895 resultados para Évolution de la coopération
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Este estudo tem por objetivo compreender como as mães da criança com Fibrose Cística (FC) vivenciam o luto pela perda da saúde do seu filho, considerando que esta ocorrência representa uma ameaça de morte continua à vida da criança, quando da ausência da adesão do tratamento. A Fibrose Cística é uma doença crônica, genética, sem cura e potencialmente letal, com prognóstico reservado, que demanda tratamento de alto impacto e intenso cuidado. A estratégia metodológica fundamentou-se na abordagem clínico qualitativa, com ênfase na análise de conteúdo. Participaram deste estudo onze mães com filho diagnosticado com FC e que se encontrava em acompanhamento ambulatorial no Programa de Assistência de FC, do Hospital Universitário João de Barros Barreto. A coleta de dados foi realizada a partir de um encontro com a mãe para uma entrevista semiestruturada e a realização de dois desenhos com objetivo de compreender o luto destas mães em relação à doença FC de seu filho, suas perdas e significados em relação ao adoecimento da criança. Os resultados mostram que as mães vivenciam o luto pela perda da saúde da criança, desvelando os significados atribuídos a morte e o morrer, confirmado pela hipótese de que a mãe da criança com FC sabe sobre a doença, tem consciência da ameaça de morte e compreende que o tratamento pode proporcionar ao seu filho melhor qualidade de vida. Para elas a proximidade da existência de uma morte iminente traz uma reorganização e mudanças internas e externas, pessoais e familiares que favorecem a ressignificação suas vidas a partir do enfrentamento da doença.
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No decorrer das últimas décadas, o estudo das Relações Internacionais diversificou sua análise, deixando de ter um enfoque direcionado sobre a atuação dos Estados nacionais e passando a analisar mais atentamente a dinâmica e ascensão de novos atores no cenário internacional, como as entidades subnacionais, incluindo as cidades e os governos locais, gerando um novo foco de análise, principalmente no contexto da cooperação internacional. A presente dissertação analisa por quais razões e de que maneira ocorre a inserção e atuação internacional das cidades amazônicas de Belém e Manaus, tendo como cenário um Mundo globalizado e interdependente. No conjunto desse novo cenário, favorável às relações internacionais, a Cooperação Internacional passa a ser um instrumento latente para o desenvolvimento não somente dos países, mas também das cidades, através da Cooperação Descentralizada; fenômeno político-econômico relativamente recente e que vem adentrando cada vez mais as agendas de desenvolvimento local. As cidades cada vez mais passam a adotar as relações internacionais, tal como estratégias de cooperação descentralizada como uma agenda propulsora e paralela de desenvolvimento, seja na captação de recursos externos,seja no fortalecimento da identidade local, na promoção do comércio exterior ou, até mesmo na disseminação cultural. Belém e Manaus, lócus desta pesquisa, apresentaram ao longo dos anos diversas motivações e formas de efetivarem suas relações internacionais e, para tal análise, adotou-se uma análise fundamentalmente qualitativa, traçando um quadro analíticodescritivo entre as cidades investigadas. O presente trabalho analisa as ações, estratégias, mecanismos e forma institucionalizada ou não de gerir as atividades internacionais das referidas cidades. O cenário global atual é incentivador das interações multiníveis entre velhos e novos atores internacionais, todavia o habitus das relações -internacionais incita cada vez mais a continuidade e o compromisso que os Governos (sejam eles nacionais ou locais) devem ter para corresponder e acompanhar as dinâmicas impostas pela globalização,embora, nem todos os Governos acompanham, possuem ou dedicam estruturas adequadas aos anseios que o novo e interdependente cenário internacional exige.
