Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.

Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a much better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a better store of value relative to indexed bonds. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. From a policy perspective, a key finding is that accounting for optimal indexation has important welfare implications for comparisons of IT and PT.

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine he optimal combination of a universal benefit, B, and categorical benefit, C, for an economy in which individuals differ in both their ability to work - modelled as an exogenous zero quantity constraint on labour supply - and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity at work. C is targeted at those unable to work, and is conditioned in two dimensions: ex-ante an individual must be unable to work and be awarded the benefit, whilst ex-post a recipient must not subsequently work. However, the ex-ante conditionality may be imperfectly enforced due to Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) classification errors, whilst, in addition, the ex-post conditionality may be imperfectly enforced. If there are no classification errors - and thus no enforcement issues - it is always optimal to set C>0, whilst B=0 only if the benefit budget is sufficiently small. However, when classification errors occur, B=0 only if there are no Type I errors and the benefit budget is sufficiently small, while the conditions under which C>0 depend on the enforcement of the ex-post conditionality. We consider two discrete alternatives. Under No Enforcement C>0 only if the test administering C has some discriminatory power. In addition, social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make each type error. However, under Full Enforcement C>0 for all levels of discriminatory power. Furthermore, whilst social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make Type I errors, there are certain conditions under which it is increasing in the propensity to make Type II errors. This implies that there may be conditions under which it would be welfare enhancing to lower the chosen eligibility threshold - support the suggestion by Goodin (1985) to "err on the side of kindness".

Integer Programming on Domains Containing Inseparable Ordered Paris

Using the integer programming approach introduced by Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2003), we extend the analysis of the preference domains containing an inseparable ordered pair, initiated by Kalai and Ritz (1978). We show that these domains admit not only Arrovian social welfare functions \without ties," but also Arrovian social welfare functions \with ties," since they satisfy the strictly decomposability condition introduced by Busetto, Codognato, and Tonin (2012). Moreover, we go further in the comparison between Kalai and Ritz (1978)'s inseparability and Arrow (1963)'s single-peak restrictions, showing that the former condition is more \respectable," in the sense of Muller and Satterthwaite (1985).

The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant "constrained discretion" to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds must be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, our numerical experiment suggests that no-discretion is a transient phenomenon, and that some discretion is granted eventually.

Informatització de l'arxiu d'històries clíniques d'un hospital

El sector sanitari és un dels més importants i sensibles dintre de l’economia espanyola, ja que és un element clau del benestar social. Per aquest motiu, el sector de la sanitat s’enfronta a nombrosos reptes, i les Tecnologies de la Informació i les Comunicacions (TIC) obren un ampli ventall de possibilitats de renovació i millora. És per això que Hewlett-Packard està desenvolupant una aplicació informàtica per a hospitals, anomenada HCIS (Health Care Information System). El projecte que es presenta en aquesta memòria és el desenvolupament del mòdul d’HCIS per a gestionar l’Arxiu d’Històries Clíniques d’un hospital, i la seva implantació a la Corporació Sanitària Parc Taulí de Sabadell.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Designing the Optimal Conservativeness of the Central Bank

In this paper we propose a new measure of the degree of conservativeness of an inde- pendent central bank and we derive the optimal value from the social welfare perspective. We show that the mere appointment of an independent central bank is not enough to achieve lower inflation, which may explain the mixed results found between central bank independence and inflation in the empirical literature. Further, the optimal central bank should not be too conservative. For instance, we will show that in some circumstances it will be optimal that the central bank is less conservative than society in the Rogoff sense. JEL classification: E58, E63. Keywords: Central bank; Conservativeness; Independence.

Health Bill 2008

Health Bill 2008 AN ACT TO AMEND THE HEALTH ACT 1970, THE HEALTH CONTRIBUTIONS ACT 1979, THE SOCIAL WELFARE CONSOLIDATION ACT 2005 AND THE CIVIL REGISTRATION ACT 2004, TO MAKE PROVISION IN RELATION TO ELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICES UNDER 10 THE HEALTH ACT 1970 AND FOR LIABILITY FOR HEALTH CONTRIBUTIONS AND TO PROVIDE FOR MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH. Click here to download PDF 55kb

Growing up in Ireland. Key findings: infant cohort (at 3 years).

