On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach to collective households

Esta dissertação apresenta uma abordagem alternativa para o problema de taxação de famílias. Mais especificamente modelamos a decisão familiar com um modelo de barganha de Nash em que os o governo determina de forma ótima as utilidades de discórdia. Demonstramos um Princípio da Revelação para esse modelo de forma a reduzir a classe de mecanismos possíveis, além disso calculamos os ganhos do mecanismo ótimo em relação a outros mecanismos razoáveis por meio de exemplos. Discutimos algumas implicações associadas ao mecanismo ótimo.

Taxation and the architecture of the international economic system

Includes bibliography

Suggestions regarding the principles which may be adopted by the Caribbean countries in negotiating agreements for the avoidance of double taxation with developed countries

Includes bibliography