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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
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Les théories du post-industrialisation utilisent comme une preuve empirique du changement du processus historique l’entrée dans une nouvelle structure sociale que, par ailleurs, se distingue par le déplacement des biens et des services et par la formation de nouvelles structures professionnelles et de la gestion. Dans ce contexte, en premier lieu, c’est très intéressant à comprendre comme les nouvelles formes de l’organisation économique et sociale ont reussies à influer sur les systèmes de la fiscalité directe de l’État italien et de l’État français à la formation et au perfectionnement de la notion de revenu du travail indépendant et aussi à la formation et au perfectionnement des modèles de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant. Par conséquent, la recherche, dans le principe, se concentre sur le processus de la construction et de l’évolution de la notion de revenu du travail indépendant et aussi de la construction et de l’évolution des formes nationales de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant; un processus dévelopé au cours de l’Époque Moderne et de l’Époque Contemporaine que, du point de vue historique-fiscale, s’encadre comme l’époque des grands changements en ce qui concerne aussi à la fiscalité directe des revenus de la richesse mobilière. En second lieu, c’est très important à préciser si existe la possibilité de reconstruire les notions actuelles des revenus du travail indépendant en vue de l’aproximation des modalitès de la taxation directe de cette catégorie de revenus de la richesse mobilière avec les modalitès de la taxation directe des revenus de l’entreprise adoptées dans les systèmes italien et français de la fiscalitè directe; par conséquent, la recherche s’oriente vers la déscrition et l’analyse des questions en ce qui concerne à la définition fiscale objective et subjective des revenus du travail indépendant, à la direction vers laquelle on doit s’adresser actuellement les modèles nationaux de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant et les raisons que la justifient. En autre, la recherche s’étendre vers une analyse comparative laquelle évidence les éléments de la convergence et de la divergence nécessaires pour tirer avec exactitude des conclusions sur l’approximation au niveau national et européen des notions des revenus du travail indépendant et des principes et modalités de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant à fin de garantir les libertés de l’établissement et de la prestation des services et les principes de non-dicrimination et de la non-différenciation fiscale des travailleurs indépendants transfrontières dans le marché intérieur. En troisième lieu, c’est très intéressant à préciser avec cette recherche si dans le cadre conventionnel et européen existe une notion de revenu du travail indépendant ou non et si existe un modèle européen unifié ou, au contraire, il s’agit d’une approximation des modèles nationales de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant. Par conséquent, un’autre argument de la recherce est l’analyse de la normative conventionnelle et de la législation européenne et aussi de la jurisprudence de la Cour de la Justice de l’Union Européenne relatives à la construction d’une notion conventionnelle et aussi européenne du travail indépendant au matiere de la fiscalité directe et l’incidence de principes conventionnels et aussi de libertés européenne de l’établissement et de la prestation des services à la taxation directe des revenus des travailleurs indépendants par rapport aux principes de non-discrimination et de la non-différenciation fiscale; une analyse laquelle évidence l’absence d’un modèle conventionnel et d’un modèle européen harmonisé relativement à la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant à raison de la prévalence du principe de la souveranité fiscale au domaine de la fiscalitè directe et pour cette raison en peut parler seulement d’une approximation des modèles nationales de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant à fin de garantir les libertés européenne de l’établissement et de la prestation des services des travailleurs indépendants et les principes conventionnels de non-discrimination et de la non-différenciation fiscale. À la fin, c’est très intéressant à préciser si existe une corrélation entre les Traités fiscales et le Droit fiscal européen en ce qui concerne à la notion de revenus du travail indépendant et les principes fiscales. Par conséquent, la recherche se compléte avec l’analyse du régime fiscale des revenus du travail indépendant évidencé dans le Modèle de la Convention de l’OCDE et dans la Convention Italie-France concernant à l’élimination de la double imposition; une analyse laquelle, en analogie avec le droit fiscal européen, précise l’approximation des revenus du