 The latest results from the study paint a picture of how these families are faring across a range of areas in their lives including their health, family life and financial and economic circumstances. In general the findings show that three-year-olds in Ireland are in good health with a few notable public health and related issues (including overweight and obesity), there is overall stability in family structures over the short term and that the recession has had a substantial effect on families with young children over the last number of years. These are the first longitudinal findings from the study. The first wave of fieldwork with the families of the Infant Cohort included approximately 11,100 nine-month-olds, their parents and carers. Interviews began in September 2008 and were completed in March 2009. Interviews for the second round of interviews with this cohort took place between January and August 2011. A total of 90% of the original sample of nine-month-olds were successfully re-interviewed. (A full download of the results released today, presented in three briefing documents can be found by clicking here. Key findings include: Health â?¢ Most of the children were described as being in good health; 75% were rated as very healthy and a further 23% were rated as healthy, but a few minor problems. Girls were more likely to be reported as very healthy (78%) compared with boys (72%). â?¢ One in four or almost one quarter of three-year-old children were overweight (19%) or obese (6%). â?¢ Childrenâ?Ts weight was related to household social class. 5% of children in families in the professional/managerial group were classified as obese at three years of age compared with 9% of those in the most disadvantaged social class group. However, at least one-fifth of children in every social class were overweight. â?¢ Childrens consumption of energy-dense foods such as crisps, sweets, chips, and non-diet fizzy drinks increased as parental education fell. 63% of children whose mother had a lower secondary education or less ate at least one portion of crisps compared with 36% of those from degree-level backgrounds, although consumption of biscuits/chocolates was over 70% for both groups of children. â?¢ Two-thirds (66%) of three-year-olds had received at least one course of antibiotics in the 12 months preceding the interview. Children with a full medical card (35% of the sample) or a GP-only medical card (5% of the sample) were more likely to have received a course of antibiotics than â?¢ Children with a full medical card received a higher number of antibiotic courses on average (2.6) compared with those without a medical card (2.1). â?¢ Just under 16% of three-year-old children were reported as having at least one longstanding illness, condition or disability. The most commonly reported illness types included Asthma (5.8%), Eczema/Skin allergies (3.9%) and Food/digestive allergies (1.2%) Family Life and Childcare â?¢ While the overall distribution of family structure was stable, there have been transitions from one-parent families to two-parent families and vice-versa over the 27 months between interview â?" approximately 2 to 3 percent in each direction. â?¢ 50% of three year olds were in some form of non-parental childcare for eight or more hours a week. The most common form used was centre-based childcare which almost tripled between nine months and three years, from 11% to 30%. â?¢ A similar percentage of grandparents were caring for children at both nine months and three years, 12% and 11% respectively. A total of 10% of three-year-olds were being minded by a childminder, an increase of 3 percentage points from when the children were nine months of age. â?¢ Children who were in some form of non-parental childcare were spending an average of 23 hours a week in their main type of childcare. â?¢ At time of interview the vast majority of mothers reported that they had regular contact with the Study Childâ?Ts grandparents (91%). In offering support to parents, grandparents were most likely to babysit (50%), and buy clothes (40%) at least on a monthly basis. One-parent families were more likely than two-parent families to receive financial support from grandparents with just under one-third (66%) of one-parent families receiving financial support from grandparents at least once every three months. â?¢ The most frequently used discipline technique was â?~discussing or explaining why the behaviour was wrongâ?T, with 63% of mothers saying they always did this. â?¢ 12% of mothers said they used â?~smackingâ?T as a form of discipline now and again and less than 1% used â?~smackingâ?T as a form of discipline more frequently. Over half reported that they never smacked the Study Child. Financial and Economic Circumstances â?¢ Just over half (53%) of mothers of three-year-olds worked outside the home, 38% said they were on home duties and 6% said they were unemployed. â?¢ The biggest change in terms of the work status of three-year-oldsâ?T parents was an increase in the percentage of unemployed fathers â?" 6% when the child was nine months rising to almost 14% when s/he was three years of age. â?¢ 61% of families of three-year-olds reported experiencing difficulties in making â?~ends meetâ?T. This was a substantial increase from 44% in the first round of interviews when the children were nine-months-old. â?¢ Almost two thirds (63%) of all families with three-year-olds reported that the recession had had a very significant or significant effect on them. â?¢ The most frequently recorded effects were: a reduction in wages (63%); canâ?Tt afford luxuries (54%), social welfare reduction (53%) and canâ?Tt afford/cut back on basics (32%). Growing Up in Ireland is a Government funded study tracking the development of two nationally representative cohorts of children: an Infant Cohort which was interviewed initially at nine months and subsequently at three years of age; and a Child Cohort which was interviewed initially at nine years and subsequently at 13 years of age. The study is being conducted by a consortium of researchers led by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and Trinity College Dublin. For Further Information Please Contact: Jillian Heffernan Communications Officer, Growing Up in Ireland Tel: 01 896 3378 Mobile: 087 9016880This resource was contributed to our repository by the National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.

Guía para la promoción de la alimentación equilibrada en niños y niñas menores de tres años

En port.: Consejería para la Igualdad y Bienestar Social

El programa de estancia temporal 2011 atiende a 3.124 menores del Sahara, Rusia y Europa del este acogidos por familias andaluzas

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud

La atención a la inmigración en el ámbito local, un esfuerzo conjunto de profesionales de la salud, ONG'S, asociaciones y ayuntamientos

Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Salud Pública y Participación Social de la Consejería de Salud