entity in discussions Amnesty Policy to the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, since the Constitution is the beginning of a full rule of law. We seek to understand the object as a space for democratization, combining the concepts of History, Memory and Politics. In the analyzes are guided theoretically by Jacques Le Goff, Pierre Nora, Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Bourdieu and Hannah Arendt. Be rebuilt the period of democratic rule in the land potiguares birthing shares of OAB / RN, particularly in the following events: Amnesty Policy 1979, the mobilizations around the campaign of "Direct Now" and the 1988 Constitution We make use of legislation. minutes, papers and interviews built on Oral History.

U.S. Army meteorologist Private Merle Coleman at White Sands Missile Range in Las Cruces, New Mexico

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

First women's class at West Point

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.