travail indépendant avec les revenus de l’entreprise en se référant le Modèle de la Convention de l’OCDE et l’absence d’un modèle conventionel de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant, mais, à différence du droit fiscal européen, évidence la présence des certains critéres adoptés par la normative conventionnelle à fin de garantir l’arrêt de la double imposition et le principe de la non-discrimination que, en substance, sont points de convérgence avec le droit fiscal européen. En autre, l’analyse de la normative conventionnelle de l’OCDE, à différence de la normative conventionnelle relative à la Convention de l’élimination de la double imposition finalisée par l’Italie et la France, évidence une évolution de la fiscalitè directe en ce qui concerne aux travailleurs indépendants laquelle se vérifie à l’adoption des critéres de la fiscalitè directe des revenus des sociétés et de la quelle en se dérive l’approximation de la notion des revenus du travail indépendant avec la notion des revenus de l’entreprise, en substance, revenus provenant par les activités économiques. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, c’est clair la convérgence parmis les législations nationales de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant et la normative conventionnelle du Modèle de la Convention de l’OCDE et la normative europénne; une convérgence que confirme la nouvelle diréction vers la quelle s’adressent les notions et les modèles de la taxation directe des revenus du travail indépendant dans les systèmes nationals de la taxation directe: l’approximation avec les modèles nationales de la taxation directe des revenus des sociétés en vue de l’approximation des notions des revenus dérives par les activités économiques.
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Der Beitrag schildert an Beispielen aus der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH), wie sich ausgehend von der Regel, dass jeder Mitgliedstaat das Gemeinschaftsrecht nach eigenem nationalstaatlichen Verwaltungsrecht vollzieht (sog. Vollzugskompetenz der Mitgliedstaaten) in den letzten Jahren gleichwohl Ansätze eines gemeinsamen Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts entwickelt haben. Hierbei werden zunächst die Wirkungsweisen des Effektivitätsgebotes und des Diskriminierungsverbotes erläutert, die als Grund legende Prinzipen dem nationalen Verwaltungsvollzug zugrunde liegen müssen. Daneben erläutert der Beitrag als weitere systematische Grundstrukturen, die für eine gleichmäßige Anwendung des Verwaltungsrechts in allen Mitgliedstaaten kennzeichnend sind, exemplarisch den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, den Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes und den Grundsatz der Rechtssicherheit. Im Fazit konstatiert der Verfasser eine durch den EuGH forcierte Rechtsfortbildung, die sich deutlich in Richtung auf ein sich ständig verdichtendes Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht weiterentwickelt.
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Le conseiller fédéral Didier Burkhalter a pris la direction du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (DFAE). – Le parlement a octroyé un crédit de 11.35 milliards de francs pour la coopération internationale 2013-2016. – Le Conseil fédéral a activé la clause de sauvegarde envers les Etats de l’UE-8. – Les questions institutionnelles ont continué à bloquer les relations bilatérales avec l’UE. – L’Allemagne et les Etats-Unis ont maintenu la pression sur la place financière suisse lors des négociations d’accords de double-imposition. – Le peuple a refusé l’initiative de l’ASIN « La parole au peuple ! ». – La Suisse a pris position sur le conflit syrien en instaurant des sanctions contre le régime. – La Suisse a fêté ses 10 ans d’adhésion à l’ONU et a reçu son secrétaire général Ban Ki-Moon. – La Suisse a accueilli à Berne le Prix Nobel de la Paix Aung San Suu Kyi et a ouvert une ambassade au Myanmar.
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Die internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist im Umbruch. Die drohenden Auswirkungen des globalen Wandels halten uns vor Augen, wie klein und verletzlich unsere Erde ist. Es wird höchste Zeit, dass die Weltgemeinschaft die Kräfte für ein koordiniertes Vorgehen zu Gunsten einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung auf allen Ebenen bündelt. Dieser Beitrag zeigt einige wesentliche Elemente der Herausforderung und entwirft eine Positionierung aus Sicht einer internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, welche der Armutsbekämpfung und der nachhaltigen Entwicklung verpflichtet ist.
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How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
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How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
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How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
